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ABSTRACT
I ask whether or not the Lyric can be defined solely in structural terms as a self-referential
linguistic artifact, and if so, in what sense we should construe the poem’s relationship to
the world and to knowledge. Using close readings o f ancient and classical Greek epigrams,
I first turn to Michael Riffaterre’s semiotics o f poetry, in which it is proposed that the
sign/signifier relationships generated in the text o f poems can be exhausted in principle in
an intertextual system o f signs that makes no reference to the world. I then turn to Paul de
Man, who suspects that Riffaterre may be conflating semiotics with interpretation in a
rationalistic attempt to account fully for the nature o f literary language. This critique
serves as a bridge to a brief look at Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain’s contention
that the lyric poem displays both a rational correspondence to a linguistic system and a
pre-rational connection to the body and soul. His comments are compared to those o f
Julia Kristeva, who asserts that the body itself is the matrix o f signification and that this
phenomenon is foregrounded in poetic language. This primal relationship o f experience to
language leads to an examination o f Martin Heidegger’s advice to philosophers to “listen
to the poets.” His contention that language is a gift o f Being that comes to us through the
poet is analyzed in the light o f de Man’s criticism that Heidegger, in his eagerness to attain
transcendence via language, oversteps the boundaries o f legitimate philosophical inquiry.
Then it is taken up in the context o f Paul Ricoeur’s more generous appraisal that poetic

viii

language, understood as a form o f linguistically innovative metaphor, can transcend
semiosis to achieve a revelation o f some new aspect o f the world.

IX

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
When asked to define poetry, Dr. Johnson remarked that “it is much easier to say what it
is not” and further likened the task to explaining the phenomenon o f light: “We all know
what light is, but it is not very easy to tell what it is.” The Lexicographer had demurred, at
least this once, at making definitions. With this cautionary tale in mind, I try nevertheless
in this series o f essays to discover something to “tell” about poetry, especially about the
tradition o f Lyric, that will contribute to an understanding o f what it is and what it is not. I
am particularly interested in exploring whether or not we can define a lyric poem solely in
structural terms as a self-referential linguistic artifact, and if so, in what sense we should
construe the poem’s relationship to the world and to knowledge. I draw many o f my
examples o f lyric poems from one o f the major sources o f Western Lyric, ancient and
classical Greek poetry, especially the epigrams preserved in the Greek Anthology. To
guide these readings, I engage the ideas o f several modem and contemporary literary
critics and philosophers who have described lyric poetry as that subset o f language that
most clearly foregrounds the issues involved in comparing so-called literary language with
so-called ordinary language.
Before beginning this quest for an adequate characterization o f Lyric, however,
some distinctions have to be made in regard to the word lyric and some o f its related
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forms, especially the adjective lyrical and the noun that names the concept o f being lyrical,

lyricism. Lyric as the noun that names a subset o f the genre o f poetry is derived o f course
from the historical sense that some poems can be recognized as being lyrical. That notion,
in turn, can be traced etymologically to the Greek word for the musical instrument, lyre
[XeAu], that was used to accompany singers in ancient and classical Greece. Being
described as lyrical is associated, however, not so much with the instrument itself as with
the music o f song. That which can be characterized as being “song-ful” can be described as
lyrical. The adjective has become synesthetic, that is, it can be used to describe works in
all the fields o f fine art, including poetry. The case o f poetry is especially complicated,
however, because the words to the songs first sung to the accompaniment o f the lyre,
which are now called “the lyrics,” eventually evolved into the genre o f lyric poetry. There
is, therefore, such a close affinity between musical lyricism and poetic lyricism that it is
difficult to discern where one ends and the other begins. Melodies traditionally are
described as lyrical when their movement and tone are extraordinarily expressive o f a
subject’s emotional state. Both an aesthetic judgment (“extraordinarily expressive”) and
judgment o f category (lyric as opposed, for example, to narrative) are involved in the
ascription o f the adjective. Visual artists have appropriated the term as a way to describe
an intangible yet somehow perceptible movement o f tone and color in painting that might
be said either to mimic melos, or, it might be argued, to embody what melos is, not just for
music, but for all the arts. Koshiro Onchi, for example, has described his painting in
general as a “lyrical” art form, and an entire series o f his paintings, which he named
“lyrique,” (1932) was “intended as visual analogies o f his responses to hearing works o f
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[impressionist and modem] composers” (Fiorillo). Onchi wrote in the same year that
“there was an equivalence between the sounds in music and colors and shapes in the
pictorial arts” (qtd. in Fiorillo).1 Other fine art forms—sculpture, dance, even cinema—also
use lyrical to describe a certain musical quality inherent to a work. The term, then, seems
paradoxically to be forever tied to, yet separable from, its musical origin. A song is not
necessarily or only lyrical when accompanied by a lyre; a melody played upon a lyre is not

thereby lyrical, although it may indeed be so. If a poem, however, was first deemed
“lyrical” because its effect on the listener resembled that o f a lyrical melody, it might seem
sufficient to define the lyric poem, or the genre o f Lyric, as that poetry which owes its
development to music, whose essence is music, and whose essential qualities may
therefore be exhausted in the metaphor o f music. Insofar as music is ultimately
inexpressible in words, and insofar as lyricism is defined in musical terms, lyricism, or the
quality o f being lyrical, would remain intact as the ineffable “muse” not only o f music, but
the other fine arts and poetry as well.
In the realm o f music, song may be the happy marriage o f words and melody. The
question remains, however, o f what happens when the words o f a song are divorced from
the melody to be fixed in print and subsequently “performed” by the solitary reader. This is
the process that is recognized to have happened in ancient Greece, where before the
development o f the alphabet and reading, song and performance were inextricably linked.
Often the words do not fare well on their own; they resolve into sentimentality and
melodrama, as a quick look at the texts (lyrics) o f hundreds o f popular songs would attest.
On the other hand, sometimes they succeed in remaining intellectually viable and even, we
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would say, “lyrical.” At any rate, I suggest in this series o f essays that poetry occupies a
special category o f art form in terms of its relationship to music because its medium o f
expression is the word. Words bear a logos that transcends emotion because they
necessarily engage the cognitive world o f discourse with the intent o f referring to the
world.
To support this hypothesis, I follow a course o f investigation that enters the
mysterious relationship o f music and words in the context o f several theoretical
approaches to Lyric, beginning with the semiotic approach o f Michael Riffaterre. I place
Riffaterre’s semiotic method o f approaching poetry in the historical context o f the
structuralist movement in literary criticism in general, which made certain assumptions
about language (borrowed largely from early modem positivist philosophy) that affected
structuralists’ views on the cognitive status o f literary language. The poem is, for
Riffaterre, a system o f signs that can be understood in the structural context o f the
relationship o f signifier to signified, that is, by explicating or pointing out the semiotic
relationships o f the poem as a whole to other texts. In the case o f poetry, these
relationships are at first obscured by language that purports to mirror the real world, the
world o f empirical objects as described in the language o f science. The more sophisticated
readers become, however, the quicker they recognize that this mimicry is an illusion, and
they then move on to a second, truly semiotic reading.21 give a generous reading to
Riffaterre to investigate in what way or ways his semiotic analysis o f poetic texts
contributes to the understanding o f how Lyric achieves its effects, that is, how a reader
successfully negotiates a reading so as finally to understand the poem in a manner that can
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be expressed in so-called non-figural language. Using examples both o f Riffaterre’s
choosing (usually modem French poems) and very early examples o f Greek lyric (in the
form o f the epigram), I try to determine what his method yields, and it does yield a
considerable harvest. As Paul de Man observes, discerning in what way a poem is itself a
signifier in a larger system o f literary signs can give readers a remarkable insight into a
given poem’s textual genealogy. In addition, in response to de Man’s friendly critique,
Riffaterre is coaxed into speculating that there is indeed an extra-textual factor at work in
the genesis (and therefore o f the genealogy) o f a poem that is an essential characteristic o f
poetry (if not a definition) namely, prosopopeia—the performance o f an address or
dialogue, first between poet and world and then between reader and text. At the same
time, I take seriously de Man’s warning that Riffaterre’s method, useful as it is as a
pedagogical tool, may blind the reader to this surplus. It is not exhausted in the rigor o f
structuralist analysis; it is accessible only by way o f a hermeneutic—the understanding o f a
text beyond its function in a system. This is the thrust o f his critique o f Riffaterre, and I
explore it further in the following chapters.
Chapter Two takes up two approaches to the question o f whether the origin or
genesis o f literary texts can be recovered from previous texts (at least sufficiently to make
them explicable) or whether we must posit an important and material aspect o f textuality
that escapes a system o f linguistic signs because its source lies elsewhere. First, I look at
Julia Kristeva’s argument, as set forth in her Revolution in Poetic Language, that the
genesis o f text lies in a matrix o f bodily, therefore material, impulses that are only later
captured in the diachronic architecture o f linguistic systems. I try to explicate further her
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complex and polysemous approach by comparing it to the aesthetic philosophy o f Jacques
Maritain, whose assimilation o f Freudian psychology into a Thomistic approach to art
strikes me as substantially prefiguring and supporting Kristeva’s insights. Maritain’s
discussion o f literary texts, like Kristeva’s, makes central the issue o f the poem’s relation
to the world. He suggests that the genesis o f literary texts begins with an individual’s
burgeoning knowledge o f the world before it is textually constructed by mind. Although
that knowledge o f the world must be conveyed through the structure o f a linguistic and
semiotic system, it remains connected to the world by its intention to refer. This
conclusion is at odds, o f course, with a positivist approach to literary language that assigns
to literary language a purely affective role, chiefly illustrated by its use o f rhetorical
figures. As a cognitive activity it plays a broader role in contributing to human experience,
according to Kristeva and Maritain, than merely providing emotional color.
In order to explore further this broadening o f the base o f literary texts (especially
as foregrounded in the Lyric), I move in Chapter Three to a discussion o f Martin
Heidegger’s appropriation o f Friedrich Holderlin’s lyric poems to explicate his own project
o f the recovery o f philosophical wonder about existence, the origins o f which he finds in
the writing o f the pre-Socratics. In his word studies o f Anaximander, Parmenides, and
Heraclitus he claims to recover a sense in which language can open out upon a space,
however fleetingly, that provides a glimpse into Being. This language is before discourse,
therefore inaccessible to the philosopher, but available to the poet. From Heidegger’s
perspective, Holderlin, as well as some o f the ancient Greek poets that he occasionally
references (especially Pindar) grasped this dilemma. His philosophical lyrics are a
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testament, according to Heidegger, to Holderlin’s tragic recognition that he, as a poet,
could speak about his journey into the realm o f Being and therefore enable others to
recognize Being, but that it was unlikely that he as poet would be heard. For Heidegger, it
was the very delicate task o f the philosopher to listen to the poets’ words and ponder them
“out loud” for others, all the time running the danger, just like the poet, o f having these
thoughts devolve into mere discourse—a system o f signs. In keeping with this “listening,” I
try to explicate at some length Pindar’s Olympian Ode IX, in which Pindar articulates what
Heidegger calls the poet’s “measuring” o f Being, the broad overarching relationships
between earth and sky, humans and gods.
Finally, in Chapter Four, I examine the approach to language taken by Paul
Ricoeur, especially in his Rule o f Metaphor, in which he suggests that metaphor,
traditionally taken as the chief analog or metonym o f literary expression, is that aspect o f
language, most noticeable in literary language and specifically in poetry, that makes
available to cognition formerly hidden aspects o f the world, thereby contributing to our
knowledge o f it. If literature might be said to non-referential in its fictionality, it does refer
nevertheless, according to Ricoeur, at another level to (borrowing Heidegger’s term) a
possibility o f Being that cannot be captured in a system o f linguistic signs. Language
therefore at some point transcends its own system.
Taken together, these essays suggest that structuralists in the field o f literary
theory acceded early on and too readily to modem philosophical positivism. This approach
did open up a new realm o f study in which long and often fruitless discussions about an
author’s intent or a particular reader’s interpretation could be set aside in favor o f what
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seemed like a more scientific and pragmatic discussion o f discovering universal ways in
which literary language is structured to achieve rhetorical effects within the genres. It did
not, however, abrogate the conclusions o f philosophical positivism; it merely sidestepped
them. Structuralism’s concession to positivism meant that hermeneutics in literature came
to be seen as divorced from serious discourse as had theology and metaphysics to the
positivists; the rhetoric o f figural language could never yield a stable interpretation.
Literary structuralists, and those who followed them in semiotics, had no real quarrel,
therefore, with postmodernists who lamented, or alternatively, rejoiced over the death o f
meaning, except to note with some trepidation that the universal claims o f structuralism
might soon come under attack, as they did. Eventually, structuralism was caught in a
dilemma. On the one hand, the structuralist wants to assert that the structures o f language
and, for semiotics, the systems o f signs, that allow readers to recognize language as
literary artifacts are universal in such a way that we can understand what a given work
“says” or signs. We therefore can interpret, that is to say, translate or decode a work, on
the basis o f these universal characteristics into a language that is not literary but truly
meaningfiil and capable o f a hermeneutic because it is cognitive; it engages the real world.
Philosophers o f language, in the meantime, were having their own discussions about what
language is and how it refers to the world. So-called postmodern literary critics, such as
Paul de Man and Jacques Derrida, were inclined to characterize all language, even the
metalanguage o f theory and philosophy, as intrinsically rhetorical, leaving them skeptical
about the role o f logic and truth in any analysis, and collapsing literary theory
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(including structuralism and semiotics) and literary language into one genre or language
game. This move left theorists little to say about literature; they could only join in its
production.
The monumental efforts o f the structuralists, therefore, led to a curious effect. By
looking at the structure o f a literary work, we could discover not only how it worked, but
an understanding o f its central content as well, however much that understanding would
be limited, in one person’s understanding, by the impossibility o f perceiving the infinity o f
signifier/signified relationships within a linguistic system. But this structuralist
“understanding” has a necessary if obscure relationship to hermeneutics, and the question
remains as to whether or not there is something in the literary work that escapes the
strictures o f system and refers to the world, or even a new world. Next to Riffaterre, then,
I juxtapose theorists such as De Man, Heidegger, Maritain, Kristeva, and Ricoeur, who
labor to explain that literary language, as foregrounded most noticeably in the lyric poem,
grows out o f a “matrix” o f material human experience that precedes language acquisition,
yet is expressible within and even despite a system o f signs that is exhausted in the logic o f
its structure. This expression, the offspring o f the union o f nonlanguage and language, is
anchored in experience o f the world and is open as well to new experiences o f the world,
and ready to be translated, as it were, into the discourse by which we understand the
world. It therefore rises beyond mere affect, or feelings o f experience, to the level o f
knowledge. According to Heidegger, this expression in words is unique to poetry, but he
ventures to align it with philosophy, which also attempts an understanding o f the world.
For Ricoeur, the expression, although foregrounded in literary language in general, is a
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characteristic o f the potency o f all uses o f language to re-describe the world and thereby
add to our knowledge o f it.
In the context o f Ricoeur’s argument, I suggest that there are two orders of
reference exhibited in literary language in general. The first takes place within the system
o f signifiers and signified that refer to a linguistic sign discoverable in the fabric o f existing
texts. Once this cipher is solved, that is, once the sign is found, the work can be said to be
explicated, and this explanation yields a type o f understanding. While it is true, then, that
in literary language, the visible, surface features o f a literary work guide the reader to
cancel a prima facie reference to the world, this same nullification o f original reference
generates a second-order reference to the world that extends beyond the linguistic system
in which it gained expression. This second reference occurs when the reader recognizes
(perhaps not without the help o f the text’s affective features) that something new has been
proposed for consideration as knowledge.
This model o f reading, derived from Ricoeur’s bifurcated analysis o f language,
brings us foil circle to Riffaterre’s suggestion that the essence o f lyric poetry might be best
expressed as prosopopeia. He concedes to de Man that in poetry at least there is always a
material reference to an author, who by virtue o f inscribing the poem, has set in motion an
hypothesis that is expressed as a dialogue between the writer and the world, a kind o f
masque that, for the reader, must first be read as an obvious fiction that dispenses with
both the author and the world. The last section o f Chapter Four, in fact, reviews a variety
o f prosopopeiaic structures at work in ancient and classical Greek epigrams,
demonstrating that a variety o f forms o f dialogues exist. A new dialogue begins when the
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poem, almost in spite o f the linguistic system from which it takes its form, speaks to the
reader in what Heidegger would call the language o f Being, proposing a new way o f
experiencing the world that allows for an engagement o f being with Being, and which in
turn yields a new understanding o f the world.
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CHAPTER II
INSCRIPTION ABOVE AND BELOW:
THE GREEK EPIGRAM AND MICHAEL RIFFATERRE’S HYPOGRAM

<271 5r| x ^Xv 5 ia p.01 Xeye
tpuvaeoaa be yiveo. — Eaiupw
Come, divine lyre, speak to me andfind yourself a voice. — Sappho
The Development o f Greek Lyric
In his Greek Lyric Poetry, Willis Bamstone characterizes the Lyric as “simply . . .
a short poem that sings” (16).3 C. M. Bowra also proposes melody as Lyric’s defining
metaphor: “In the main it [Lyric] refers . . . to poetry which, if not actually sung, has in
itself an element o f song” (1). O f course, the singing o f songs was ubiquitous in ancient
Greek society, and as Eric Havelock observes, ‘“Poets’ were not read in their own day but
listened to . . . .” (17). Even as late as the fifth century BCE., including the period o f
Plato’s famous symposia, oral performance was traditional at private dinners and the like.
Although some poems were transcribed to share with other small audiences, “[t]he act o f
composition is itself oral. The language is ‘melic,’ to use the correct ancient term. It is
framed to be sung” (Havelock 18).
The analogy o f Lyric as music, however, invites a perception o f oral texts as
subordinate to the melodies that “carried” them. This certainly would be a mistake, at least
in the case o f epic poetry, for example, where all o f the elements o f the ancient craft o f
12

mousike—word, song, and dance— conspired to foreground a mythos, a narrative
depository o f cultural values that existed apart from any single performer. The epic
inculcates a tradition “displayed at a second ‘diachronic level’ o f the memory; the song
[text] is a ‘feedback’” (Havelock 157).4 Melody with dance accompaniment was intended
primarily to aid in rendering mythos literally and figuratively memorable by exciting or
energizing the soul. Werner Jaeger, for example, claims that the Greeks “considered that
the only genuine forces which could form the soul were words and sounds [in tandem
with] rhythm and harmony” (xxvii). Yet the oral text acted as a “first among equals”
because o f its logos, that is, its capacity to articulate tradition in terms o f formal concepts.
Melody and dance served as necessary supplements to verbal mnemonic devices: “Its
[melody’s] function so far as it was employed [was] to assist . . . in imprinting that syntax
[of what was to be learned] on the memory by maximising the pleasure in reciting it”
(Havelock 136).
Havelock speculates that what enabled melody to emerge and develop into
independent form was the invention o f alphabetic writing—a technology that allowed
speakers to dispense with other mnemonic devices, including dance and melody (136).5
Melody was free to exist in its own right as a form o f expression, no longer under the
constraint o f concepts. Havelock describes the written form o f the epic, for example, as
mythos embedded in the very words and syllables o f the text via “[p]honetic redundancy
o f diction, producing alliteration, anaphora, chiasmus, and the like . . . ” ( Havelock 157).
Musical accompaniment assists in this recreative process, but it is the text that must serve
as the “phenominalisation” (Havelock 157).6 Here, however, Havelock has confused the

13

technology o f the alphabetization, which makes possible the transmission o f the text
without accompaniment, with the audible effects as well as the rhythm o f syntax, which
creates its own inner music. Although it is true that rhetorical features become visible in
writing, they are bound to the sound and order (rhythm) o f the words o f the text and not
the alphabet. The question remains therefore concerning the relationship between
syntactical structures and their audible effects and the lyrical nature o f the text. In
subsequent chapters, therefore, we will examine in the syntactical “music” that poetry
generates. Since we know, however, that reading can be done in the absence o f musical
accompaniment, it is safe to say that the invention o f an alphabet that could visibly
represent both consonants and specific vowel sounds provided the context for a formal
separation o f melody produced by an instrument as accompaniment to the written text.
According to Havelock, ancient Greek Lyric, like epic and drama, was “an
invention . . . designed for the functional purpose o f a continuing record in oral
cultures”—a complex o f skills that together constitute a “mnemonic necessity” (186-7).
Jaeger also contends that even though in early lyric poems this “record” appears to be
expressed in terms more personal than in epic narrative, the context o f live performance
made the dialogue o f the poem a public event: “It is true o f Greek art as well as o f Greek
literature that until late in the fourth century it is principally the expression o f the spirit o f
the community” (xxvii). Archilochus’ sardonic observations about military life, for
example, are often cited as an initial turn toward subjectivity, but according to Jaeger,
such an interpretation would be anachronistic: “Nowadays we must find it difficult to
imagine how entirely public was the conscience o f a Greek. (In fact, the early Greeks
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never conceived anything like the personal conscience o f modem times.)” (9). Thus
Archilochus’ famous lyric about hastily abandoning his shield in the midst o f battle in
order to save himself is not so much an expression o f personal history as it is a reflection
o f a contemporaneous shift in cultural values.7 Havelock also observes, “Its [Lyric’s] style
and substance is ‘other-oriented,’ not in any abstract sense, but in the sense that the other
is an audience,. . . often symbolized in the vocative as single person, but always felt as a
listener who is a partner in the poetry” (20). It was not until private reading became
widespread (after Plato) that poetry could become a thoroughly textual discourse
(Havelock 9-10; 147-148). Once musical accompaniment was abandoned, however, it was
as if words, despite their conceptual power, had lost a certain invocatory power, and so
began a long and distinguished history o f attempts to discover or recover the inherent
melody that could still be “heard” in speech, until in the end one could argue that some
poets, such as Mallarme, achieved an inversion (never intended by the Greeks) that, in
semiotic terms, made words serve as signifiers o f a musical signified.
We can, in any case, imagine several evolutionary stages o f poetic performance
and writing during the periods o f ancient and classical Greece. From approximately 700 to
500 BCE there would have been performances o f lyric poems parallel to, but less public
than, an epic performance, where melody and dance remained integral to a verbal text.
During an intermediate period (approximately 500-400) writing became increasingly
widespread, so that poems, although still perceived as a composite o f melody and word,
also were starting to be “heard” as words alone.8 Finally, the craft o f writing took over
the mnemonic function o f melody, which was then abandoned in favor o f private reading
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and composing. It might appear, then, that the Lyric at this stage was consigned wholly to
the world o f texts. Lyric would be defined subsequently not in terms o f music, such as in
Bamstone’s phrase “a short poem that sings,” but in terms o f a linguistic system, that is, a
short poem that signs. It is not self-evident, however, that the essence o f Lyric can be
wholly subsumed under the category o f a linguistic artifact, and in subsequent chapters
this definition will be challenged or at least modified. Our first step nevertheless is to
explore the ways in which Lyric might be approached semiotically.
Michael Riffaterre and the Hypogiram
In his Semiotics o f Poetry, Michael Riffaterre attempts a semiosis o f Lyric, taking
it as a system o f signs, the structure or pattern o f which holds the key to its meaning. He
begins with a structuralist presupposition that "the language o f poetry differs from
common linguistic usage,” and he claims that readers grasp this difference "instinctively"
(1-2). Jonathan Culler, for example, outlines this approach in his Structuralist Poetics:
"[Tjhe primacy o f formal patterning enables poetry to assimilate the meanings which
words have in other instances o f discourse and subject them to new organization" (163).
The structuralist project is "to specify what is involved in these conventional expectations
which make poetic language subject to a different teleology or finality from that of
ordinary speech" (164). Culler thus sees poetry as serving an entirely different linguistic
purpose (“teleology or finality”) from that o f ordinary language. In Riffaterre's semiotic
application, learned textual conventions predispose readers to expect that when they
encounter certain structural characteristics in a poem (signifiers), they will perform a shift
in the relationship between these signifiers and their signifieds: "The literary
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phenomenon . . . is a dialectic between text and reader" that is rule-governed

(Semiotics 1). Although ordinary communication depends upon the capacity o f words to
refer, “that is, upon a direct relationship o f words to things," the rules o f the
literature/reader dialectic dictate that when a reader encounters certain signals (“aberrants”
or “ungrammaticalities”) in the text that "threaten the literary representation o f reality, or
mimesis," the competent reader should expect a shift in signification (Semiotics 2). The
syntactical patterns perceived by readers serve to make it clear that a particular unit o f text
is serving, in its signification, a difference purpose from that o f simply referring to the
world. He offers these lines o f a poem by Paul Eluard as an example:
De tout ce que j ’ai dit de moi que reste-t-il
J’ai conserve de faux tresors dans des armoires vides
O f all I have said about myself, what is left? I have been keeping false
treasures in empty wardrobes. (Semiotics 3)
Ungrammaticalities become apparent when, upon first reading, the reader attempts to
make "false treasures" refer to or represent a literal object (mimesis) and then tries to
make a false treasure exist in an "empty" wardrobe. Having recognized these anomalies,
the reader then tries a shift in signifiers. In this example, Riffaterre suggests that the first
line, "of all I have said about myself, what is left?" implies an obvious, if disheartening,
answer: "nothing" (Semiotics 3). Having realized that the second line can not be
interpreted straightforwardly, that is, in terms o f ordinary language, the reader is in a
position to make a shift in signification. The reader reads again, this time noticing that the
second line's figures might be distilled into a "...periphrastic statement o f disillusionment
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(all these things amount to zero)," which means that the line is essentially a figurative
variant o f the key word 'nothing' that is already implied in line one (Fig. 1) {Semiotics 4).

Signifier = "false treasures"

n ew S ig n ifier = n o t h i n g (ordinary lan guage)

S ign ified (em pty set - n o objective referent)

Signifier = "keeping n o th in g in nothing"
*
n ew S ig n ified = n o t h i n g (ordinary language)

S ign ified (em pty set - n o objective referent)

Figure 1. Riffaterre’s analysis o f a shift in signification made by the reader after
recognizing ungrammicalities in the text.
Riffaterre calls the initial reading an "heuristic reading" in which meaning is sought
according to "an assumption that language is referential— and at this stage words do
indeed seem to relate first o f all to things" (Semiotics 5). But when "incompatibilities" or
ungrammaticalities occur, the reader is forced to do a "retroactive" reading—a second
reading—which Riffaterre calls a "truly hermeneutic reading" {Semiotics 5). This second
reading is a "structural decoding" o f the text, which Riffaterre defines as the reader
"working his way back to the structures that generate the text" {Semiotics 6, 168). Any
key or kernel words discovered by this decoding process are "hypograms," which are
related as signifiers, that is, they refer not to things but to a second-order set o f verbal
signifieds that can be described as a matrix or origin o f all o f the variant hypogrammic
kernels and which can be, in turn, converted to an ordinary language sentence.9
It is here that Riffaterre parts company with an emotivist approach to poetry by
presupposing that the ordinary, referential language o f the matrix to which the poem’s

18

text refers is unproblematic. Paul de Man, for example applauds Riffaterre’s refusal to
“valorize the irrational” (“Hypogram” 27). Riffaterre in fact displays a penchant for
choosing texts that foreground a certain “morbidity,” but he remains well within the realm
o f structural poetics, “o f the Slavic as well as o f the French variety” (“Hypogram” 27).10
His semiosis o f Lyric tries to show that while poetry does not mirror nature, it does,
nevertheless, yield a reverse image o f ordinary statements. Yet he does not go on to offer
a philosophical argument about the relationship o f ordinary language to reality. Linguists
o f a positivist bent had freed poets o f any obligation to speak (or to be interpreted) in
propositions that had any truth-value, but, according to structuralist critics who retained
positivist assumptions about language, it did not render poems incomprehensible. They
remain intelligible as exemplars o f the way language works. Words will refer, if not to the
world, then to each other. The poem as “verbal icon,” illustrates an intuition o f
signification, but signification wholly linguistic and wholly semiotic. As a semiotician,
Riffaterre simply advances the theory that Lyric can be understood as the signifying
component o f a self-referring intertext. The poem’s significance, what it “signs,” can be
ascertained by ferreting out the poem’s relationship to other texts, that is, by discovering
how the poem as a unit is a textual signifier that, along with its textual signified (the
hypogram) becomes the sign o f a text that can be expressed in ordinary language (the
matrix). Because the number o f signifier/signified relationships in a text is finite, readers
can achieve a reasonably certain and theoretically exhaustive understanding o f the poem.11
Lyric, then, is defined by Riffaterre as a form o f “scrambled transmission” or, to
put it in traditionally rhetorical terms, periphrastic communication—a play o f words that
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engages the intellect without raising questions o f how language refers to the world

(Semiotics 165). But the dual problems o f reference and meaning, mimesis and
hermeneutics, are not thereby rendered irrelevant but merely displaced. The signifying
poem may be intertextually overdetermined, that is, wholly comprehended within the
boundaries o f inter-related texts, yet the questions remain first, whether or not it can be
reduced to, or translated into, ordinaiy language and second, whether or not ordinary
language succeeds in referring to the world where poetic language fails, or indeed,
whether poetiy steps in where ordinary language already has failed. For example, in
“Hypogram and Inscription,” Paul de Man gently critiques what he regards as Riffaterre’s
otherwise lucid semiosis, suggesting that deciphering a poem by uncovering and specifying
its matrix o f ordinary language “kernels” reveals only another cipher. His point is that the
ordinary language we use for communication and even the philosophical language we use
for criticism already (and necessarily) has been, to use a perjorative term, infected by
figures. Having admired Riffaterre’s clarity o f explication, de Man here suggests that
lucidity, even in ordinaiy language, is unattainable.
De Man claims that the boundaries o f logic and rhetoric always have been blurred,
to the consternation o f those philosophers who search for transparency in language.12 Is it
possible, then, that poems that at first glance may seem to be a playful, ciphered way o f
saying something very ordinary (for example, a cliche), or at the most, something
traditionally regarded as wise (a saying or proverb) could play the more serious role o f
unpacking the meaning o f what has, in ordinary language, become opaque to
understanding? Poetizing would then becomes a function o f t hought— a creation o f fresh
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metaphor that either truly awakens understanding or, from de Man’s point o f view, merely
poses as a new insight. From this perspective the “play” has become a game o f deception.
As he famously puts it in the title to his collection o f essays on the rhetoric o f criticism, the
reader o f literature inevitably exhibits a corresponding “blindness” in achieving any
“insight.”
The Roots o f Western Lyric
Since ancient and classical Greek Lyric is one o f English Lyric’s major roots, it
would seem natural to pursue the answers to these questions about the semiosis o f Lyric in
that context. The dearth o f complete poems from the period, however, remains a major
barrier to comparative studies. As Richard Lattimore laments, the greatest o f these lyrics
have three things in common: they are from the same period, they are short, and they are
mostly destroyed (v). Granted, however, an expansion o f the strictest taxonomy, which
would restrict the genre o f Lyric to monody accompanied by the lyre, to include more
abundant extant forms o f elegy (especially the epigram) we can perhaps gain sufficient
access to the form during the period o f its Greek origins to apply to it Riffaterre’s semiotic
method.
At first glance, it would seem sufficient simply to distinguish between lyric poems
and the dramatic and epic poetry o f ancient and classical Greece. According to J. W.
Mackail, however, the Greeks themselves made additional distinctions that reflect an
evolution o f lyrical forms. Deriving from Homeric meters and diction, the elegaic couplet
emerged first. The iambus, for which Archilochus (680-640 BCE) became famous, then
broke with these formal structures and introduced more “restless” rhythms and meters
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couched in a kind o f street language. Lastly, the melic developed from the iambus into a
form especially associated with music, employing many meters in a combination o f
dactylic and trochaic rhythms. The closest o f the forms to prose, it also found its way into
the language o f the theater. These solo performances o f poetry with lyre accompaniment
(monody) developed in Ionia in the seventh century BCE, and especially flourished 650500 BCE, a period which, according to Mackail, could be compared to Tudor England,
when medieval social structures were superseded by monarchy and a semblance o f later
democracy (.Lectures 84-86). According to Bowra, the poems o f Sappho, Alcaeus, and
Anacreon probably were composed for the edification o f friends in secular settings (5, 13).
In Mackail’s estimation, monody reached its height after the Persian wars in the poems o f
Simonides (Lectures 133).
The seven-stringed lyre used for accompanying monody may have been invented as
early as the Mycenean period, but Archilochus is the first to mention it (Bowra 2-3). There
would have been no harmony in the accompaniment; there was simply a tune, which in
turn set the meter for the poem. Since the tunes are lost, it is difficult to discriminate
among the multitude o f meters to which they were conjoined, but it is likely, according to
Bowra, that a triad o f strophe/antistrope/epode (in which the strophe-antistrophe carried
the same meter, then varied in the epode) was common (10, 11). This marriage o f melody,
meter, and words can still be appreciated even though only the words are left: “[Ejven in
their divorced state the words have an astonishingly melodious movement o f their own,
and this certainly owes much to the demands o f the accompaniment” (Bowra 10). As early
as the second century CE, in his On Literary Composition, Dionysius o f Halicarnassus, for
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example, praises Sappho’s “polished and exuberant style” and observes, “The euphony
and charm o f this passage [referring to an invocation o f Aphrodite] lie in the cohesion and
smoothness o f the joinery. Words are juxtaposed and interwoven according to certain
natural affinities and groupings o f the letters.. . ” (qtd. in Campbell 53).13
According to H. J. Rose, the early elegaic couplet employed two halves o f the
Homeric hexameter, which totaled five feet: —~

-

~

~ ” - ,14It probably

was sung, but the tunes were associated with music o f the flute or oboe that originated in
cultures to the east o f Ionia (80-81). After the Greek alphabet was invented, it evolved
from its oral form into the written form o f epigram, a term first attested in Herodotus and
an exact equivalent o f Latin inscriptio and English inscription (Mackail, Select Epigrams
1). Since Martial, the epigram has most often been understood as a short, witty poem that
makes a whimsical or moral point, but in its first use in ancient Greece, it denoted simply
words engraved in verse upon a stone, tablet, or sepulcher. Its original formal limit o f a
single couplet evolved to include up to four couplets, with occasional longer exceptions to
the rule. In addition, the descriptor elegiac did not correspond to what became known as
the tristis elegeia mode o f the Latin poets; rather, it was used to describe everything from
simple memorials to war chants and political commentary. Mackail observes that over the
course o f its early history, the elegaic epigram evolved into “a vehicle so facile and
flexible that it never seems unsuitable or inadequate” to any occasion or use {Select

Epigrams 6). Its consistent meter was sufficient to distinguish it both from the epic
hexameter and the melic modes, but very often its affinity to what we have come to know
as the Lyric in English is self-evident. Compare, for example, this seduction poem by
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Asclepiades to Andrew Marvel’s “To His Coy Mistress” :

tpe(,8r) itapdevnr]g, m i

tl

eX$oua’ euprjaeig
’Ev ^cootai

to:

irXeov ; ou yap eg 'A iSt^v
tov

(piXeovta, Kopiy

Tepuva Ta Ku-itpidog- ev S’ AxepovTt

oatea Kai (ntoSnj, irapdeve, Keiaop.eda. (9.8)15
Maiden, you prize your maidenhead, but what does it profit you? When
you arrive in Hades, chaste girl, you will find no lover. The Cyprian’s
delights are among the living; having crossed Acheron, O virgin, we shall
lie still—dust and ashes.
In fact, as Mackail notes, fragments o f long lyric poems (as well as other forms o f poetry)
sometimes were included in the Greek Anthology because, in their unfortunately
fragmented form, they could be read as epigrams:
. . . and the epigram in Greek, while it always remained conditioned by
being in its essence and origin an inscriptional poem, took in the later
periods so wide a range o f subject and treatment that it can perhaps only be
limited by certain abstract conventions o f length and metre. Sometimes it
becomes in all but metrical form a lyric;. . . . {Select Epigrams 3)
Discerning the Hypogram o f the Epigram
Riffaterre defined a lyrical poem’s hypogram as the signified o f the linguistic
matrix out o f which the poem arose. This matrix may, in the end, be an artifact o f the
sociolect (for example, a cliche, pun, or proverb) or a philosopheme, both o f which
ultimately can be stated in ordinary language. The poem as a whole signifies that matrix
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and nothing else. This means that poems axe not mimetic, that is, they do not directly refer
to the empirical world in terms o f re-presenting it to the reader {Semiotics 12-13). Rather,
every poem presents to the reader features that make it recognizable as a literary artificact.
Ungrammaticalities, for example, force the reader to do a second, hermeneutical reading,
the object o f which is to find out in what other system these ungrammaticalities become
grammatical. The greater the ungrammaticality, the more constrained the reader is to find
a specific intra-textual or inter-textual referent. There are a finite number o f referents,
even though the more complex the poem, the more referents there may be and the less
likely it is that the reader can discover them in one reading {Semiotics 164-166).
In Asclepiades’ epigram, for example, an initial reading suggests a mise en scene;
however, it becomes evident that the epigram is an artifact (that it does not “re-present”
anything) when we encounter an ungrammaticality, which is the absurdity o f the lover’s
rationale for a consummation—“on 7 a p ecr'AiSriv eXftoua’ ehprjaeig
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tpiXeov-ra, Koprp.” This is a reference to stock cliches about the brevity o f life, as well as
any number o f other epigrams lamenting the shortness o f life and the loneliness o f death,
that function as the matrix or ultimate source o f the poem’s text.16 A second reading
therefore performs a shift that places the lover’s apparent skepticism about the virtue o f
virginity in the context o f a joke addressed not to a female lover but a (probably) male
reader. Duly amused, the reader is likely to read again, however, recognizing that the
writer has structured the epigram in a way that dispenses almost immediately with its
initial cavalier attitude toward the subject o f seduction and reiterates instead in each o f the
subsequent clauses a reference to the more serious hypogram. Finally, it reads as an elegy,
25

which Mackail, in his own arrangement of selections from the Anthology, appropriately
places in the section entitled “Fate and Change” rather than “The Human Comedy,” or
“Love.” 17
In his own work on semiotics, Culler commends Riffaterre for contributing to the
structuralist project a powerful and ingenious semiotic method o f discerning poetic
structures. He defends Riffaterre against a common complaint— that Riffaterre "violates
critical decorum in claiming that reading a poem is a matter o f discovering the word or
sentence from which it is generated o f which its every element is a variant" {Pursuit
91)— by noting that Riffaterre explicitly states in Semiotics o f Poetry that the meaning o f a
poem is not "deducible from a comparison between variants o f the given, and it would be
a reductionist procedure" (12). The poem's significance is, "rather, the reader's praxis o f
the transformation, a realization that it is akin to playing, to acting out the liturgy o f a
ritu al. . ."(12). This defense seems to be based on the notion that reading is a performance
that never yields a stable meaning. Culler argues that structuralism seeks to discover the
conditions o f the possibility o f various interpretations o f the text, but it does not seek to
perform those interpretations or discover new ones; the structuralist enterprise is not
hermeneutical. Semiotics is valuable as an instrument used to "identify effects o f
signification . . . . Then one can attempt to construct models o f signifying processes to
account for these effects" (48). Yet he admits that if a competent reader will be led
ineluctably by the poem's markers to a definite matrix, this “solution to the puzzle”
effectively cancels out other interpretations (98). Despite his initial defense, then, Culler
ends by chastising Riffaterre for falling prey to the temptation to do hermeneutics—to
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offer interpretations superior to and more subtle than any offered thus far. Riffaterre tends
to muddy the semiotic waters: "It is difficult to treat the efforts o f previous readers
simultaneously as the phenomena one wishes to explain and as the errors one is attempting
to surpass" (94).18
In his 1981 paper "Hypogram and Inscription," Paul de Man, too, praises
Riffaterre for discovering a powerful and productive methodology. He calls Riffaterre's
approach "probably the most reliable didactic model for the teaching o f literature . . .
available at the present" (28). De Man also notes, however, that Riffaterre seems to
conflate structuralism and hermeneutics. While Riffaterre accepts without reservation the
traditional assumption that formalism entails description but not "understanding," he is at
the same time "compelled to integrate the hermeneutic activity o f the reader within his
enterprise" (“Hypogram” 30-31). For de Man, then, Riffaterre becomes "a model case for
examining if and how the poetics o f literary form can be made compatible with the
hermeneutics o f reading" (“Hypogram” 31).
In the end, however, de Man's critique o f Riffaterre has less to do with keeping
open the prospect o f producing a multitude o f interpretations than it has to do with the
possibility o f making an interpretation, which in turn resolves into a problem o f language.
De Man points out that Riffaterre, in the last chapter o f Semiotics o f Poetry, does
acknowledge that even after careful decoding, hermeneutics is a "chancy" business and
"interpretation is never final" (Riffaterre 165). But de Man suspects that in the
hermeneutical difficulties lie problems more intractable than those involved in accurately
solving a verbal puzzle. He suggests that reading is vexed by a problem inherent to the
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relationship between rhetoric and grammar, and that this is a problem that emerges in the
very notions o f the hypogram and matrix. It is this hesitation to affirm the strict separation
o f literary and non-literary language that marks a transition between structuralist and post
structuralist theory.
De Man argues that, traditionally, the stability o f the relationship between
quadrivium and trivium depended on the assumption that logic served as the link between
the sciences and grammar, which then served to articulate in language the findings o f
science (“Resistance” 102-3). Rhetoric retained a dignified but subordinate position; it
functioned as an ornament that enhanced the affect, or affective effect, o f language.
Structuralists inherited this presumption o f a strict separation between logic/grammar and
rhetoric and carried on a “reduction o f figure to grammar” (“Semiology” 907-8). De Man
claims, however, that "the grammatical decoding o f a text leaves a residue o f
indetermination that has to be, but cannot be, resolved by grammatical means, however
extensively conceived" (“Resistance” 104). He speculates that critical readings are
destined to oscillate forever between mounting an explanation o f the text in grammaticallogical terms and recognizing that its final content has not, alas, been comprehended fully
because its figures resist translation (“Resistance” 104-105; “Semiology” 906).
Responding, for example, to Riffaterre’s reading o f Victor Hugo’s poem “Ecrit sur
la vitre d'une fenetre flamande," de Man first agrees with Riffaterre that the poem certainly
is not mimetic, that is, it does not purport to describe the actual sound o f a carillon, but
refers to certain figures that had their origin in other literary exempla that can be traced as
soon as a reader recognizes the pertinent ungrammaticalities, such as the dancer who
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enters through a door o f air. But de Man also wondered whether or not “inscribed” within
the hypogram that Riffaterre had discovered {carillon flamande ) there was yet another
metaphor—a figure for the cognition or consciousness o f the passage o f time.
“Ecrit sur la vitre d’une fenetre flamande”
Jaime le carillon de tes cites antiques,
O vieux pays gardien de tes moeurs domestiques,
Noble Flandre, oil le Nord se rechauffe engourdi
Au soleil de Castille et s’accouple au Midi!
5

Le carillon, c’est l’heure inattendue et folle,
Que l’oeil croit voir, vetue en danseuse espagnole,
Apparaiitre soudain par le trou vif et clair
Que ferait en s’ouvrant une porte de fair.
Elle vient, secouant sur les toits lethargiques

10

Son tablier d ’argent plein de notes magiques,
Reveillant sans pitie les dormeurs ennuyeux,
Sautant a petits pas comme un oiseau joyeux,
Vibrant, ainsi qu’un dard qui tremble dans la cible;
Par un lfele escalier de cristal invisible,
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Effaree et dansante, elle descend des cieux;
Et l’esprit, ce veilleur fait d’oreilles et d ’yeux,
Tandis qu’elle va, vient, monte et descend encore,
Entend de marche en marche errer son pied sonore!
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I love the carillon o f your ancient towns, o old land, keeper o f your
domestic customs. O noble Flanders, where the benumbed North warms
itself in the sun o f Castille and mates with the South! The carillon is the
unexpected and mad hour the eye thinks it sees, dressed as a Spanish
dancer, appearing suddenly through the keen, bright hole made by a door
o f air as it opens. She comes, shaking over the lethargic rooftops her silver
apron, full o f magical notes, pitilessly waking the wearisome sleepers,
taking little jumps, like a merry bird, quivering like a spear trembling in its
target. By a fragile stairway o f invisible crystal, alarmed and dancing, she
descends from the heavens. And as she goes and comes and climbs up and
down again, the mind, that watchman made o f ears and eyes, hears her
resonant foot wandering from step to step, (trans. Riffaterre,
“Prosopopeia” 109)
De Man argues, against Riffaterre, that the matrix o f this poem is articulated most
accurately as “j ’aime le carillon,” which is a figure o f speech that could be expressed in a
sentence that describes the relationship o f the mind to time (Fig. 2) (“Ftypogram” 32).
Under this model, various signifiers o f the carillon are displaced to a new verbal
signified— "time," and the "love" that first refers to the poetic construct o f the "I" but is
displaced to "mind" or consciousness. These verbal signifieds reveal an underlying matrix
that hypothesizes a relationship between subject (I) and object (time). But both time and
mind are invisible; they can only be "seen," according to de Man, by virtue o f a kind o f
hallucination induced by a figure o f speech. It is "the claim o f all poetry to make the
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invisible visible," and it is just this invocatory power that puts the distinction
between (stable) sign and (unstable) trope in question (“Hypogram” 34). It is not certain
whether it is the sign that makes metaphor possible or metaphor that is the condition o f
the possibility o f the sign. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the latter alternative
significantly broadens the role o f metaphor in cognition.

sound (and sig h t) (sign ifier)
ch im es (sig n ified )

-M im e (n ew sig n ified )
tim e (n e w sig n ifier)
y

m ind (new sig n ified )

love (sign ifier)
I (sig n ified )

^

m ind (n ew sig n ified )

Figure 2. De Man’s analysis o f the transition o f signifieds and signifiers in Victor
Hugo’s “Ecrit sur la vitre d ’une fenetre flamande .”
Furthermore, de Man observes, the title o f the poem, “Ecrit sur la vitre d'une

fenetre flamande," clearly indicates a material inscription that constrains the reader to read
the poem under the aegis o f a material reference, namely, the author o f the poem
(“Hypogram” 35). The fantastic crystal stairway that stages the dancing figure o f the Hour
is solidly paralleled in the glass pane, which only the hardest o f substances is able to
engrave, but which becomes visible to the eye only when it is willfully (implying an
intentional subject) stained by inscription. Thus the material subject o f the poem is
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inscribed within its own creation, memorializing its consciousness in a manner that time, in
the fleeting sound o f the carillon, never can.
De Man's critique brings us full circle to the presupposition with which Riffaterre
began his semiotic project, namely, that there is a clear distinction between so-called
ordinary and literary language. If the poem, on first reading, is a confusion o f
contradictions, discovering the hypogram/matrix will yield, at the least, a figure or trope,
an inter-textual connection that can be converted to ordinary language (Fig. 3).

Signifier
poem (lan gu age o f trope)
hypogram (intertextual figure)
^ m a t r i x (intertextual structure or system )
‘■►“ordinary lan guage” proposition
‘♦ o b je c t or state o f affairs (o n to lo g ica l status bracketed)
S ign ified

*

Figure 3. Riffaterre’s hierarchy o f signifying relationships.
When Riffaterre observes, "The text functions something like a neurosis," that is,
repression precipitates its own expression under a variety o f initially cryptic forms, he is
transposing to poetry what had become a commonplace among philosophers who hoped
that an analysis o f language might solve some o f the more intransigent philosophical
riddles, especially in the realm o f metaphysical and religious propositions (Semiotics 19).
De Man warns, however, that when the conversion o f the matrix results in a philosopheme
such as the relationship between time and mind, or even in a cliche such as "time heals all
wounds," the reduction o f poetry to ordinary language becomes problematic, even if the
critic wishes not to enter into that particular philosophical fray, because it raises the
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question o f whether or not ordinary language is any more transparent to the understanding
than the so-called periphrasis o f the poem (“Hypogram” 27).
In a reply to de Man’s critique, Riffaterre does admit that de M an’s reading o f
“Ecrit” altered his perspective. Recalling Kant’s famous comment that David Hume had
awakened him from his epistemological “dogmatic slumbers,” Riffaterre observes, “I
rested happily on my conclusions, sure that I had covered all angles, until Paul de Man
jolted me out o f my complacency” (“Prosopopeia” 108). Unlike Kant, however, he was
not convinced that a critical Copemican revolution was in order. He concedes only that de
Man had shown that Hugo’s poem involved a “figure o f a figure,” namely that the figural
description o f the carillon (metaphor and thing) is itself subordinated to an association
between two figures that are ultimately organized into a new sign “where mind is the
signifier and time the signified” (Riffaterre, “Prosopopeia” 110). This new sign can be
comprehended, however, under the traditional rhetorical category o f prosopopeia, which
Riffaterre then proposes, in agreement with de Man, as one o f the essential characteristics
ofLyric.
Following Pierre Fontanier’s taxonomy o f rhetorical terms (published in 1821),
Riffaterre defines prosopopeia as the rhetorical device o f “staging, as it were, absent,
dead, supernatural or even inanimate beings” who are then made to “act, speak, answer as
is our wont” (qtd. in “Prosopopeia” 107). He uses the terms supposition and hypothesis to
explain how the poem’s author proposes to the reader a “natural impossibility”
(“Prosopopeia” 110). In the case o f H ugo’s poem, the first level o f “staging” is a
prosopopeia o f the Hour, signified by the sounding carillon that is personified in the
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Spanish dancer on a crystal stairway.19 For Riffaterre, this is a simple illustration o f the
principle that poems do not refer to the world but to “familiar [verbal] stereotypes.” He
grants nonetheless that he had ignored a second level o f “staging” in the poem that, in its
turn, makes visible or gives face to what he now recognizes as the essence o f the poet’s
art—prosopopeia, reflected in the etymology o f the term itself: Ttpoaoitov Ttoeiv
(“Prosopopeia” 108). The opening address o f the poet to the land, “I love the carillon o f
your ancient towns,” Riffaterre acknowledges, “must slant uniformly all its [the poem’s]
subsequent functions” (“Prosopopeia” 108). It is this apostrophe that effectively
“proposes a new sign for ‘consciousness o f time,” ’ and through which is revealed a
“prosopopeia o f prosopopeia.” The reader now “sees” the figure o f a figure, namely, the
cognition o f Time “figured in” the dancing Hour, who/which (the Hour and its “human
face”—the dancer— are now identical) is a figure o f the ringing o f the carillon.
In addition, it is this meta-staging that reveals both the inscription o f the author’s
self in the poem and necessarily a return to a material reference: “Inscription, as he [de
Man] points out, refers to the real. Even the most unreal play o f postulates presupposes a
subject. . . .” (“Prosopopeia” 111). The very title o f the poem, “Inscribed on a Flemish
Window,” refers to this material subject. Riffaterre observes, in fact, that “this persona
cannot therefore be distinguished from the author (this being the one instance [sic] in
literature where the intentional fallacy does not apply); consequently, any metonymic or
synecdochic periphrasis substituted for the subject (like the title in Hugo’s poem) is the

inscription o f the self in the text—the very definition o f the lyric” (emphasis added)
(“Prosopopeia” 111).
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The distinctive nature o f the Lyric, RifFaterre concludes, must be inextricably
linked to “the I-Thou relationship [of the poet] to the universe,” an association that
ineluctably surfaces in the text. At this juncture RifFaterre also acknowledges a second
“insight” offered by de Man, which is that apostrophe presupposes the possibility o f
dialogue: “the address calls for a reply o f the addressee, the gaze that perceives animation
invites gazing back from the animated object to the subject daydreaming a Narcissistic
reflection o f itself in things” (“Prosopopeia” 112). Earlier in the same essay, RifFaterre
had been careful to emphasize Fontanier’s distinction between prosopopeia, apostrophe,
and dialogism (107-108), but in this concession, a conflation o f apostrophe and dialogue
return here as the very “structure” o f prosopopeia, which he further subsumes under the
rubric o f chiasmus, defined as “the transfer or crisscrossing exchange between subject and
object. . . .” (“Prosopopeia” 112). Finally, RifFaterre proposes an intertext that, once
and for all, “fuses” the window’s material inscription (subject) with the dancing Hour
(object)—a famous graffiti etched on a window at the royal Chateau Chambord: “Woman
often changes. Foolish he who trusts her” (qtd. in “Prosopopeia” 112). The mutability o f
time, the supposed fickleness o f Woman (now transposed into the dancing woman o f the
Hour), the fragility o f glass (and thus the risk implicit in inscription), and love are
inextricably patterned and overdetermined by the poem’s title (“Prosopopeia” 112-13).
RifFaterre eventually uses this doubled-image essence o f Lyric (apostrophe and
reply) as the foundation for his larger proposal, which cannot be taken up here, that Lyric
is capable o f generating narrative (116-123). First, however, he makes a key observation
for the study o f Greek lyrics: Chiasmus, that necessary corollary o f prosopopeia, is
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demonstrated most transparently, he argues, in the epitaph. He cites de Man’s example o f
Milton’s epitaph on Shakespeare, in which Milton laments that he and all other writers are
themselves turned into stone— struck dumb— in the very midst o f inscribing a memorial to
the great playwright:

. . thou our fancy o f itself bereavingdDost make us Marble with

too much conceiving.” This apostrophe generates a dialogue in which a “dumb” object
takes up the address and in reply, speaks the subject into its own image: “prosopopeia thus
stakes out a figural space for the chiasmic interpretation: either the subject will take over
the object, or it will be penetrated by the object” (“Prosopopeia” 112).
Inscribing the Epigram
In the case o f the ancient and classical Greek sepulchral epigrams collected in the

Greek Anthology, the context, like Milton’s monument to Shakespeare, is memorial. This
context alerts readers to a cultural ritual and enables them to respond to the texts
appropriately, that is, not to expect to receive information about states o f affairs but to
perform a ritual dialogue: “[A] constant component o f poetic significance is that the
poem’s language looks as much like a ritual or a game . . . as it does like a means o f
conveying sense” {Semiotics 164). Thus the condition o f the possibility o f understanding
an epigram, whether literally inscribed on a monument or later written as text, is that it is
already literary when readers come to it, predisposing them to understand the inscription
as a unit o f signifying text. This poignant epigram, for example, is representative o f a large
class o f epigrams dedicated to those who perished at sea:
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And son o f Cleanor, desire for your homeland utterly destroyed youfor trusting to the South’s wintry wind, the unfettered season fettered you,
and the surging wet waves washed away your lovely youth.
This epigram is a direct “staging,” to use Fontanier’s term, o f an absent or dead
being. The encounter is a “mock hypothesis” (“Prosopopeia” 108). The youth, like an
actor in a Greek drama, wears a mask that makes visible the otherwise faceless dead. Once
the reader accedes to the hypothesis, the drama unfolds as an invocation and response.
What appears on first reading to be a monologue addressed to a dead person becomes a
dialogue between “I” (the poet, who is the one and only subject inscribed in the memorial)
and “Thou”-th e “calling back” o f consciousness. In this case, the figure o f destroyed
youth is the figure for a simple but ancient sentiment: “There’s no place like home.” It
only remains for the reader to work out the periphrasis, that “place” where the figure
makes play with the hypogram (“Prosopopeia” 112).
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CHAPTER III
GENERATING TEXT: MATRIX AND LOGOS IN
RIFFATERRE, KRISTEVA, AND MARITAIN

"OTrXia|iai itpog ’'Epuia irepl aTepvoiai \ 07 Lapov. . . .
Girded with the breastplate o f reason, I am armed against Love . . . . — Rufinus
Michael Riffaterre proposes that the “I-Thou” relationship, traditionally catalogued
as prosopopeia, is “the lyric figure,” and he concedes, in response to Paul De Man’s
critique, that every lyric bears witness to material inscription. “Inscription, as he [De Man]
points out, refers to the real” (“Prosopopeia” 111). Both critics use the words material
and real in their ordinary sense o f something physical and sensible. They therefore agree
that, writing, even though it is governed by linguistic codes, necessarily entails an inscriber
who is (or at least has) a body existing in the world o f space and time and that the
inscription itself can be described as a physical object. His own semiotic project, however,
is focused upon discovering the structure o f the dialogue between reader and text, in
which the subjective experience and ontological status o f the subject-author (as well as the
reader) is bracketed. Using this astringent method, Riffaterre hopes to offer a solution to
the puzzle o f how an apparently idiosyncratic subset o f language works within a larger
linguistic system; to precisely describe the linguistic province o f lyrical speech is to define
it since, by definition, to define is to set the boundaries or limits o f something. De Man,
however, continues to doubt that the “ghost o f referentiality, which has theoretically been
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exorcised in the model o f the hypogram,” is truly gone, speculating that when RifFaterre
characterizes reading as “an undecisiveness [sic] resolved at one moment and lost the
next” he is acknowledging that something exceeds the method (Semiotics 29-30). In this
chapter I examine Riffaterre’s method in the context o f his theory o f text production. I
then suggest that for both Julia Kristeva (b. 1941), whose work in literary
theory, grounded in her background in Marxist theory and Freudian/Lacanian
psychoanalysis, spans the periods o f structuralism and post-structuralism, and Jacques
Maritain (1882-1973), a Thomist whose philosophy o f aesthetics predates structuralism,
there is a corporeal “plus,” signifying the original intuition o f experience between subject
and object, which is communicated through, yet in spite of, language.
In her 1975 essay “From One Identity to An Other,” for example, Kristeva notes
that even in the case o f so-called ordinary communication, and despite powerful
constructionist critiques o f the notion o f a discreet ego, linguists still confront the problem
o f the “communicable sentence between speakers,” which seems to presuppose a
Cartesian notion o f the autonomous self (Desire 131). She does not argue, however, that
there is nothing that “exceeds the operating consciousness”; in fact, it is this “excess” that
Kristeva explores in her various analyses o f poetic language and the semiotics o f the body.
According to Kristeva, poetic language, which she extrapolates to include literary
language in general, has manifested a sea-change dating from Mallarme {Revolution 823).20 But she also contends that this diachronic “revolution” is always present
synchronically along the borders o f the symbolic and semiotic in the body. The trespasses
o f the semiotic upon the symbolic therefore are apparent in any literature, ancient or
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modem (Revolution 15).21 Unlike Riffaterre, however, Kristeva locates the semiotic not in
language or other public systems o f signification, but in the body itself. The semiotic is a
pre-authorial and pre-linguistic matrix o f bodily impulses and rhythms generating the
process o f self-formation only later recognized in language {Revolution 36).
Maritain and Kristeva ultimately differ in their metaphysics.22 Like Kristeva,
however, Maritain describes in his works on creativity a preconscious matrix o f drives,
emotion, and will that is pre-linguistic and incarnated, that is, o f the body, and which
generates something not yet expressible yet destined to be expressed. He also shares with
Kristeva a profound aversion to Cartesian rationalism as well as an affinity for Aristotelian
materialism, and he precedes her in identifying a revolution in poetic language (although
he chooses Baudelaire rather than Mallarme as its pioneer) and in adopting a Freudian
standpoint toward consciousness (262, 91).
Riffaterre’s Theory o f Textual Production
According to Riffaterre, the space and expression o f the hypogram are generated
in the recursive processes (expansion and conversion) that establish a semantic
equivalence between the kernel word or matrix sentence (a lexeme that is “always
rewritable”) and its syntagm, which is ensconced in the poem (47). Expansion “transforms
Lexeme
Expansion^

Syntagm

4>

■^-Conversion

Figure 4. Expansion and contraction establish an equivalency between lexeme and
syntagm.
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one sign into several”; conversion transforms “several signs into one ‘collective’ sign” (47)
(Fig. 4).
Expansion is “the chief agent” in generating “textual signs,” which Riffaterre
defines as “signs that stand for a whole text” that are already well-known or “easy for him
[the reader] to reconstruct” and is “therefore the principal generator o f significance, since
a constant can be spotted only where the text spreads out into successive variants o f its
initial given, the more complex issuing from the simpler” (47, 174). It “transforms the

constituents o f the matrix sentence into more complex fo rm s” (48). Thus the reader reads
the periphrasis o f the poem as a whole by gradually reconstructing the matrix o f the
expanded sequence, which is “the text imagined by him [the reader] in its
pretransformation state” and may comprise one or several sentences, a cliche, a quotation,
or a “descriptive system” (63).
The text o f the “son o f Cleanor” epigram , for example, might be read as a
reference to cultural idiolects about the close relationship between death and desire.
Within the space o f its apostrophe, the poem develops an equivalence between the two
concepts announced in the first fine by transforming irodoo “yearning for something
absent” into coAeae “destruction.”
K a i a e KAe'qvopiSr), iro $ o c wAeae iraT pihoc oar|C
And you, too, son o f Cleanor, desire for your homeland utterly destroyed
you—
Lines two and three then complicate this doomed relationship by recalling the ancient ties
between intemperate trust (Oapoew) and its all-too-frequent outcome in deceit, that is,
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being tripped-up or caught in a bind (irebato).
•fro'pa'qaavTa N otou AaiXata xei|xepir)’ flpTl y a p ere nebiqaev a v e y y v o ^ - v y p a be tt|v ctt| v
for trusting to the South’s wintry wind,
the unfettered season fettered you,
These terms serve as an interpretive node leading to the periphrasis o f the final line:
vulnerability to deceit is the fruit o f desire, and the outcome o f deceit is destruction.
KUp.ttT’ dtp’ L|i.epTT|V € kAiXJ6V T)XlKtT]V.
and the surging wet waves washed away your lovely youth.
Sea-billows “wash away” the lovely youth (figuratively and literally), establishing the
equivalence o f desire, deceit, and destruction. In the end, drowning accomplishes both a
baptismal release from the fetters o f deceit and a dissolving o f the bonds o f life
“€KAuto”—only to be replaced by the bonds o f death.
A hypogram’s reconstruction, therefore, is essentially a conversion process that
subsumes the text’s syntagms under a single signified. This reconstruction, Riffaterre also
notes, possesses a negative “pejorative” or positive “meliorative” charge that is mirrored
in the expansion/production o f the text: “This means that the significance will be a positive
valorization o f the textual semiotic unit if the hypogram is negative, and a negative
valorization if the hypogram is positive” (63-64). This linguistic charge applies a common
radical or marker to the sequences generated by expansion, and it is this semiotic role that
the symbol plays: “[Individual meanings o f words are subordinated to a single overriding
symbolism, and the symbolism is the opposite o f the hypogram’s connotations” (emphasis
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added) (65). For example, in the following anonymous epigram, the hypogram is expanded
in the text into a positive valorization o f its opposite on counts both o f life/death and the
trick o f memory that make an impossibility “possible.”

Tovto toi fjp.eTep'nc ijwrprjiov, eodXe Sa(3Ive,
T) Xidoc T) ptxpr| Tfjc pe7 dXiriq (piXi/qc;Aiel ^TiQao) ae- <ji>8’, ei d ep ic ev tpdipevoiaiv,
tou

Aiqdin<; err’ epoi
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mr|<; uSaTOQ (3.64)

This little stone, good Sabinus, is a memorial o f our great friendship.
I will always miss you; and if with the dead
you must drink o f the waters o f Lethe,
drink not forgetfulness o f me.
The “time must have a stop” o f death is marked in the poem by an opposing radical, which
is the hope that memory can overcome it— even a command that it do so.23 What is
implicitly denied in the physical inscription is explicitly affirmed in the text o f the
inscription. The diminutive little and its antonym great conjoin to restore to life the
warmth and intimacy o f friendship, and they are followed by an “amplificatio, ” the
“simplest form” of expansion, in which repetitive sequences accumulate to create a single
effect (49). In this series o f amplifications the possibility o f eternal remembrance is
repeatedly posited by a negation o f the pejorative connotation o f the hypogram.
Ultimately, and given the magnitude o f what the memorial attempts to achieve, the
maximum must be supposed: a conversion o f the waters o f Lethe from the waters o f death
to the waters o f life, so that forgetfulness itself becomes a memorial to memory, and a
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stone monument becomes a watery memorial. Like Hugo’s inscription on glass (Chapter
One), the epigram is marked by the subject’s consciousness o f vulnerability. The
inscription is the last trace o f “the ‘here’ and the ‘now,’” as de Man puts it (“Hypogram”
32).
The same conversion o f pejorative hypogram to meliorative text is evident in
Plato’s “Morning Star” epigram.
'aaT rip irpiv pen e X a p ite c e v l £coolaiv Ewoc,
vuv be dancdn Aap/rceic ’'E airep o g ev cpdipevoic. (11.53)
Once you shone, the Morning Star, among the living,
now in death you shine, the Evening Star, among the dead.
This epigram places in dramatic parallelism the relative functions o f the morning
and evening stars, resulting in a parallax— a shift in position relative to the eye o f the
beholder, the subject who writes the epitaph. In the initial encomium the poet posits a
dialogue that effects a denial o f death—a meliorative, reverse image o f the matrix
sentence, “All must go down to the darkness o f Hades,” so that the deceased is still alive
though among the dead, still shining, and still a star. The present tense o f the second line
makes explicit this proposal to undo death.
Percy Bysshe Shelley translated this epigram into English to use on the title page
o f Adonais, his elegy on the untimely death o f John Keats. His rendering of the epigram as
a quatrain intensifies dramatically, via the amplification that additional lines afford, the
symbolism o f immortality:
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To Stella
Thou wert the morning star among the living,
Ere thy fair light had fled;—
Now, having died, thou art as Hesperus, giving
New splendour to the dead.
Shelley’s second line, which is not part o f the original, is a gloss on the first. The morning
star traditionally symbolizes hope and new \ife;fair adds soft, appealing beauty to the
star’s reliquary o f icons, and fle d connotes an intimate relationship with someone who,
suddenly discovered, departs unwillingly, in haste, and perhaps even blushingly—as a
comely youth might hasten from a bedchamber. Enhancing the implications o f the present
tense, Shelley’s last line expands X ap-tretc to connote both new, which affirms the divine
power o f Hesperus to revivify “the dead” each day by reinstating a role as morning’s
herald, and splendid, which enhances the delicate beauty connoted by fa ir to an effulgent
brightness.24 Most powerful because o f its absurdity, then, is the hypothesis that this lovely
soul will achieve a general resurrection o f the dead.
Syntagm as Metalanguage
This analysis o f the relationship between lexeme and syntagm inevitably involves a
hierarchy of language. In his discussion o f humorous poetry, for example, Riffaterre
comments that the linguistic fun o f humor amounts to “a means o f testing new semantic
and semiotic relationships,” which leads to him to speculate that “poetic language is a
special case o f metalanguage” (138). There are many examples o f humorous poetry
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among the Greek epigrams, one o f which is Nicarchus’s dark commentary on judging the
value o f life:

Xeipoup7 uv empcdjev ’AKeoTopiSir]v ’AyeAaoc'
7 a p xwAeueiv, <pr\aiv, ep.eAXe ra X a q . (10.30)
Agelaus killed Acestorides during surgery because,
he said, “The poor wretch would have been a cripple for life.”
According to Riffaterre, readers recognize jokes when it becomes clear to them that two
formally or semantically incompatible codes are present in the same text (125).25 In this
case, both the form and meaning o f the traditional war-hero epitaph is negated. For
example, Simonides’ paean to the Athenians who died at Plataea begins, “If to die nobly is
the chief part o f excellence, to us out o f all men Fortune gave this lot” (Mackail Select
3.1). The grim humor Nicarchus’s epigram elicits in the reader depends on the reader’s
recognition o f the absurdity generated by this formal intertextual conflict. Semantic
conflict is perhaps more subtly but just as effectively produced in the first line by
eacpa^ev, a word derived from the slitting o f an animal’s throat during sacrifice, cr<pdfa,
only later applied (by Pindar) to human sacrifice (.Intermediate 784). According to medical
historian Ludwig Edelstein, Pythagorean physicians distinguished between practicing
medicine (prevention, medication, setting fractures, and the like) and performing invasive
surgery. They eschewed any use o f the knife, contending that it was too closely associated
with animal sacrifice (30-32). Hippocratic surgeons remained dubious about the practice.
As Edelstein dryly observes, “Predictable occurrences o f . . . mutilation argue for the use
o f special caution and special means” and “[T]he desire to perform an operation correctly
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combines with the realization o f how harmful it is to one’s reputation to treat a patient
poorly” (92). The notion o f sacrifice is further amplified in xcoAeueit', which carries the
negative connotation o f its root, XcoAoc, a metaphor for something imperfect and thus
unsuitable for sacrifice. Lastly, r a A a c is a descriptor that in its ambiguous sense o f

wretched can convey both pity and contempt.
Humorous poetry comments upon these tensions within naturalized concepts using
an extreme form o f catechresis, and Riffaterre regards it as a kind o f metalanguage that
opens up ordinary language’s “potentialities” by “testing new semantic and semiotic
relationships” {Semiotics 138). While Riffaterre generally conceives o f Lyric as a
determined unit o f language that refers to its matrix for explanation, in the case of humor
he inverts the hierarchy, so that to be understood, the matrix must wait for its explication
in the poem: “ [H]umor is nothing other than a special case o f poetic language, and . . .
poetic language is a special case o f metalanguage {Semiotics 138). This concession that, at
least in the realm o f humor, the poem can act as a “metalanguage” that “opens up” and
“tests” ordinary language, can serve to alert us to theories examined in later chapters.
Riffaterre’s phenomenology o f text production begins, then, by using the organic
metaphor matrix but ends with manufacturing metaphors such as expansion, conversion,
and reconstruction that, appropriate to Riffaterre’s approach, connote the production o f
artifacts. Readers o f texts engage in a reverse engineering that retraces steps leading to the
product’s raw materials. This analogy implies, however, that the dialogue under discussion
is solely between text and reader. The material author, although a necessary condition for
inscription to occur, is no longer necessary for understanding and re-production.26
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Riffaterre, therefore, can concede with some equanimity that a poem is a material trace o f
an unavoidable and fascinating I-thou relationship while continuing to affirm that
understanding it is a matter o f dialogue between reader and text. His analysis implies that
there are two subject/object relationships— the prosopopeia o f the poem itself and the
communication that takes place between text and reader. It may be that there are two
distinguishable matrices as well— a mathematical matrix that is the formula by which the
reader potentially can resolve all the linguistic elements o f a poem and an organic matrix
out o f which is bom the material inscription.
Julia Kristeva’s “semiotic chora” and “the symbolic”
Kristeva’s technical term for the latter, organic matrix is the semiotic chora
“Xwpa,” which is borrowed from Plato’s Timaeus. In this dialogue, Timaeus, renowned
for his knowledge o f astronomy and “the nature o f the universe,” first describes the
creation o f the world and world soul (27a). He then moves on to explain how individual
things, as images o f divine ideas, were created. In the context o f his discussion o f the
relative natures o f self-existent ideas and material bodies, he argues that space {chora)
must be postulated as a third nature in which things are generated and make their
appearance. This space, however, is never apprehended by the senses or the intellect; it is
a necessary but inchoate notion, “apprehended,. . . by a kind o f spurious reason, and is
hardly real” (52b). Timaeus also likens the x^po: to a “mother,” a “receptacle” (51a), and
a universal “receiving principle” (50d). The elements o f earth, air, fire, and water are
mixed in it—their disproportionate energies having incited a constant motion in this
“receiving vessel” (53a). The subsequent admixture generates the initial appearance o f
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created things, but their affiliation remains, to this point, random—“without reason and
measure” (53b). Kristeva describes this choric environment as “an extremely provisional
articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases” {Revolution 25).
Having borrowed the term, Kristeva adapts it to a Freudian analysis o f the preconscious— what one o f her translators describes as “an economy o f primary processes
articulated by Freud’s instinctual drives . . . where social family structures make their
imprint through the mediation o f the maternal body” (Roudiez 6). This “imprint”
subsequently is sealed by “the symbolic,” a regulated order that bears the icon o f the
Cartesian ego, full o f presence and rationality. Kristeva describes the turn in Western
philosophy since Descartes toward rationalism as the ascent o f the symbolic and observes
that it was one o f the conditions for the rise o f the study o f structural linguistics, itself an
effort to identify the structure o f language so as to re-present it to the self as a transparent
object o f knowledge {Desire 127). By her account, however, the chora resists such
rationalization. When grasped by the symbolic, it excretes a surplus— an impolite
transgression o f the social order that signifies nonverbally even in the context o f language.
Literary language most clearly exposes what, to the rationalist, must be odious:
If there exists a “discourse” which is not a mere depository o f thin
linguistic layers, an archive o f structures . . . and is, instead, the essential
element o f a practice involving the sum o f unconscious, subjective, and
social relations in gestures o f confrontation and appropriation, destruction
and construction . . . it is “literature,” or, more specifically, the text.

{Revolution 16)
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When texts “behave” irrationally, Riffaterre confidently intervenes with a key—an
originating matrix iterable in ordinary language that is the text’s rational mirror image.
Kristeva, however, thinks that literature reflects a dialectic incarnated in the writer-subject;
the text never completely submits to logic nor escapes into madness; nor can it be reduced
to a fetishist “play o f language” {Revolution 82). Rather, it instigates a return from the
symbolic to the semiotic chora by introducing an “excess that would be ‘more than
logical’” {Revolution 83). This warfare at the boundaries o f the semiotic and the symbolic
ultimately constitutes the subject as ego {Revolution 82). A decisive victory by either side
would render the subject psychotic.27 For Riffaterre, matrix and text are equivalents. For
Kristeva, the semiotic chora is Timaeus’ “third nature”— a receptacle or space in which a
collocation o f pre-conscious images are generated and eventually become “visible” in the
text as traces when they accommodate themselves to the logic o f the symbolic order. The
body, as nexus o f the preconscious and the symbolic, releases drives that erupt into
language at the same time that language is working its regulation o f the body. From this
point o f view, the sepulchral epigram, for example, is the scene o f a battle already lost; the
subject either has been murdered, literally or figuratively, by ideology, or it has succumbed
to its own death wish. Yet, as text, the subject once again confronts an other. In this
epigram by the Byzantine Paulus Silentiarius, an unquiet spirit begins by questioning the
reader and ends by questioning Logic’s first principle— identity:

Ovvopd (jlol—tl be Tonto ; naTptc 8e poi—ea

tl

be rovro ;

KXeivou 8’ el|xl yevouc—ei yap dtpaupoTatou ;
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Z r ja a c ev56£wc eXiirov (3tov—e i 7 a p aSoljcoc ;
K etpm 5’ e v d a 5 e vvv—t ic t iv i T a u ra X e y e ic ; (11.51)
My name— why? and my country—what for?
I am o f illustrious race— but if I had been o f the meanest?
Having lived nobly, I died—-and if ignobly?
So then, I lie here now— Who says this, and to whom?
Just as an absurdist play makes visible its own theatrical conceits, Paulus’ question
and answer, address and response, reveals the conceit o f the epigram’s ritual dialogue.
The pointed questions and the beginning o f the last line, “K elpm 5’ e v d a h e vuv” [So
then, I lie here now] refer to two philosophemes. The first— that a final journey to Hades
is the inevitable result o f being bom, no matter one’s birthplace, class, or position— can be
traced throughout Greek literature. The second is more closely affiliated with a late
classical Greek attitude that discounted even the life well lived and articulated a
disillusionment with and melancholy about life and its brevity.28 To this point in the poem,
however, the subject and addressee remain within the symbolic—the realm o f a possible,
regulated hermeneutic o f life and death, even when its final conclusion is that found in the
final line o f another epigram by another Byzantine, Glycon:
I l a v r a yeX ag Kai ir a v r a kovk; Kai n av ro : to p'q h ev
ir a v r a 7 «p e£ aXo7 uv e a r i to; 7 i7 v6|xeva.
All is laughter, and all is dust, and all is nothing; for out o f unreason is all
that is. (12.34).
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The entire last line o f Paulus’ epigram, statement and questions— “K elpm S’ evftaSe
vhv— t ic tlvi TavTQ: XeyeiQ

[Who is saying this, and to whom?] intensifies this

sentiment since a dead person cannot say anything and therefore can speak to no one.
Paulus equivocates, then, on presence, calling attention to the way writing seems to enable
speech in absentia. Yet the riddle o f identity remains. There is the absence o f Paulus, who
first inscribed but is no longer present or necessary as speaker. There is the paradoxical
presence/absence o f a dead man who “is saying this.” There are readers who come to ask
questions that can be answered under the regime o f the symbolic order but who are invited
forthwith to ponder the mystery o f their own death. Finally, there are current, “real,”
readers, who are invited to ponder the mystery o f no one saying anything yet something
being said by virtue o f their own reading/saying. And what is being said, as much as it can
be, is a “more than logical” upsurge from the matrix o f semiotic chora : that life and death,
presence and absence, do not possess their own identity. No one is “saying this,” no one
hears it being said, and no one understands it— not even those who solve the poem’s
riddle.
Jacques Maritain’s “Creative Intuition”
In his 1952 A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts at the National Gallery o f Art,
Jacques Maritain explicated his notion o f “creative intuition.” Maritain presupposes the
Aristotelian notion that matter and form are inextricably bound together and that
knowledge arises only after sense perception, that is, a posteriori. The intellect knows the
world by means o f ideas; however, the intellect is not identical to its ideas; they are the
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instruments by which we arrive at a knowledge o f what things are— their ratio. This
Aristotelian adjustment to Plato as adopted by Aquinas, has kept open, according to
Maritain, an alternative doorway to knowledge that Descartes inadvertently closed.
According to St. Thomas, the soul is not (just) the intellect; it acts in several ways. One o f
those ways, Maritain maintains, is through creative intuition, which is a mode o f knowing
the world that is pre-conceptual and nonrational. In a chapter entitled “Creative Intuition
and Poetic Knowledge,” Maritain offers a schema o f the soul’s activities (Fig. 5). The
intuitive mode o f knowledge is pre-conceptual because its apperception o f the object is

Figure 5. Schema o f the soul’s activities, according to Maritain (108).
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preconceptual; it comes before the formation o f concepts giving us rational knowledge
about the object. It is nonrational because it is a union o f subject and object that depends
on emotion (desire) and will and can be known only mediately as a concept. The first
circle encompasses the world o f discursive reason. Because its mechanism is logic, we can
suppose that it corresponds in part to Kristeva’s symbolic. The second circle Maritain
describes as the “waking state,” wherein the imagination takes up sense perception and
uses it to enable a person to function in the world o f things and ideas, third circle
represents sensation, a mixture o f “intuitive data” that “becomes sense perception” when
it encounters memory and imagination (108-109). Finally, the “top” o f the soul is infused
with what Maritain calls the “preconscious” o f the spirit while its “bottom” participates in
the “automatic unconscious,” Maritain’s acknowledgment o f Freud. In words reminiscent
both o f Kristeva’s description o f the energies o f the chora and Timaeus’ account o f a
primeval mixing o f elements, Maritain describes the circle o f the Intellect as “an immense
dynamism emanating from the very center o f the Soul,” and the circle o f the imagination
as “an immense dynamism working upwards and downwards along the depths o f the
Soul.” Finally, the bodily sensations migrate to “the depths o f the Soul” so that finally, “all
that it [the soul] receives from the external world, all things seized upon by sense
perception, all treasures o f that sapid and sonorous and colorful Egypt, enter and make
their way up to the central regions o f the soul” (109).
For Maritain, an artist’s essential intuition takes place in the context o f an I-Thou
relationship before reason (logos) comes into play. The soul (subject) grasps the object
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(which may be an event, a person, a thing, etc.) intuitively in a dynamic matrix o f instincts,
drives, energies, images, will, and emotion. But these “rhythms” (Kristeva Desire 28), or
this “musical stir” (Maritain 300) subsequently must pass through the regime o f reason in
order to become something made and something public, that is, a work o f art. Maritain
uses the word pulsions to denote this type o f “mental wave or vibration, charged with
dynamic unity” (302). Kristeva uses the same term, which according to her translators has
been translated into English as “drives” to correspond to Freud’s “ Trieb” (Roudiez;
Waller). Poetic intuition must submit to the logos in order to become intelligible and to
enter the social world o f communication. When it does, a dialogue can occur between text
and reader.
Maritain agrees with Kristeva that modem poets often consciously seek to
minimize the interference o f the symbolic in communication. They rupture the text in order
to transmit a “flash o f reality which has been grasped without concept and which no

Figure 6. Maritain’s schema showing the relationship between intuition and text in
classical poetry (319).
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Figure 7. Maritain’s schema showing the relationship between intuition and text in modem
poetry (320).
concept can express” (312). He offers two schemata to illustrate the differences between
what he describes as “classical” and “modem” poetry (Figs. 6 and 7).
The first diagram represents poetic intuition in a so-called classical poem passing
through “Logos-dominated concepts” and submitting thoroughly to the “logical
organization required to signify definite things” (320). The danger is that the reader will
perceive in this work just Reality 1, which is “definite things standing as objects o f
thought” and miss the “transreality” (R2) that had been apprehended in the original
intuition.
The second diagram corresponds to Kristeva’s “revolution” in poetry. Here, the
initial “process o f spiritual production” is dominated not by logos but by imagination, and
the structure o f the work is nonrational because it depends “only on [the] transreality to be
signified” (320). The happy result is significance at the original level o f reality—the “trans
reality caught by poetic intuition” (320). Kristeva echoes this notion when she writes that
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the signifying economy o f poetic language is specific in that the semiotic is
not only a constraint as is the symbolic, but it tends to gain the upper hand
at the expense o f the thetic and predicative constraints o f the ego’s judging
consciousness. (Desire 134)
Referring to the second diagram, Maritain comments that in modem poetry “[t]he creative
process is free to start developing in the nest o f dynamic unity” (320).
The music o f the words, still necessary as it may be, yields the foremost
place to another, more internal music . . . . What matters essentially now is
the music o f intuitive pulsions, which passes into the work o f words
freely—without being repressed or obliterated by the exigencies o f the
logos—and to which the reader in his turn is taken by this work o f words.
(321 )29
Maritain agrees with Kristeva, however, that because these energies are an essential aspect
o f truly poetic language, any literary period can bear witness to it. His finds in his own
eclectic list o f exemplars (which includes Homer, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Racine,
Pushkin, and Baudelaire) that
in the fullness o f the poetic sense the intelligible sense expands freely, and
supreme clarity appears as the privilege o f supreme mastery. Creative
innocence is so powerful in them that it permeates with intuitive freedom
the stoutest materials . . . and brings them to a state o f fusion. (400)
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He also cites two Saphhic fragments:

SeSuxe |iev a aeXavva
Kat nXiriia5 eg- pieaca be

vvtneq, irapa b epXeT wpa,

€7(0 be p.ova KaTeubw.
The moon has set and the Pleiades; and now
it is midnight, and time goes by, and I lie alone. (Campbell 168B)30
and the famous

Hpap.av |i€v e y u ae$€V,’ A T$i, iraXai -koto.
I loved you, Atthis, long ago. (Edmonds 48)
These poem fragments are remarkable for their simplicity, but that is not what
Maritain meant by clarity. He is referring to a process o f textual production that involves a
minimum o f inhibition or malformation o f the poetic intuition by discursive concepts as it
comes to be expressed in language. For both Kristeva and Maritain the semiosis o f the
poem involves this essential characteristic— the signified is the matrix o f the drives,
emotions, and imagination o f the author that is set into motion by an act o f knowing that
precedes concepts; the poem signifies this knowledge. Transparency, then, is not
necessarily a matter o f simplicity in language; indeed, clarity, insofar as it is ordered by
grammar and logic, is liable to be sacrificed for the sake o f shattering the opacity o f
concepts.
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Signs, Concepts, and Reference
Maritain anticipated the structuralist precept that poems are not products o f
mimesis, that is, they do not refer to empirical or mental objects, and Kristeva agrees. Yet
their semiotic analyses differ. Each analysis proposes a different set o f signs. For Kristeva,
it is the material body that is signed in and under language but not by it. The body is a
matrix o f organic drives that seek expression. On the other hand, the symbolic order
continually seeks to constitute it as subject and therefore dominate it. The body therefore
becomes the locus o f these contending forces. Language, as a communication system
within the symbolic order, is thetic; it seeks to maintain subjects as closed systems under
the control and guidance o f concepts in order to maintain the stasis o f social order.
Literary, or poetic, language affords the significance o f “jouissance” :
In cracking the socio-symbolic order, splitting it open, changing
vocabulary, syntax, the word itself, and releasing from beneath them the
drives borne by vocalic or kinetic differences, jouissance works its way into
the social and symbolic. (Revolution 79-80)
It is through the literary text that the body, as matrix o f change and revolution, insinuates
itself into the “code o f linguistic and social communication” by upsetting its logic and
creating fissures in it as a closed system. This threat o f anarchy sets up a dialectic between
readers o f the text and the dominant social order (Revolution 17).
Maritain, while proceeding in a more irenic vein, carries out a similar analysis. He
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alludes to a saying o f the “old Logicians”: “Words refer to concepts, and concepts refer to
things.” Words in a poem will refer to any number o f concepts that, in turn, will refer to
specific things (physical or nonphysical), but the poem itself does not refer to any thing.
The poem itself is a signifier only o f the poetic sense, which is a nonconceptual act that
uses the system o f language to express experience. Poetic knowledge, unlike intellectual
knowledge, does not have an object that it knows or intends; it creates an object that
refers only to itself, that is, the matrix o f intuition, will, emotion, and images out o f which
it arose. In her quatrain about being alone on a summer’s night, for example, Sappho is
expressing knowledge, but not o f an intelligible object— something known through the
intellect that can be paraphrased. Because words are ordered by logical and semantic rules
to refer to intelligible concepts, a conceptual framework for the experience will emerge,
but it will be a secondary sign.
For Riffaterre, if the language o f the poem does not refer to the world, it must
refer to another text. Signs, in their role as material signals, must be available to any
competent reader and be publicly verifiable, just as a scientific experiment must be iterable
for its working hypothesis to be generally accepted. Breaking the semiotic code o f a poem
provides at one stroke the operating structure, the language system, and the meaning o f
the poem as a signifier o f its matrix. There is no meaning beyond or behind this meaning,
and the proscription o f the intentional fallacy—that the writer’s experience is neither
discoverable nor relevant—remains intact. Kristeva characterizes this as an
anthropological attempt at a “phenomenological reduction”:
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. . . structuralism retains only the image o f the unconscious as a depository
o f laws and thus a discourse. Since they are considered solely from the
point o f view o f their relationship to language and deprived o f their drive
bases, these structural operations depend on the phenomenological
reduction, just as they depend on what this reduction is able to make
visible: thetic symbolic functioning.. . . {Revolution 41).
The crux o f the difference between the approach taken by Riffaterre as opposed to
the parallel approach o f Kristeva and Maritain, therefore, lies in the reference o f the sign
(Fig. 8).

Riffaterre

Signifier (poem)
Sign= ------------------------------->

Refers to: Matrix o f
Intertexts

Signified (hypogram)

Maritain/Kristeva

Signifier (poem)
Sign = --------------------------------->
Signified (semiotic chord)

Refers to: Poetic Intuition

Figure 8. Sign and reference as conceived by Riffaterre, Maritain, and Kristeva

All three accept that the poem does not refer to things in the sense o f reproduction or
mimesis. For Riffaterre, the poem’s significance lies in the matrix o f texts out o f which it is
produced: “[T]he stock epithet is thus poetic because it implies a hypogram, usually a
descriptive system . . . whose nuclear word remains unsaid and appears only in the

expanded form o f a sentence. This sentence is the w ord’s periphrasis, so that the true
referent is not a lexeme in the text but a syntagm in the intertext” (31). For Kristeva and
Maritain, however, the poem’s significance lies in the experience o f the subject who is
inscribed within the poem. These approaches, however, are not incompatible, and
recognizing both o f them can shed some light on the limits both o f structuralism and
hermeneutics.
Escaping the Figural
Although Riffaterre embraces the notion o f the subject/object relationship that is
essential to Lyric, his real delight is in finding the key allusion that explicates just where
the inscription o f the author/subject is made manifest in the text. Since inscription is
language, it must be ultimately determined by language itself. What Riffaterre does for
structuralism is to offer a semiotic method o f uncovering how a text has been produced,
and to that extent, what the text means in terms o f its generating matrix. The text does not
perform this uncovering, it is the competent reader who does this by playing the game o f
catechresis. For Riffaterre, literature is a “verbal game” and poetry the verbal game par

excellence (Semiotics 138). Meaning, however, is susceptible to equivocation. Semantic
meaning does not capture other ordinary uses o f the term. Most readers will continue to
ask, even after deciphering a poem, what it means in terms o f prosopopeiaoeia—its
material reference. As Kristeva notes, the “externality” o f the ego to the text has “always
been a particular problem for semiotics, which is concerned with specifying the
functioning o f signifying practices such as art, poetry, and myth that are irreducible to the
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‘language ’ object” (emphasis added) {Revolution 21-22). Lyric, then, might be considered
as signifier o f nonrational knowledge that, because o f its expression in language, tempts
readers to fall under the thrall o f concepts. If Kristeva and Maritain seem to ignore
intertextuality, it is because in their view the translation o f codes from one linguistic
system to another does not speak to the will o f the subject either to make (Maritain) or to
resist being made (Kristeva). For Kristeva the importance o f this point is even greater,
since in her view language as the expression o f the symbolic order is continually fastening
itself upon the semiotic chora in order to realize a self that is static, determined, and
incapable o f resistance. I f and when Lyric becomes significant, it is because it has elicited a
surplus o f resistance in the reader.
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CHAPTER IV
ORIGINAL INSCRIPTIONS:
“MAKING POETRY AND THINKING”
“ What at first looks like the title o f a thesis—making poetry and thinking—turns out to be

the inscription in which our destined human existence has ever been inscribed. The
inscription records that poetry and thinking belong together ”— Martin Heidegger31
In Martin Heidegger’s “A Dialogue on Language” (1954) the “Inquirer” concludes
that “the essential being o f language cannot be anything linguistic” and that “language, as
sense that is sounded and written, is in itself suprasensuous, something that constantly
transcends the merely sensible. So understood, language is in itself metaphysical” (On the

Way 23-24; 35). Although this thesis appears in a new and specific context o f a
comparison between German and Japanese conceptions o f language, Heidegger had been
developing this perspective for some time.32The notion o f language as something otheror more-than a signifying system is reflected, for example, in his studies (1943 to 1946) o f
the pre-Socratic philosophers, which include commentary on fragments from
Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides. In Early Greek Thinking, Heidegger examines
the pre-Socratics’ use o f terms such as to ov, toc ovtoc, A eyeiv, aAr)$€La, and

ipaoKeiv (Krell 6). Each o f these word-studies is crucial to his explication o f the
relationship between poetry, language, and philosophy as well as being central to his
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overall project o f reinstating in the Western philosophical tradition a true appreciation o f
the question o f being.33
Being and the “Presencing” o f Beings
According to David Krell, Heidegger first focused on the terms to 6 v [Being/das

Sein] and r d

ovtqc [the world o f things/Aw

Seiende], concluding that these terms

connote not only the stasis o f “presence in time and place,” but the phenomenon o f

“coming to presence o f whatever presents itself, the Being o f beings, the eov o f eovTa”
(Krell 7-8).34The relevant fragment from Anaximander is
e£ uv be rj yeveo iq e o n TOiq ovai Kod tt|v <p$opdv etc; tccuto:
7 iv e a $ a i K ara to xpecov § i5 6 v ai 7 « p a u t d 8Ckt| v kcci tictlv
dXArjAoic; Tfjg aStK iag KaTa tt|V too xpovou Ta^iv. (qtd. in Early

Greek 13)
But where things have their origin, there too their passing away occurs
according to necessity; for they pay recompense and penalty to one another
for their recklessness, according to firmly established time. (Diels, qtd. in

Early Greek 13)
What Diels translates as “things” in the very first phrase “e£ div be f| 7 evecdg
e o n TOtq ouoi” Heidegger takes as “t« ovto:” [things/beings] {Early Greek 20). It is
only later in the essay that he makes clear that he also takes eivoti, e o n v , o v , and r d

ouroc, traditionally translated as “to be,” “is,” “being,” and “beings” to be so integrally
related as to raise the same problems o f interpretation and translation {Early Greek 23).
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This is the nexus o f words surrounding the question o f how Greek philosophers before
Plato conceived the question o f Being— a question that to Heidegger’s mind remains
unanswered: “all the notions and representation we have inherited from Greek philosophy
remain in the same confusion, exiled for millennia” (Early Greek 25). For his part,
Heidegger proposes a phenomenology o f “presencing” as that which thinking first takes
up as its concern. It is a two-fold process o f revealing and concealing, which can
appropriately called “Becoming,” conceived in a positive sense rather than in its
traditionally pejorative sense o f something not yet actual (Early Greek 31). Being, which
Heidegger defines at one point as “the incipient power gathering everything to itself,
which in this manner releases every being to its own self,” brings beings into presence,
while necessarily hiding itself in the very act o f doing so (Poetry, Language 100). What it
reveals about itself in beings is therefore always imbued with paradox: “Beings come to
pass in that errancy by which they circumvent Being and establish the realm o f error (in
the sense o f the prince’s realm or the realm o f poetry)” (Early Greek 26). Traces o f this
sense o f Becoming can be found, according to Heidegger, in archaic uses o f the terms

y e v e o tq and <pdopa, used by Anaximander in the fragment, that stem from <pvoLq
‘nature,’ which Heidegger claims also bears the sense o f a “luminous rising and decline”:
T eveoig is coming forward and arriving in unconcealment. $ flo p a means
the departure and descent into concealment o f what has arrived there out
o f unconcealment. The coming forward into . . . and the departure to . . . .
become present within unconcealment between what is concealed and what
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is unconcealed. They initiate the arrival and departure o f whatever has
arrived. {Early Greek 30)
What is concealed or unconcealed is, according to Heidegger, toc OPTa ‘beings,’ and he
notes at least one ancient use o f this term that “poetically brings to language what ovt«
names” {Early Greek 32-33). It occurs in an early passage (lines 68-72) in The Iliad,
where Kalchas the augur is described as one who sees past, present, and future.
. . . toloi 5 dveoTTi

KdAxa? ©eoTopidiqg oioovoiroAwv ox’ dpiarog

oq 'qS'p

to t

eovTa t« t’ eaaopeva itpo

t govto

Ka i vtiead T|7T^aa:T, ’ Axaicov ’'IAiov eiaw
6ia pavToauvriv, rr\v oi nope tpoipog ’AnoXAtov
. . . and among them stood up
Kalchas, Thestor’s son, far the best o f the bird interpreters,
who knew all that is, is to be, or once was,
who guided into the land o f Ilion the ships o f the Achaeans
through that seercraft o f his own that Phoibos Apollo gave him.
(Lattimore, qtd. in Early Greek 33)
According to Heidegger, it is important to note the etymological link between oq

tfdri, characterizing Kalchas as one o f those who “knew,” and this verb as a form o f
olbep [he has seen] {Early Greek 33). This relationship provides Homer with a way o f
understanding the seer as one who has already gone forth to see the future and who now
“sees” it as something that has already happened. Therefore what becomes present to the
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seer is, as the passage states, the “three-fold” o f “to: t e o v ra Ta t ’ eaao|xeva irpo t ’
eovTa.” These three presences, as the seer perceives them, are both discreet and the same.
They are:
an open expanse . . . o f unconcealment, into which and within which
whatever comes along lingers......... What is past and what is to come also
become present, namely as outside the expanse o f unconcealment.........
Even what is absent is something present, for as absent from the expanse, it
presents itself in unconcealment. What is past and what is to come are also
eovTa. Consequently eov means becoming present in unconcealment.

(Early Greek 34-35)
“True time,” according to Heidegger, “ is the arrival o f that which has been” (On the Way
176).35 Here Heidegger’s “preliminary observation” about the ancient Ionian and Aeolian
forms o f TO OP and Ta optoc becomes important as a mode o f thinking o f “being” as that
which “is” or “exists,” since he believes that “ [t]he epsilon in “eov” and “eovTa” [dropped
as early as Plato and Aristotle] is the epsilon in the root ea o f “eoTiv, est, esse and ‘is’”

{Early Greek 32). A few decades after Anaximander, Heidegger observes, Parmenides
establishes both eop and e lp a i as the “fundamental words o f Western thinking” {Early

Greek 38). But he denies that Parmenides or his followers understood eoTiv chiefly in
terms o f the copula; rather, he contends, even Aristotle understood “essence” not as a
predicate that categorizes an object, but in its primal sense o f napovoL a ‘presence o f
things’ {Early Greek 38).
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“Saying” as “Laying Before”
Heidegger admits that the concept o f future and past as implicit in presencing or
unconcealment is a difficult one, and he contends that the experience o f Being comes to
language as a riddle that in the end only poetic thinking can solve (Early Greek 58). Greek
thinkers offered their own solution by “designating” this presencing or unconcealing as

A o yo q (Early Greek 39). A e y t i v ‘saying’ is therefore taken up by Heidegger as a key to
understanding what poetic thinking is, and he takes care, especially in his study o f a
fragment attributed to Heraclitus, to articulate what he regards as its original usage. This
fragment (B50) reads,
ouk

e|iou aXXa

tou

A070U ctKouaaTag

6|xoXo7 e lv aotpov ea-riv 'E v Ila v T a . (qtd. in Early Greek 59)
When you have listened not to me but to the Meaning,
it is wise within the same Meaning to say: One is All.
(Snell, qtd. in Early Greek 59)
The key to understanding this particular “riddle,” according to Heidegger, is to think
about a.KOvaavToi.Q, A o y o v, and o^ioX oyelv in their basic forms o f aKOveiv, A o yo q
and Xeyea* {Early Greek 59-60). He outlines three successive, diachronic ways in which
ancient writers employed X e y e iv and which still occur (synchronically) in current usage.
The first use was in the sense o f a “collecting” and “gathering” that which is heard.
“Hearing is primarily gathered hearkening,” Heidegger observes, adding the startling
comment, “ We do not hear because we have ears. We have ears, i.e., our bodies are
equipped with ears, because we hear” {Early Greek 65). This “hearkening,” Heidegger
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asserts, is the prerequisite for a gathering together o f that which comes to be expressed in
language, and he compares it to the Latin legere, rendered as “collecting and bringing
together” {Early Greek 61). He assimilates this usage with a second that, for the most
part, eventually supersedes it—that o f “laying down” or “bringing before”: “A e7 Gtv is to
lay. Laying is the letting-lie-before— which is gathered into itself—o f that which comes
together into presence” {Early Greek 63). Finally, “laying before” attains a third and
perhaps more commonly understood sense o f “saying.” But even this saying, as the fruit o f
listening and gathering, is not yet an element o f a signifying system: “A e y e iv as laying, is
determined neither by vocalization (cpuv'q) nor by signifying (arj|i.oaveiv)” {Early Greek
64). Rather, saying as showing or ushering-into-view is a mode o f conceiving Being that is
more ocular than oral. Heidegger had emphasized this point already in Being and Time:
“Being is that which shows itself in the pure perception which belongs to beholding, and
only by such seeing does Being get discovered. Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure
beholding” (215). Like Homer’s p.avToauviqv ‘seercraft,’ it is a beholding-in-advance o f
that which becomes present as one thing:
Do we wonder off the path if we think Ao^og as A e ^ eiv prior to all
profound metaphysical interpretations, thereby thinking to establish
seriously that X e yeiv, as gathering letting-lie-together-before, can be
nothing other than the essence o f unification, which assembles everything
in the totality o f simple presencing? {Early Greek 70)
Heidegger’s notion o f Xoyoq is here identified with his explication o f X e y e iv , he can
therefore say that “the Xoyoq by itself brings that which appears and comes forward in its
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lying before us to appearance— to its luminous self-showing” {Early Greek 64). In
addition, Heidegger’s metaphors continue to forge a close relationship between becoming
present and becoming visible, which leads him to two additional important terms for
defining poetic thinking—ipaaiq and a X i)$ e ia .
Illumination and Truth
Heidegger introduces <paoLg in the context o f two fragments by Parmenides on

Moipa [Fate], the first o f which is the short phrase “to Yap ai>TO voelv eariv T6 Kai

elvai” [For thinking and Being are the same] (qtd. in Early Greek 79). In the second,
longer fragment there appears the similar line “raurov 6' earl voelv re Kal ovveKev

e o n vo rjp a ” [Thinking and the thought “it is” are the same], followed by the cryptic “ov

Yap aveu

tou govtoq,

ev w TretpaTiapevvov ecmv, / eupriaeic;

to

voelv:” [For

without the being in relation to which it is uttered you cannot find thinking;] (Diels-Kranz,
qtd. in Early Greek 79).36Heidegger argues that in the second fragment Parmenides
“experiences voelv as TteipaTiopevvov” in the sense o f thinking as a process of
revealing: “Noelv, taking-heed-of, and what it takes up, are something said, something
brought forward into view” {Early Greek 90). Once again, Heidegger makes an
identification o f terms, this time claiming that the “essence” o f ipaoKeiv, from which

TTe(paTiOfievvov is derived, means “to invoke, to call upon,” as in “letting something
appear,” and as in describing the “phases” [y?dw], that is, the coming into view and fading
from view o f the moon and stars {Early Greek 90).

[I say], which shares the same

root [<FA], is thereby identified with the “essence” o f XeYCo: “to bring what is present in
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its presencing forward into shining appearance, into lying-before” (Early Greek 90). This
etymology allows Heidegger to propose that Parmenides and Heraclitus were “saying” the
same thing: “What Parmenides thinks as tp a aig Heraclitus calls the A070Q, the letting-liebefore that gathers” {Early Greek 93). In sum, “[W]e have to learn to think the essence o f
language from the saying, and to think saying as letting-lie-before (A070C;) and as
bringing-forward-into-view (<pacng)” {Early Greek 91).
Heidegger’s genealogy o f saying uncovers for him the metaphor o f language as
that which illuminates what is coming to presence as being. The moment o f illumination in
speech, however, is not equivalent to its expression. In “The Way to Language,”
Heidegger argues that
saying is in no way the linguistic expression added to the phenomena after
they have appeared— rather, all radiant appearance and all fading away is
grounded in the showing Saying.. . . Saying pervades and structures the
openness o f that clearing which every appearance must seek out and every
disappearance leave behind, and in which every present or absent being
must show, say, announce itself. {On the Way 126)
In the phenomenology o f saying, there are two phases: speech that enables things to
emerge or become ontologically visible as things and speech that utilizes language as
iteration:
To satisfy this demand [of preserving language’s first phase] remains a
difficult task because the first illumination o f the essence o f language as
saying disappears immediately into a veiling darkness and yields
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ascendancy to a characterization o f language which relentlessly represents
it in terms o f ipcoviQ, vocalization, and ultimately o f data and information.

{Early Greek 91)37
4>doig, for Heidegger, comprises a synonymic series o f dual metaphors:
hearkening/beholding, collecting/gathering, illuminating/concealing, laying
before/presencing, and showing/saying. Although he begins his discussion with X e yeiv,
followed by cpaaig, he eventually inverts the hierarchy o f their relationship. In the end,

A o y o q receives its valence from <pa.aiq via that term’s derivation from the root <PAfl ‘to
shine.’ Schein and Scheinen as “appearing” and “coming to light” are similarly emphasized
in An Introduction to Metaphysics, where Heidegger alludes to one o f Sappho’s
fragments:
a o re p e g |xev d|jupi K a \a v aeX av v av
cty diruKpuirTOiaL ipaevvov et5og
otnroTa itXridotao: p a X iaT a Xap.'jrq yctv (34 Eust. U. 729. 20)
The stars hide away their shining forms around the lovely moon when in all
her fullness she shines (over all) the earth, (trans. Campbell 83)
Heidegger concludes, “When we say: the moon shines \scheint\, this means not only that
it spreads a glow [Schein], a certain brightness, but also: it stands in the sky, it is present,
it is. The stars shine: glittering, they are present. Here appearance [Schein] means exactly
the same as being” (85). For Heidegger, Schein does carry the double meaning o f
“glowing” and “being present.” It is, however, the second meaning, “being present,” or
perhaps more precisely, “appearing” that he wants to point out as equivalent to “being.”
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The ultimate importance o f this illumination, succinctly if cryptically summarized in
his oracular “The event o f lighting is the world,” leads Heidegger to consider its relation
to Truth {Early Greek 118). The initial “disclosure” and immediate reciprocal concealment
o f the Being o f beings, according to Heidegger, is indeed what the pre-Socratics meant by
aA fjdeio: [truth,] so that in the end we have the ultimate identification o f cpaoig, \ 070g,
and d A rjd e ia : “Because Ab^oq lets lie before us what lies before us as such, it discloses
what is present in its presencing. But disclosure is ’ A X rjdeia. This and Aoyog are the
Same. A e y etv lets d A r ^ e ia , unconcealed as such, lie before us” {Early Greek 70).38
Once again, however, Heidegger calls attention to what he perceives as an original use o f
the term that, since Plato, has gradually become opaque to the very language to which it
gave birth. Disclosure ( A A rideia) engenders a beholding-saying (<pdaicr-\e7 eiv),
which, for the thinker-poet, illuminates the reason {Ao'yoq) such that it can “think” the
disclosure in an assertion (<paaeiv-ipcdv<o). In Being and Time, Heidegger had argued
that this asserting (“discourse” } “helps to constitute the disclosedness o f Being-in-the
World” (205). A070C;, later conceived as the “natural light” o f Reason in Western
philosophy, therefore has a dual nature:

Lumen naturale, natural light, i.e., the illumination o f reason, already
presupposes the disclosure o f the duality. The same holds true o f the
Augustinian and medieval views o f light— not to mention their Platonic
origins— which could only develop under the tutelage o f a n ’ AArjdeLO:
already reigning in the destiny o f the duality. {Early Greek 97)
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Heidegger’s perception o f this inherent duality in what it means both to say and to
assert the truth is central to the relationship he establishes between poetry and thinking.
The “thinking” o f which he speaks in conjunction with poetry is a hearkening to Being that
is prior to the illumination o f reason and the formal fashioning o f any poem (or art in
general): “Thinking o f Being is the original way o f poetizing. Language first comes to
language, i.e., into its essence, in thinking. Thinking says what the truth o f Being dictates .
. . . [It] is primordial poetiy, prior to all p o esy ,. . . since art shapes its work within the
realm o f language” (Early Greek 19). And while he concentrates on this synchronic
revelation o f truth in language, it is nevertheless important to Heidegger’s own “thinking”
that historically it was the Greeks who first “beheld” Being: “What is Greek is the dawn o f
that destiny in which Being illuminates itself in beings and so propounds a certain essence
o f man . . . . ” (Early Greek 25). Heidegger calls this “the poetizing o f the truth o f Being in
the historic dialogue between thinkers” (Early Greek 57). The original and fecund
dialogue is one in which Being “shines,” speaking in this way to mortals as beings who
care and who, ever cognizant o f error, endeavor nevertheless to shadow this dialogue to
fellow mortals in order to invoke in them a memory in kind. Heidegger argues that
“Mvp-oauviq is mother o f the muses,” (Early Greek 36) and in one o f his own poems
published under the collective title o f “The Thinker as Poet,” he writes,
The oldest o f the old follows behind
us in our thinking and yet it
comes to meet us.
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That is why thinking holds to the
coming o f what has been, and
is remembrance. {Poetry, Language 10)
Holderlin and Thinking Poetry
According to Steiner, it is Heidegger’s “strangely Platonic” view that “[t]o think
fundamentally is not to analyze but to ‘memorate’ (Denken ist andenhen), to remember
Being so as to bring it into radiant disclosure” (129).39 One o f the most important things
the poet does is to recognize, in the sense o f a re-cognition, what is burgeoning forth in
language as thought. For Heidegger, this “seercraft” was best exemplified in the poetry o f
Friederich Holderlin (1770-1843). Like Heidegger, Holderlin was “prepossessed by the
magnitude o f the Greek intelligence” (Middleton, xii). He translated Sophocles and Pindar,
and Christopher Middleton categorizes him as a poet in the ancient pastoral tradition,
whose metrics often can be characterized as “Greco-Alemannic” (xi-xii). His
contemporary philosophical influences included Schelling and Hegel, both o f whom he
met, as well as Herder and Schiller (Middleton iv, xv-xvi). He even attended Fichte’s
lectures, but, as Middleton notes, could not in the end accept what he perceived in
Fichte’s ideas as a radical subjectivism (xix).
Steiner contends that Heidegger found in Holderlin’s poetry “one o f those very
rare, immeasurably important expressions o f man’s fallenness, o f his ostracism from Being
and the gods, and simultaneously, a statement o f this very condition whose truth and lyric
power give assurance o f rebirth” (141-142). Heidegger read in Holderlin’s lyrics the
poetic expression o f his own philosophical project o f recovering the meaning o f Being.
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In his “Note” attached to “Remembrance o f the Poet,” for example, Heidegger remarks
that he was not attempting literary criticism as such in that essay (which includes detailed
explication o f specific passages in Holderlin) nor in “Holderlin and the Essence o f Poetry.”
Instead, he writes, these essays “arise from a necessity o f thought” and can best be read in
the light o f two o f his more conventionally philosophical essays, “On the Essence o f
Truth” and “What is Metaphysics” {Existence and Being 232).40 Although Heidegger
treats at some length a few other poets, such as Rilke and Trakl, it is Holderlin who
figures most prominently in those o f Heidegger’s lectures and essays that focus upon
poetry and poetic thought.41
Even the essay “What Are Poets For?” ostensibly a lengthy treatment o f Rilke’s
poetry, is made to serve as a litmus test o f whether or not Rilke is a “true” poet in
comparison to Holderlin.42In the first section o f this essay, for example, Heidegger
articulates his vision o f the poet’s vocation in the context o f Holderlin’s elegy “Bread and
Wine.” Midway through the poem, the speaker asks the question that had been used in
truncated form in the essay’s title: “What are poets for in a destitute time?” The question
is embedded in a lament that the gods, both o f Greece and Jerusalem, have departed from
earth. Humans now languish in a “Night,” a time when everyone is “asleep” and no one
listens to poetry. Yet, the voice says, even the Night is sometimes sweet:
Aber zuweilen liebt auch klares Auge den Schatten
Und versuchet zu Lust, eh’ es die Noth ist, den Schlaf,
Oder es blikt auch gem ein treuer Mann in die Nacht hin,
Ja, es ziemet sich ihr Kranze zu weihn und Gesang,
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Weil den Irrenden sie geheiliget ist und den Todten,
Selber aber besteht, ewig, in freiestem Geist.
Aber sie muB uns auch, daB in der zaudemden Weile,
DaB im Finstem fur uns einiges Haltbare sei,
Nonetheless there are times when clear eyes too love the shadows,
Tasting sleep uncompelled, trying the pleasure it gives,
Or a loyal man too will gaze into Night and enjoy it,
Yes, and rightly to her garlands we dedicate, humans,
Since to all those astray, the mad and the dead she is sacred,
Yet herself remains firm, always, her spirit most free.
But to us in her turn, so that in the wavering moment,
Deep in the dark there shall be something that endures,
(Hamburger 242-43, 2.7-14)43
Most importantly for the poet, the night is an eschatological sign, a necessary prelude to
the gods’ return, even though it marks a time o f deafness, blindness, and suffering:
und stark machet die Noth und die Nacht
BiB daB Helden genug in der ehemen Wiege gewachsen,
Herzen an Kraft, wie sonst, ahnlich den Himmlischen sind.
Donnernd kommen sie drauf.

Night and distress make us strong
Till in that cradle o f steel heroes enough have been fostered,
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Hearts in strength can match heavenly strength as before.
Thundering then they come. (Hamburger 248-250, 7.8-11)
Meanwhile, the poets flit about, hardly wanted, like Dionysus’ priests, “ Welche von Lande

zu Land zogen in heiliger Nachf ’ [Who in holy Night roamed from one place to the next]
(Hamburger 250-51, 7.16) until “Seelige Weise sehns; ein Ldcheln aus der gefangnen /

Seele leuchtet, dem Licht thauet ihr Auge noch a u f” [Blissful, the wise men see it; in souls
that were captive there gleams a / Smile, and their eyes shall yet thaw in response to the
light] (Hamburger 252-53, 9.15-16).
Heidegger quickly makes clear that he interprets this poem against the background
not o f Romanticism, but in the context o f Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical legacy,
which he understands as having introduced a new historical era, “the era to which we
ourselves still belong,” chiefly characterized by a “double Not: the No-more o f the gods
that have fled and the Not-yet o f the god that is coming” {Poetry, Language 91; Existence

and Being 289). This is not to say, however, that humans have been delivered from a
world well lost. For Holderlin, at least, the gods were integral to a reality o f which humans
had lost sight and even memory. Middleton notes, for example, that one o f the questions
that preoccupied Holderlin from his youth was “[w]hat is to be done when divine and
human planes o f being cease to connect” (xvi). Heidegger argues that it is this loss o f
relationship that provokes at once a sense o f melancholia and foreboding within human
societies: “The time o f the world’s night is the destitute time, because it becomes ever
more destitute. It has already grown so destitute, it can no longer discern the default o f
God as a default” {Poetry, Language 91). Only a “turn” on the part o f mortals would
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allow the immortals a “return,” but the destitution becomes such that few even realize the
dire state o f affairs ( Poetry, Language 92-93). In the seventh stanza o f “Bread and
Wine,” the speaker exclaims that even if the gods are willing to return, the very sight o f
them, in this era o f destitution and forgetfulness, would blind rather than reveal.
Aber Freund! Wir kommen zu spat. Zwar leben die Gotter
Aber tiber dem Haupt droben in anderer Welt.
Endlos wirken sie da und scheinens wenig zu achten,
Ob wir leben, so sehr schonen die Himmlischen uns.
Denn nicht immer vermag ein schwaches GefaB sie zu fassen,
Nur zu Zeiten ertragt gottliche Ftille der Mensch.
But, my friend, we have come too late. Though the gods are living,
Over our heads they live, up in a different world,
Endlessly there they act and, such is their kind wish to spare us,
Little they seem to care whether we live or do not.
For not always a frail, a delicate vessel can hold them,
Only at times can our kind bear the full impact o f gods.
Ever after our life is dream about them. (Hamburger 248-49, 7.1-7)
The poet is one o f those few who might “hold them” and who ventures into what has
become a void in consciousness, there to find and listen anew to the gods and afterwards
return as a herald o f a new age: “Poets are the mortals who . . . sense the trace o f the
fugitive gods, stay on the gods’ tracks, and so trace for their kindred mortals the way
toward the turning” ( Poetry, Language 94).
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Holderlin o f course precedes Nietzsche, but Heidegger avoids the charge o f
anachronism by casting him in this role o f “precursor o f poets”— someone who “does not
go off into a future; rather, he arrives out o f that future, in such a way that the future is
present only in the arrival o f his words” {Poetry, Language 142). In Ho Merlin’s
“Exhortation,” a voice prophecies:
Und er, der sprachlos waltet und unbekannt
Zukunftiges bereitet, der Gott, der Geist
Im Menschenwort, am schonen Tage
Kommenden Jahren, wie einst, sich ausspricht.
And he who silent rules and in secret plans
Things yet to come, the Godhead, the Spirit housed
In human words, once more, at noontide,
Clearly will speak to the future ages.
(Hamburger 162-63, 25-28)
Heidegger relates this poetic mission to his own philosophical account o f Being:
The poet thinks his way into the locale defined by that lightening o f Being
which has reached its characteristic shape as the realm o f Western
metaphysics in its self-completion.. . . The locality to which Holderlin
came is a manifestness o f Being, a manifestness which itself belongs to the
destiny o f Being and which, out o f that destiny, is intended for the poet.

{Poetry, Language 95)
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The remainder o f the essay “What Are Poets For?” is devoted to answering the
question o f whether or not “we modems” can identify a contemporary poet who has
likewise ventured into this “abyss” and found a place from which to recall kindred humans
to Being; specifically, whether Rilke is such a poet {Poetry, Language 96). Meanwhile,
Holderlin’s poems remain relevant because it is still night, a “holy” night that in its silence
waits for a word: “This is why the poet in the time o f the world’s night utters the holy.
This is why, in Holderlin’s language, the world’s night is the holy night” {Poetry,

Language 94).
Greek theology and Christian eschatology are similarly implicit in Heidegger’s
exegesis o f Holderlin’s long poem “Homecoming,” which appears in its entirety in the
essay “Remembrance o f the Poet” {Existence and Being 236-242). Rejecting both “elegy”
and “hymn” as appropriate categories, Heidegger calls it a “meditation” on the “Holy,”
defined as “that which the poet in his poethood invokes” {Existence and Being 233).44
Subtitled “To Kindred Ones” and divided into five stanzas, it describes the joys, and (at
least Heidegger will insist) the sorrows o f a homecoming. The speaker in the poem is
sailing across a lake towards harbor and home, commenting on the surroundings and at
times addressing the beloved “kinsmen” who wait on shore.45 Once again it is night, but a
night that is nevertheless “bright,” and the sailor is cognizant o f the “Joyous” : “There amid
the Alps it is still bright night and the cloud, / Writing o f the Joyous, covers the night
within the yawning valley” (1.1-2). The first stanza continues as a hymn to Nature. In the
second stanza, the homecomer praises the “ [bjlissfiil god rejoicing in the play o f holy
beams” (2.4) and in the third testifies to praying often to this god (“Much spoke I to him,
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for whatever poets meditate or sing / Is o f value chiefly to the angels and to him”) on
behalf o f home and kindred, who seem “beset with care” (3.1 -2, 5). In the fourth and fifth
stanzas, the speaker offers praises once again for the beauty o f the surrounding hills and
valleys, expressing a desire to “go out into the much-promising distance, / There, where
wonders a r e ......... ” but even more, “[t]o go home, where flowering ways are known to
me” (4.7-8, 14). Lastly, the “Angels” o f house and year are invoked, that they would
“Ennoble! Rejuvenate! So that no human good, no / Hour o f the day may be fittingly
hallowed / Without the Joyful Ones and without such joy as now,” adding only that we
must be careful in our invocations: “No god loves what is unseemly; / To grasp him [god],
our joy is scarcely large enough. / Often we must keep silence; holy names are lacking”
(5.21-23, 27-29). For the kindred ones who await the homecomer’s arrival, however, any
“cares” such as these are to be subsumed under the greater joy; it is the poet alone who,
“whether he wills or no,” must “bear” them (5.35-36).
Heidegger makes much o f the ultimate phrase o f the poem, uaber die anderen

nicht” [but the others not] (5.36), arguing that the poem is in fact framed by dual negative
images o f the traditional, stereotyped picture o f the joy o f homecoming. The first stanza o f
the poem includes, for example, a description o f the machinations o f nature that,
Heidegger observes, is not so much homely as terrifically sublime (.Existence and Being
243): “Cascades are falling, the ground steams under the tumbling, / Echo sounds all
about, and the imponderable workshop / Moves its arm by day and night, conferring gifts”
(1.16-18). Heidegger also interprets Holderlin’s use o f seems in “All seems familiar, even
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the hastening greeting / Seems the greeting o f friends, each face seems congenial” (3.1718) which occurs at the end o f stanza three, in its strongest sense o f implying that an
opposite state o f affairs actually obtains. Even though the homecomer is happy to see the
kindred, true familiarity with them is unlikely; according to Heidegger, they “shut away
what is most their own” (Existence and Being 244). This reticence and liminal anxiety,
Heidegger argues, emerges clearly in the last stanza, and he cautions against a simplistic
reading o f the poem’s overall message.
Often we must keep silence; holy names are lacking,
Hearts beat and yet does speech still hold back?
But lyre-music lends to each hour its sounds
And perhaps rejoices the heavenly ones who draw near.
This makes ready and thus care too is almost
Placated already—the care that entered into the joy.
Cares like these, whether he wills or no, a singer
Must bear in his soul and often, but the others not. (5.28-35)
Heidegger first notes that, despite the poem’s consistent reference to the divine, there is
no “holy name” by which its presence can be invoked such that humans could “grasp” it.
Thus, the “singer” knows that song, or speech, is inappropriate, which leaves only the
dumb music o f the lyre to “perhaps” charm the gods.46This is the burden o f the poet— to
be filled with a joy that can be expressed only in melody that “perhaps rejoices the
heavenly ones who draw near” and serves to “placate” those kindred who grow uneasy
performing a ritual in which they cannot name what they worship:
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Therefore too the people o f the country may not attempt to make to
themselves a god by cunning and thus put aside by force the supposed lack.
But neither may they accommodate themselves merely by calling on an
accustomed god. . . . So for the poet’s care there is only one possibility:
without fear o f the appearance o f godlessness he must remain near the
failure o f the god [to appear], and wait long enough in the prepared
proximity o f the failure, until out o f the proximity o f the failing god the
initial word is granted, which names the High One. (.Existence and Being
265)
Heidegger takes the “others” found in the ultimate phrase o f the last line o f the poem

“aber die anderen nicht” ‘but the others not’ to mean the homecomer’s “kindred,” who
are exempted from the care that the singer must always bear, “whether he wills or no”

(Existence and Being 266).47 This he takes to be fair warning about the sorrows awaiting
poets who decide to follow their calling. In the autobiographical poem, “Home,” Holderlin
bears witness to this destiny. It begins:
Froh kehrt der Schiffer heim an den stillen Strom,
Von Inseln femher, wenn er geemdtet hat;
So kam’ auch ich zur Heimath, hatt’ ich
Giiter so viele, wie Laid, geerndtet.

Denn sie, die uns das himmlische Feuer leihn,
Die Gotter schenken heiliges Laid uns auch,
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Drum bleibe difi. Ein sohn der Erde
Schein’ ich; zu lieben gemacht, zu leiden.
Content the boatman turns to the river’s calm
From distant isles, his harvest all gathered in;
So too would I go home now, had I
Reaped as much wealth as I ’ve gathered sorrow.

For they who lend us heavenly light and fire,
The gods, with holy sorrow endow us too.
So be it then. A son o f Earth I
Seem; and was fashioned to love, to suffer.
(Hamburger 142-43, 1.1-4; 6.1-4)
The poet is forever coming home to dwell once again, if possible, in the homeland. “The
vocation o f the poet is homecoming,” Heidegger observes, “by which the homeland is first
made ready as the land o f proximity to the source. To guard the mystery o f the reserving
proximity to the M ost Joyous,. . . that is the care o f homecoming” {Existence and Being
266). And in “The Poet’s Vocation,” Holderlin writes,
Wenn edler, denn das Wild, der Mann sich
Wehret und nahrt! denn es gilt ein anders,
Zu sorg’ und Dienst den Dichtenden anvertraut!
Der Hochste, der ists, dem wir geeignet sind,
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Daft naher, immemeu besungen
Ihn die befreundete Brust vemehme.
When, nobler than wild beasts, men work to
Fend, to provide for themselves—to poets
A different task and calling have been assigned.
The Highest, he it is whom alone we serve,
So that more closely, ever newly
Sung, he will meet with a friendly echo.
(Hamburger 172-733, 3.3-4; 4.1-4)
Therefore, according to Heidegger, even though the people o f the homeland do not bear
the poet’s burden, they are not exempt from the responsibility o f the care o f listening to
the singer/homecomer: “The ‘not’ [of the last line o f “Homecoming”] is the mysterious
call ‘to ’ the others in the fatherland, to become hearers, in order that for the first time they
should learn to know the essence o f the homeland. ‘The others’ must for the first time
learn to consider the mystery o f the reserving proximity” (Existence and Being 266-67).
According to Heidegger, although this poem is framed by a cautionary tale o f
hearing yet failing to hear, it nevertheless establishes a close association between
homecoming and joy (variously termed throughout the poem as the “Joyous,” the “Most
Joyous,” and the “Joyous One”). The epitaph o f the address, for example, is a couplet by
Holderlin: “Little knowledge, but much joy / Is given to mortals. . . {Existence and

Being 243).48 “The Joyous” occurs as early as the second line, where, in a curious
personification, a cloud that covers the valley is said to be “writing o f the Joyous” as a
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portent o f hope: “There amid the Alps it is still bright night and the cloud / Writing o f the
Joyous, covers the night within the yawning valley” (.Existence and Being 236). For
Heidegger, the cloud is that which both reveals and conceals the gods:
The cloud hovers between the summits o f the Alps, and covers the
mountain ravines, down into whose unlighted depths the serenifying beam
o f light penetrates. But the cloud . . . dreams between the heights towards
the Joyous. The cloud, as it composes, points upward into the Serene.

(.Existence and Being 250)
Serene does not occur in the poem; it is the term Heidegger chooses to describe that into
which all forms o f the joyous resolve: “The cloud is serenified into the Serene. What it
writes, the ‘Joyous,’ is the Serene” {Existence and Being 247). The cloud, then, works as
an analogy o f the relationship between Being and being. Just as the cloud, although
occluding the valley’s view o f heaven, writes the Joyous by virtue o f being lit from the
brightness o f the Serene above it, so the poet, who has become an ephemera in the
“destitute time” o f the forgetfulness o f gods, can write Being by virtue o f dwelling and
listening in proximity to that which is at present forgotten. And just as the poet, by
venturing into the nearness o f Being, allows language to come to poetry, so “The cloud
writes p o etry .. . . The poetry does not come from the cloud. It comes upon the cloud in
the form o f what the cloud is lingering over against” {Existence and Being 247). Being
cannot be revealed without human speech; the “high one” cannot reach down to mortals
without the help o f one who “first (and therefore alone) comes singing to meet the Joyous
One and already forms part o f him” {Existence and Being 252). This “First” is someone
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“who poetically rejoices in the face o f the greeting heralds, in order that he, alone and in
advance, may first conceal the greeting in the word” (Existence 268-69). In “The Rhine,”
Holderlin reflects again upon this sense o f vocation, although in this poem he is obviously
less sanguine about home and homecoming:
Es haben aber an eigner
Unsterblichkeit die Gotter genug, und bedurfen
Die Himmlischen eines Dings,
So sinds Heroen und Menschen
Und Sterbliche sonst. Denn weil
Die Seeligsten nichts fuhlen von selbst,
Mufl wohl, wenn solches zu sagen
Erlaubt ist, in der Gotter Nahmen
Theilnehmend fuhlen ein Andrer,
Den brauchen sie; jedoch ihr Gericht
Ist, daB sein eigenes Haus
Zerbreche der und das Liebste
Wie den Feind schelt’ und sich Vater und Kind
Begrabe unter den Trummem,
Wenn einer, wie sie, seyn will und nicht
Ungleiches dulden, der Schwarmer.
But their own immortality
Suffices the gods, and if
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The Heavenly have need o f one thing,
It is o f heroes and human beings
And other mortals. For since
The most Blessed in themselves feel nothing
Another, if to say such a thing is
Permitted, must, I suppose,
Vicariously feel in the name o f the gods,
And him they need; but their rule is that
He shall demolish his
Own house and curse like an enemy
Those dearest to him and under the rubble
Shall bury his father and child
When one aspires to be like them, refusing
To bear with inequality, the fantast. (Hamburger 415, 8)
Steiner comments that for Heidegger, “It is the poet’s calling— literal, soul-consuming,
imperative to the point o f personal ruin— to bring creation into the neighborhood o f the
divine” (142). “Homecoming,” then, signifies yet another dual relationship: that between
the poet and the Joyous One(s) and that between the poet and fellow mortals. The poet,
“first (and therefore alone)” already has made a homecoming by returning to “the
proximity o f the source” {Existence and Being 252, 256). Now, however, the poet’s
vocation calls for an additional homecoming that is “bringing near the Near, while keeping
it at a distance. Proximity to the source is a mystery” {Existence and Being 259).

90

Neither poet nor kindred can know the Source; only the mystery can be known, and it
must be guarded carefully as such. There is that “reserve” in the kindred that creates
concern in the homecomer; there also is a guardedness in the poet that reserves for the
sake o f the holy. Bringing home mystery rather than science, however, makes the poet
appear foolish: “To say that something is near and that at the same time it remains at a
distance—this is tantamount either to violating the fundamental law o f ordinary thought,
the principle o f contradiction, or on the other hand to playing with empty words. . .

{Existence and Being 260). Because the poet is compelled to speak nevertheless, the
joyous homecoming, the hymn to God and mortals, heaven and earth becomes an elegy in
the midst o f the serenity o f joy. It is only nearness and mystery that are “revealed”; the
poet must bear with both the absence o f holy names and the kindred’s misunderstanding:
“Therefore the joy o f the poet is in fact the care o f the singer, whose singing guards the
Most Joyous as the reserved, and brings the sought-for near in a reserving proximity”

{Existence and Being 262). In this context, Heidegger quotes the epigram that Holderlin
wrote as a preface to his translation o f Sophocles’ tragedies:
Many have sought in vain to tell
joyously o f the Most Joyous. Now
at last it declares itself to me,
now in this grief. {Existence and Being 262)
For the poet, grief, sorrow, and care are the ultimate catalysts for true joy: “Grief,
separated from mere melancholy by a gap, is joy which is serenified for the Most Joyous,
so long as it still reserves itself and hesitates” {Existence and Being 262).
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However foolish it sounds, the poet is compelled to “sing.” Heidegger’s plea to his
audience is to take the foolishness to heart. He pleads with his listeners, for example, not
to separate the literal references in “Homecoming” to the Bodensee (the lake that he
assumes is the setting for the poem) from allusions in the same poem to “The citadel o f the
heavenly ones / As in the ancient belief,” and he delivers a jeremiad against what he
perceives as the intractable dullness o f his fellow Germans:
How long are we going to imagine that there was first o f all a part o f
nature existing for itself and a landscape existing for itself, and that then
with the help o f “poetic experiences” this landscape became colored with
myth? How long are we going to prevent ourselves from experiencing the
actual as actual? (Existence and Being 255)
The “innermost core” o f the poem, he had mentioned in passing in his prefatory remarks,
“is concealed in a line in the third stanza, which mentions the “‘people o f the country’”

{Existence and Being 234). The relevant context is: “Much [I prayed] for you also who
are beset with care in the fatherland, / To whom the holy gratitude smiling brings the
fugitive, / People o f the country! . . ( 3 . 5 - 7 ) . And although he adds that he does not
intend to address this “core” issue, by the end o f the essay Heidegger is speaking directly
to this point. His fellow Germans, the “people o f the country,” he will regard as fugitives
in their own land until they learn to share in the concern o f the poet for the fatherland as
that place o f “proximity to the Near” {Existence and Being 264). The homecoming o f the
poet, which “holds concealed the poetic call to the dearest in the homeland,” is destined
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eventually to become “the future o f the historical being o f the German people” {Existence

and Being 268).
Heidegger expands upon this theme o f the “actuality” o f thinking the world
poetically in “ . . Poetically Man Dwells . . .

In this essay, first presented as a lecture in

1951, Heidegger reiterates that the appeal o f language to which humans must respond is
“that which speaks in the element o f poetry” {Poetry, Language 216). Listening to
language and speaking language is the true nature o f homecoming, but this is not symbolic
homecoming; it is truly a return to an earthly dwelling in time and space. The title o f the
essay is taken from a line in Holderlin’s three-part poem “In Lieblicher Blaue . . . ” [“In
Lovely Blueness . . .”] .49 Heidegger comments upon just the last half o f the poem’s first
section and the very beginning o f the second section. It is the first section that contains the
phrase upon which he builds his essay. Albert Hofstadter translates the relevant lines as
“Full o f merit, yet poetically, man / dwells on this earth” {Poetry, Language 216). The
lines preceding this phrase are a series o f images that suggest someone looking up at a
church steeple with its bell tower set off against a bright blue sky. Then follow the
meditative lines that Heidegger examines:
So sehr einfaltig aber die Bilder, so sehr heilig sind die, dafi man wirklich
oft furchtet, die zu beschreiben. Die Himmlischen aber, die immer gut sind,
alles zumal, wie Reiche, haben diese, Tugend und Freude. Der Mensch darf
das nachahmen. Darf, wenn lauter Mtihe das Leben, ein Mensch
aufschauen und sagen: so will ich auch seyn? Ja. So lange die
Freundlichkeit noch am Herzen, die Reine, dauert, misset nicht ungltiklich
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der Mensch sich mit der Gottheit. 1st unbekannt Gott? 1st er offenbar wie
der Himmel? dieses glaub’ icht eher. Des Menschen MaaB ist’s. Voll
Verdienst, doch dichterisch, wohnet der Mensch auf dieser erde. Doch
reiner ist nicht der Schatten der Nacht mit den Stemen, wenn ich so sagen
konnte, als der Mensch, der heiBet ein, Bild der Gottheit.

Giebt es auf Erden ein MaaB? Es giebt keines. Nemlich es hemmen den
Donnergang nie die Welten des Schopfers. Auch eine Blume ist schon, weil
sie bltihet unter der Sonne. Es findet das Aug’ oft im Leben Wesen, die viel
schoner noch zu nennen waren als die Blumen. O! ich weiB das wohl!

Yet these images are so simple, so very holy are these, that really often one
is afraid to describe them. But the Heavenly, who are always good, all
things at once, like the rich, have these, virtue and pleasure. This men may
imitate. May, when life is all hardship, may a man look up and say: I too
would like to resemble these? Yes. As long as Kindliness, which is pure,
remains in his heart not unhappily a man may compare himself with the
divinity. Is God unknown? Is He manifest as the sky? This rather I believe.
It is the measure o f man. Full o f acquirements, but poetically man dwells on
this earth. But the darkness o f night with all the stars is not purer, if I could
put it like that, than man, who is called the image o f God.
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Is there a measure on earth? There is none. For never the Creator’s worlds
constrict the progress o f thunder. A flower too is beautiful, because it
blooms under the sun. Often in life the eye discovers beings that could be
called much more beautiful still than flowers. Oh, how well I know it!
(Hamburger 600-01)
In his introduction to Poetry, Language, Thought, which includes Heidegger’s
essay “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . . , ” Hofstader argues that Heidegger’s conception o f
truth evolved from an initial sense o f “the showing o f beings in overtness,” the 6iXr]deia
articulated in the pre-Socratic fragments, to include the sense o f a mutual “appropriation”
o f Being and beings. He bases this argument on an analysis o f Heidegger’s use o f
“e r e ig n e n which Heidegger traces etymologically not only to a “lighting” but to a proper
fitness or proportion that comes as a result o f a measuring:

Ereignen comes to mean . . . the joint process by which the four o f the
fourfold [earth, sky, divinities, mortals] are able, first, to come out into the
light and clearing o f truth . . . and secondly, to exist in appropriation o f and
to each other, belonging together in the round dance o f their being.. . .
(xxi)
The Serene, Heidegger states in “Remembrance o f the Poet,” “allots each thing to that
place o f existence where by its nature it belongs, so that it may stand there in the
brightness o f the Serene, like a still light, proportionate to its own being” {Existence and

Being 247). Mortals are those beings who recognize this dimension o f existence.
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In “The Way to Language” Heidegger personifies “appropriation,” describing it as “what
brings all present and absent beings each into their own from where they show themselves
in what they are, and where they abide according to their kind” (On the Way 127). It is
what “grants to mortals their abode within their nature, so that they may be capable o f
being those who speak” (On the Way 128). In “ . . Poetically Man Dwells . . .” Holderlin
suggests it is in looking heavenward that mortals obtain their own measure, the “image o f
God,” and Heidegger glosses by remarking that this “span” o f earth to sky is the
recognition that mortals are apportioned a “dwelling” in time and space: “The upward
glance passes aloft toward the sky, and yet it remains below on the earth. The upward
glance spans the between o f sky and earth. This between is measured out for the dwelling
o f man” (Poetry, Language 220). Therefore, “the taking o f measure is what is poetic in
dwelling” (Poetry, Language 221). God is unknown yet manifest in the sky and everything
that “blossoms” beneath it:
[T]he poet calls all the brightness o f the sights o f the sky and every sound
o f its courses and breezes into the singing word and there makes them
shine and ring.
. . . In the familiar appearances the poet calls the alien as that to which the
invisible imparts itself in order to remain what it is— unknown. (Poetry,

Language 225)
When the poet writes, “In lovely blueness the steeple . . . blossoms,” the dimension
o f dwelling has been marked out and apportioned from earth to sky and thus god to
mortal. And this is speaking the truth because it is “the disclosure o f appropriatiori,'>
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(Hofstadter xxi). Just as he exhorted his fellow Germans not to make two separate
realities o f the Bodensee as a lake and the Bodensee as a dwelling o f gods and mortals,
Heidegger cautions against taking images as fanciful representations o f the “merely”
physical. Rather, images are the “visible inclusions o f the alien in the sight o f the

familiar''’ (emphasis added) (Poetry, Language 226):
Because poetry takes that mysterious measure, to wit, in the face o f the
sky, therefore it speaks in “images.” . . . . The poetic saying o f images
gathers the brightness and sound o f the heavenly appearances into one with
the darkness and silence o f what is alien. By such sights the god surprises
us. In this strangeness he proclaims his unfaltering nearness. (Poetry,

Language 226)
Heidegger had used Holderlin’s phrase

. .poetically man dwells . . . ” in an earlier

lecture, “Holderlin and the Essence o f Poetry” (1936) as the last o f five
“pointers”— quotations from Holderlin that he believed captured the essence o f poetry.
His commentary on this last “pointer” serves as a summary and conclusion to a cumulative
argument based on the previous four:
THE FIVE POINTERS
1. Writing poetry: “That most innocent o f all occupations.” (Ill, 377.)

2. “Therefore has language, most dangerous o f possessions, been given to
man . . . so that he may affirm what he is. . . . ” (IV, 246.)
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3. “Much has man learnt.
Many o f the heavenly ones has he named,
Since we have been a conversation
And have been able to hear from one another.” (IV, 343.)
4. But that which remains, is established by the poets. (IV, 63.)
5. “Full o f merit, and yet poetically dwells
Man on this earth.” (VI, 25.) (Existence and Being 270)50
Pointer one is a quotation o f a remark that Holderlin made in a letter to his mother

{Existence and Being 272). Heidegger interprets Holderlin’s comment ironically, but not
before offering a persuasive defense o f a straightforward reading:
Writing poetry appears in the modest guise o f play. Unfettered, it invents
its world o f images and remains immersed in the realm o f the imagined.
This play thus avoids the seriousness o f decisions, which always in one way
or another create guilt. Hence writing poetry is completely harmless. And
at the same time it is ineffectual; since it remains mere saying and speaking.
It has nothing about it o f action, which grasps hold directly o f the real
world and alters it. Poetry is like a dream, and not real; a playing with
words, and not the seriousness o f action. Poetry is harmless and ineffectual.
For what can be less dangerous than mere speech? (Existence and Being
272)
Here Heidegger sets forth a description o f poetry as “play” t hat is strikingly similar to
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Riffaterre’s characterization o f poetry as a verbal “game” and a “puzzle” (Semiotics 164165). It is, however, this definition he ultimately rejects. This so-called poetry is the poetry
o f distraction and diversion, not reality. It exerts no influence; it is the least o f the forms o f
language. Juxtaposed to this view is Heidegger’s true estimation o f poetry as the essence
o f language. In Pointer Two he quotes a fragment from Holderlin: “Therefore has
language, most dangerous o f possessions, been given to man . . . so that he may affirm
what he is . . . . ” ( Existence and Being 270). According to Heidegger, this fragment places
language in the context o f a gift from the gods to man as a special creation (“godlike” and
“given the power to command and to accomplish”) and this power, the power to make
history, is volatile— simultaneously disruptive and creative (Existence and Being 273).
Even more importantly, according to Heidegger, is Holderlin’s insight that language is
dangerous to itself. Language manifests Being while preserving it, that is, allowing it to
remain concealed, but the perception o f that manifestation is always in danger o f being lost
in ordinary speech. It may become instrumental, something that is used as a thing at hand,
because “[i]n it [language], what is purest and what is most concealed, and likewise what
is complex and ordinary, can be expressed in words” {Existence and Being 275). This is
not to say that using language is not necessary to historical existence: “Even the essential
word, if it is to be understood and so become a possession in common, must make itself
ordinary” {Existence and Being 275). But, as equipment or tool, language runs the
supreme risk o f being forgotten in its primary function as “that event which disposes o f the
supreme possibility o f existence” {Existence and Being 276-77). To the poet is given the
task o f preserving language (bringing its essence to remembrance): “[T]he poet also uses
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the word— not, however, like ordinary speakers and writers who have to use them up, but
rather in such a way that the word only now becomes and remains truly a word” (Poetry,

Language 48).
In his “Celebration o f Peace,” Holderlin calls humanity a “conversation”
‘Gesprach,’ demonstrating for Heidegger that language must be considered an essential
characteristic o f what it is to be human.51
Much has man learnt.
Many o f the heavenly ones has he named,
Since we have been a conversation
And have been able to hear from one another. (Existence and Being 277)
The nature o f conversation as dialogue, both to listen/hear and say/speak, is such that it
presupposes a ground o f unity (Existence and Being 277-78). Conversation is the locus o f
language that makes possible learning and “the naming o f the gods,” which for Heidegger
is a response to their claim regarding us, namely, that we bear the responsibility that
language bestows for good or evil, openness to Being or forgetfulness o f it. It follows,
then, that it is the calling o f the poet to preserve language as a conversation, a dialogue
that induces the memory o f Being. Poetry, therefore, “is the establishing o f being by means
o f the word”; as pointer four states, “But that which remains, is established by the poets”

(Existence and Being 280).
Heidegger’s argument, then, to this point: Poetry only appears to be a most
innocent work; as the essence o f language, it is actually a most dangerous activity. It
comes to humans and establishes the world by apportioning gods and beings their place in
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the storms o f history, even as it runs the risk o f being forgotten— used merely as a tool.
To avoid this loss, language must be maintained in its essential form o f a conversation that
calls together and names all o f the elements integral to gods and heaven, earth and
mortals: “Since language became actual as conversation, the gods have acquired names
and a world has appeared” {Existence and Being 279). Poets perform this sacred service;
they measure out the world in word, both revealing and keeping concealed the mystery o f
Being. “If,” Heidegger observes, “we conceive this essence o f poetry as the establishing o f
being by means o f the word, then we can have some inkling o f the truth o f that saying
[pointer four] which Holderlin spoke long after he had been received into the protection o f
the night o f lunacy” {Existence and Being 282).52 It follows for Heidegger that if
recognition and acknowledgment o f the gods, human existence and history, and the
establishment o f the earth as world derive from language, then “our existence is
fundamentally poetic” {Existence and Being 283).
Heidegger does make a final observation about a sense in which writing poetry
involves a kind o f innocence {Existence and Being 286). Poets, cast out “into that
Between, between gods and men,” because they appear to be engaging in useless child’s
play, inadvertently are protected from and innocent o f what “afflicts and enframes man in
his existence” in everyday life {Existence and Being 288, 275). Yet, he concludes,

unbeknownst to the many, the “play” o f poets sustains existence, to the extent that what is
condescendingly called “fancy” is reality:
Poetry looks like a game and yet it is not......... [It] rouses the appearance
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o f the unreal and o f dream in the face o f the palpable and clamorous reality,
in which we believe ourselves at home. And yet in just the reverse manner,
what the poet says and undertakes to be, is the real.

{Existence and Being 286)
Pindar and Heidegger’s “Fourfold”
Heidegger describes the very nature o f language as “the movement o f the face-toface encounter o f the world’s four regions” (On the Way 107). When these four regions
appropriate one another in the dance o f time and space, humans “dwell” poetically. That
this reality is the dwelling o f humans, Heidegger articulates at length in “Building
Dwelling Thinking” [“Bauen Wohnen Denken”] in a liturgy o f the “primal oneness” o f the
world: earth, sky, divinities, and mortals (Poetry, Language 149).53 Earth is “the serving
bearer, blossoming and fruiting . . sky is “the vaulting path o f the s u n , . . . the year’s
seasons and their changes, the clemency and inclemency o f the weather. .

divinities are

“the beckoning messengers o f the godhead”; and mortals are human beings, who are called
mortals because they are “capable o f death as death.” Each o f these “definitions” is
followed by the chorus, “When we speak o f [“the earth” “the sky” “the divinities”
“mortals”], we are already thinking o f the other three along with it [them], but we give no
thought to the simple oneness o f the four” (Poetry, Language 149-50).
O f the Greek lyric poets, Pindar is closest to this sacramental approach to the
relationships between gods, mortals, and the world. The structure o f Pindar’s odes
depends on his perception o f a similarly proper and apportioned relationship between earth
and heaven, gods and mortals. In his introduction to the Loeb edition o f Pindar (1961),
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John Sandys notes that the odes generally follow a pattern o f 1) offering praises to the god
in whose name the games were held; 2) extolling the excellence o f the victor and his home
(city/country and relatives); and 3) retelling a myth (which becomes the ode’s centerpiece)
that expresses an integral relationship between the victor, his ancestors and ancestral
home, and the gods (xxi, xxxi). In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger
acknowledges that for Pindar, “to glorify was the essence o f poetry” (87). He relates this
glorification to the doxa theou in Greek and New Testament theology that connotes a
beholding o f “grandeur,” and which, in the Greek doxa [aspect, regard] meant (if the
aspect disclosed if o f the highest order) “to place in the light and thus endow with
permanence, being” (87). Being is, in turn, the “fundamental attribute o f the noble
individual and o f nobility” as in Pindar’s advice to Hieron, ‘fyenoi’ olg e a a l |ia d c o v ,”
[now that thou hast learnt what manner o f man thou art] (Pythian Ode II, 72). Heidegger
translates this phrase as “Mayest thou by learning come forth as what thou art,” which for
him means that “coming forth” is an “appearing” that must take place by virtue o f
“standing-in-the-light” (Introduction to Metaphysics 86). Light, in this instance, is
important because o f its “inner connection” to Being and being-there, a connection that is
established by the ancient Greek radicals for being and light, $ T 7fl and $ A 0 , which,
according to Heidegger, are equivalent: “The radicals phy and pha name the same thing.

Phyein, self-sufficient emergence, is phainesthai, to flare up, to show itself, to appear”
(Introduction to Metaphysics 85). If the essence o f poetry is to glorify, the calling o f the
poet is “to place in the light” (Introduction to Metaphysics 87).
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Pindar’s Olympian Ode IX, written in three stanzas (each consisting o f strophe,
antistrophe, and epode), can serve as an example o f this light ing/glorifying that brings an
individual, and thus his location in both time and place, to being. The first stanza begins
with praise to Zeus, “the Lord o f the ruddy lightning,” then (in the antistrophe) to the
victor (Epharmostus the wrestler) and his city, the “famous Opus.” The city’s history is
lauded right through to the epode, where Pindar observes, “Lo! I am lighting up that city
dear with dazzling songs o f praise,. . . ” [6703 Se tol <piXo:v ttoXiv / p a X ep a lq
eirupXe7 cov d o iS alg ] (21-22). The epode ends with an acknowledgment o f the role the
gods play in the destiny o f all mortals, including his own: “I, by the ordering o f destiny, am
tilling the choicest garden o f the Graces, for ‘tis they that are givers o f delight, but men
become brave and wise according unto fate divine” [ei avv tivi poipiSicp ira X a p a /
e^aCperov XapiTtov v e p o p a i Kctirov / K elvai 7 a p o m a a a v to: Tepirv’ • 070:1)01
8e Kal ao<po! koto S a ip o v ’ avSpeg] (26-28). That acknowledgment serves as a
transition in the second stanza to the legend o f Heracles’ defense o f Pylos against
Poseidon. It is unthinkable, Pindar contends, that Heracles would have had the courage to
withstand “the trident” on that occasion without divine intervention— so unthinkable that
he begins the antistrophe by cautioning himself against blasphemy: “Babble not, my Muse,
o f such themes as these;” [p a v ta icriv (moKpeKei. / pi) vvv \o c \a y e i to: tolout’ •]
(39-40) and he returns quickly to a genealogy o f the victor’s city o f Opus.
Pindar’s history o f Opus begins with a passing reference to the legend o f Pyrrha
and Deucalion, who, by order o f Zeus, were supposed to have founded the city o f
Protogeneia [IIpcoT07eveLa] by fashioning its populace out o f stones. In the epode,
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however, Pindar offers his own account, a “new song” that traces the ancestry o f the
founder o f the city o f Opus from survivors o f the Deluge to an evolving race o f kings, and
finally, in the strophe o f the third stanza, to Protogeneia, the daughter o f an original King
Opus. Her lineage is then elevated to that o f Zeus himself, who having stolen her away,
“lay by her side in a silent spot amid the Maenalian mountains” [Ttplv’ OXufjnrpiOQ
d7e|ju*)v / fivyajp' airo ya q ’ Erreuov ’ OitoevTog dvap-rraacag, eWXog / plx^fi
M aivaX tcciaiv ev hetpcdg, . . .] (57-59). Pindar insists that this was an act o f kindness
on the part o f Zeus, who wished that Locrus, Protogeneia’s husband, would not remain
childless: “that so Time might not destroy him, laying upon him the doom o f childlessness”
[p.f| KadeXoi piv alwv iroTpov etpctyoag / optpavov 7 eveag] (60-61). Locrus, for
his part, “rejoiced,” and gave his son a city, Opus, which subsequently flourished. In fact,
in the antistrophe we read that Achilles’ friend, Patroclus, was among the many and noble
settlers in Opus. This most famous o f friendships forms the transition from the epode to
the last stanza. In the epode, Pindar asks his Muse for one more grace, which is to sing the
praises o f another pair o f friends, Epharmostus and fellow-citizen Lampromachus, for
their victories in the same Isthmian games, and for Lampromachus’ solo victories at
various other contests. The antistrophe also is a final summary o f all o f Epharmostus’s
victories, although in typical fashion Pindar reminds his listeners that in any case, mere
human effort is insufficient for success: “ [M]any men have striven to win their fame by
means o f merit that cometh from mere training; but anything whatsoever, in which God
hath no part, is none the worse for being quelled in silence” [to 5e ipua KpcmaTOV
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aitav iroAAol be 5i5aKTalg / avOpairtov dpetalg xXeog / wpouaav apeaflai]
(100-104). In this regard, Heidegger calls attention, in his discussion o f the equivalence o f

to be and to appear, to a phrase in the immediately preceding line: “That which cometh o f
Nature is ever best.” [to be ipua KpcmoTOV airav.] Heidegger translates the phrase,
“that which is through and from out o f phya is the mightiest o f all,” and contends that for
Pindar, “phya was the fundamental determination o f man’s being-there” (Introduction to

Metaphysics 86). In the final epode, Pindar affirms that Epharmostus indeed had obtained
the “blessing o f heaven” ‘Tot'S’ dcuepa botipovLa' (109).
In Heidegger’s terms, Pindar has taken the measure o f earth and sky, gods and
mortals and established them as a world in which humans “poetically dwell.” For the
listeners, the world steps forward into the open as what it is. The poet’s revelation, then, is
not a commentary upon what the world might be— but what it actually is—a “round
dance” o f the fourfold, in which there takes place “the sublimely simple play o f their [the
four-fold’s] mirroring” (Hofstader xxi). Holderlin wrote in 1804, “At present I am
especially occupied with the fable, the poetic view o f history, and the architectonics o f the
skies, especially o f our nation’s, so far as it differs from the Greek” (qtd. in Poetry,

Language 227). Heidegger places this quotation in the context o f contending that poetic
dwelling is in real time and space:
Man does not dwell in that he merely establishes his stay on the earth
beneath the sky, by raising growing things and simultaneously raising
buildings. Man is capable o f such building only if he already builds in the
sense o f the poetic taking o f measure. Authentic building occurs so far as
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there are poets, such poets as take the measure for architecture, the
structure o f dwelling. {Poetry, Language 227)
Naming as Waking the Monster
Heidegger suggests in "Holderlin and the Essence o f Poetry" that poetry is the
essence o f language itself:
[P]oetry is the inaugural naming o f being and o f the essence o f all
things—not just any speech, but that particular kind which for the first time
brings into the open all that we then discuss and deal with in everyday
language. Hence poetry never takes language as a raw material ready to
hand, rather it is poetry which first makes language possible. {Existence

and Being 283)
Whatever a poem might bring into the open, however, runs the risk o f being shut up by
gradual conversion into “everyday language.” He observes in his lecture, “Language,” that
“What is purely hidden in mortal speech is what is spoken in the poem. Poetry proper is
never merely a higher mode ( melos) o f everyday language. It is rather the reverse:
everyday language is a forgotten and therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly
resounds a call any longer” {Poetry, Language 208). He was perhaps reminding us that
any reading o f a poem is another poem. For his part, Heidegger could only go so far as to
say that “we cannot here decide flatly whether poetry is really a kind o f thinking, or
thinking really a kind o f poetry. It remains dark to us what determines their real relation,
and from what source that we so casually call the ‘real’ really comes” {On the Way 83).
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Or, as Holderlin expressed it:
Kommt eine Fremdlingin sie
Zu uns, die Erwekerin,
Die menschenbildende Stimme.

A stranger it comes
To us, that quickening word,
The voice that moulds and makes human. (“At the Source” 385, 2.1-3)
To give face to something is to name it— to demarcate its form as one separate from
others: “This naming does not consist merely in something already known being supplied
with a name; it is rather that when the poet speaks the essential word, the existent thing is
by naming nominated as what it is. So it becomes known as existent" (Existence and

Being 281).54 Paul De Man compares this naming to invoking a monster—the "visual
shape o f something that has no sensory existence: a hallucination" that is made "so
eminently visible that any reader must respond to it" (49). Perhaps that is why Heidegger
refers without further comment to Holderlin’s “Homecoming” as a “monstrous poem”

{Existence and Being 282). And in “To Hope,” Holderlin writes,
O du des Aethers Tochter! erscheine dann
Aus deines Vaters Garten, und darfst du nicht
Ein Geist der Erde, kommen, schrok’, o
Schroke mit anderem nur das Herz mir.
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Then come, O Aether’s daughter, appear to me
Out o f your father’s gardens; and if you may
Not wear the shape o f earthly spirits,
Frighten my heart with a different aspect. (Hamburger 195)
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CHAPTER V
MEDIATING SEMIOTICS AND SEMANTICS IN POETRY:
METAPHOR, REFERENCE, AND PROSOPOPEIA

“The affirmation o f the opacity ofpoetic discourse and its corollary, the obliteration o f
ordinary reference, are merely the starting-point o f an immense inquiry on the topic o f
reference . . . . ” —Paul Ricoeur
In his essay “Heidegger’s Exegeses o f Holderlin,” Paul de Man argues that the
question o f whether or not Heidegger’s appropriation o f Holderlin’s poetry actually
advanced Holderlin studies must be subsumed under the larger question regarding
Heidegger’s “exegetical” method (246). O f course, characterizing Heidegger’s approach
to Holderlin as “exegesis” prefigures for de Man an assessment o f Heidegger’s work as
commentary on sacred text rather than as literary criticism. And de Man does contend
that, rather than the groundwork for an overall approach to aesthetics, Heidegger’s
exegesis o f Holderlin is better characterized as part o f a general quest for an adequate
ontology (246-47).
In support o f this argument, de Man first notes that Holderlin has become
notorious among philologists for the number o f extant revisions o f his poems.55 The
problem o f which revision to regard as authoritative is exacerbated in Heidegger, who
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generally does not defend his choices among variant texts or comment on other critical
interpretations. He examines lines, phrases, and even words in isolation and without
context, bases some o f his word studies on apocryphal texts, and uses without comment
texts from Holderlin’s so-called mad period (de Man 249-50). Most important, however,
according to de Man, is that Heidegger’s interpretations o f Holderlin are founded on “a
notion o f the poetic that seeks to assert the fundamental impossibility o f applying objective
discourse to a work o f art” (249). According to de Man, what qualifies as a work o f art
for Heidegger is that which can reveal what is in essence not capable o f revelation.
Although this language o f paradox is to be expected from mystics, de Man claims that it
constitutes a logical contradiction in Heidegger’s supposedly philosophical method that
ultimately vitiates his attempt to link language and ontology (260).
De Man first likens Heidegger’s estimate o f Holderlin as the “meta-metaphysician”
who can speak and thereby reveal Being, to Hegel’s utopian vision o f the philosopher who
has arrived at the end o f the dialectic o f Absolute Spirit (250-51). Alternatively, he frames
Heidegger’s approach to Holderlin as an apociyphal quest for the “parousia o f Being” that
ushers Being into presence in poetry by naming it as it reveals itself. The poet is the one
who can assure us that there is indeed a ground o f being in Being. This is evident, for
example, in Heidegger’s interpretation o f Holderlin’s dictum “Was bleibet aber stiften die

Dichter” [But what remains, is founded by the poets] as a foundation for the “immediate
presence o f Being” (251-52). Heidegger himself was reticent about stating whether or not
he himself had experienced original Being; he was at any rate convinced that the role o f
the philosopher was not to reveal (something o f which discourse must be deemed
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incapable o f doing) but to listen and preserve a testimony o f revelation. Holderlin’s role as
poet, on the other hand, was to speak the revelation:
Holderlin [according to Heidegger] knows Being immediately and he says
it immediately; the commentator need only know how to listen. The work
is there, itself a parousia. Being speaks through Holderlin’s mouth as God
did through the mouth o f the seer Calchas in the Iliad, (de Man 253)
According to de Man, this relationship o f prophet to disciple reduces Heidegger’s
“criticism” o f Holderlin to commentary: “With Holderlin, there never is any critical
dialogue [on Heidegger’s part]” (253). Heidegger’s an-denken [sic] “thinking-of ’ is a
thinking-with or thinking-alongside that does not question; rather, it may on occasion
successfully recover the wonder o f Being and share with others what it means to “dwell
poetically on earth” (254).
It is on this point that de Man criticizes Heidegger most severely. Holderlin, de
Man argues, actually “says [in his poetry] exactly the opposite o f what Heidegger makes

him say”; that is, the characteristic note o f Holderlin’s work is not one o f revelation but o f
lamentation over the impossibility o f revelation. Holderlin does not claim to reveal what he
has become, having ventured into the realm o f Being— he can only intend it: “It is not
because he has seen Being that the poet is, therefore, capable o f naming it; his word prays
for the parousia, it does not establish it” (258). De Man claims that Heidegger’s attempt to
ameliorate this problem by arguing that language, although it does mediate the immediate
in the poem, does not actually reveal the immediate is a contradiction. To insist on
“showing the poet as naming the presence o f the present,” despite the poet’s frequent
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protestations, is to conflate language, that which merely announces the hope o f revelation,
with revelation itself, which is an experience o f original Being. Ho Merlin’s “conception o f
the poetic,” according to de Man, is that o f “an essentially open and free act, a pure
intuition, a mediated and conscious prayer that achieves self-consciousness in its failure; in
short, a conception diametrically opposed to Heidegger’s” (263).
There is a sense in which this critique o f Heidegger— that he is overconfident o f
the capacity o f language to articulate experience-—is analogous to that argument
(discussed in Chapter One) which de Man levels against Michael Riffaterre. De Man
suggests that Riffaterre attempts to “escape the figural” by exhausting its expression in a
rationale o f semiotic analysis. This reduction would entail a movement downwards, so to
speak, from apparently extraordinary expression to ordinary speech that is, in turn,
reducible on structuralist principles, to scientific language. But according to de Man, there
is no one descriptive linguistic system into which we can reduce all others; structuralism’s
naive retention o f positivism as a philosophical presupposition reveals a lingering
overconfidence in the ultimate transparency o f language. Heidegger’s error, on the other
hand, stems from his desire to recover original experience in language. He therefore
inflates the power o f language (especially figural language) “upward,” arrogating to it the
capacity, in the poet, to presence Being, thereby identifying Being and language in a
mystical manner that is self-contradictory and non-philosophical. Heidegger, therefore, is
also seeking to “escape the figural” by convincing himself that the figural can transcend its
own being-in-the-world, that being can be translated into Being by virtue o f the “gift” o f
language.
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De Man therefore rejects Heidegger’s claim that language can mediate between the
ineffable and the mundane; language always is already and only in the realm o f the
mundane. He concludes his essay by speculating nevertheless that “the encounter between
these two possible attitudes could constitute the center o f a valid poetics” (263). How
could this be so?
Any exegetical method will ultimately have to come to grips with the same
problem: how to elaborate a language capable o f dealing with the tension
between the ineffable and the mediate. The ineffable demands the direct
adherence and the blind and violent passion with which Heidegger treats
his texts. Mediation, on the other hand, implies a reflection that tends
toward a critical language as systematic and rigorous as possible, but not
overly eager to make claims o f certitude that it can substantiate only in the
long run. (263)
It is not so obvious as de Man claims, however, that Heidegger turned Holderlin’s
elegies into revelations; he was well aware o f the poet’s inability to make Being
transparent. If there is a logical battle to be fought, it is on the ground o f figure as
mediator. For Heidegger, the poet’s word “figures” both as disclosure and closure. If we
protest that it cannot be both, Heidegger will claim we have begged the question. For
example, de Man sets up an opposition between what can and cannot be expressed in
language. Rather than between true opposites, however, such as the ineffable (something
about which nothing can be uttered) and the utterable, his opposite terms are
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“the ineffable” and “the mediate.” He already has defined, however, the “mediate” as
language and therefore assumes what he sets out to prove.
Heidegger’s question is whether or not figure pre-figures discourse in such a way
that when we “listen to the poet,” we hear language as the ground o f discourse. De Man
observes that “[f]or the poet the anguishing question . . . is: how can one not only speak o f
Being, but say Being itself. Poetry is the experience o f this question.” But poetry is not
only the experience o f this question; we know it is poetry only when we hear it speak the
question. When it speaks the question, Heidegger would contend, it says Being. It is the
philosopher who is left to “think with” the poet and then carefully to preserve thought in
order to “dwell poetically.”
Paul Ricoeur and the Mediating Role o f Metaphor
For Heidegger, language could be said to act as mediator between Being [Sein]
and being [das Seiende]. How does it do so? One possibility, according to Paul Ricoeur, is
through metaphor, conceived o f not as a simple trope o f resemblance and substitution (as
in semiotics) but as semantic innovation, the production o f meaning in discourse. In a
sequence o f studies in The Rule o f Metaphor that outlines the function o f metaphor from
word to sentence to text, Ricoeur attempts a careful negotiation between semiotics and
semantics.56 He tries first to demonstrate that metaphor produces a simultaneous effect on
signification (at the level o f word) and meaning (at the level o f the sentence). He then
applies this finding to a critique o f the status o f literary language (especially within the
genre o f poetry) and its distinction, if any, from philosophical language. In a literary work,
he argues, metaphor alerts the reader to a bifurcation o f reference, one o f which is, in fact,
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a “redescription” o f the world that is cognitive, that is, it conveys new information or
knowledge about reality. Ultimately, he concludes that this capacity o f language to deploy
metaphor as a “semantic innovation” lays the groundwork for concepts subsequently taken
up in philosophy.
Metaphor as “semantic innovation”
The notion o f metaphor as a word that improves style by “standing in” for a
properly denotative, but uninteresting, word is familiar enough. Treating metaphor as
substitution or deviation from the norm implies that the “proper” name always can be
restored or paraphrased; therefore, “[t]he algebraic sum o f substitution and subsequent
restitution is zero” (Ricoeur 45-46). As such, no new information is conveyed; the trope
remains a matter o f style. In Rhetoric 1410b 13-15, however, Aristotle states that “when
the poet calls old age ‘a withered stalk’ he conveys a new idea [literally: he has produced a
knowledge] [epoiese mathesin kai gnosin ], a new fact to us by means o f the general
notion [dia tou genous] o f “lost bloom . . . ” (qtd. in Ricoeur 26).57 The poet has set up a
proportional relationship o f genus to species that states that the general concept o f “old
age” is to “an old person” as the general concept o f “lost bloom” is to “a withered stalk.”
The two species are then transposed so that “a withered stalk” comes under the general
concept o f “old age.”58 This “taking one thing for another by a sort o f calculated error”
may be a violation o f the logical order, but it is intended to establish a new point o f
view—to redescribe the world: “Thus,” Ricoeur claims, “the category-mistake is the deconstructive intermediary phase between description and rediscription” (21, 22). He
speculates that this may be in fact the way that thought forges the concept o f genus:
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A family resemblance first brings individuals together before the rule o f a
logical class dominates them. Metaphor, a figure o f speech, presents in an

open fashion, by means o f a conflict between identity and difference, the
process that, in a covert manner, generates semantic grids by fusion o f
differences into identity. (198)
Recalling H.-G. Gadamer’s comment in Wahrheit und Methode that there is a
“‘metaphoric’ at work at the origin o f logical thought, at the root o f all classification,” he
suggests that when Aristotle employs metaphor as a verb ( metapherein), he supports an
idea o f metaphor that acts by “creating rifts in the old order” (22-23).59 Even at the level
o f individual word, metaphor as semantic innovation creates new rather than merely
equivocal meaning.
Metaphor in the Context o f the Sentence
Ricoeur notices that Pierre Fontanier, in his classic taxonomy o f figures Les

Figures du discours, makes a key distinction between “proper” and “improper” metaphor
that relies on the notion o f catechresis. Improper metaphor, or “figure-trope,” occurs
when there is a loss for words that results in a “forced” use o f a name: “/« general,

catachresis refers to a situation in which a sign, already assigned to a first idea, is
assigned also to a new idea, this latter idea having no sign at all or no other proper sign
within the language” (qtd. in Ricoeur 62). Aristotle, Ricoeur also notes, already had used
the figure epiphora to describe this use o f metaphor; it implies filling a “semantic lacuna”
with a word for which no truly “natural” name has been yet discovered (19, 20).6° By
virtue o f this denotative invention, according to Ricoeur, metaphor impacts not only a
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word but (simultaneously) the sentence as a whole because it is the sentence, not the
word, that functions as the basic semantic unit o f language. He therefore takes as his
“working hypothesis” that “the semantics o f discourse is not reducible to the semiotics o f
lexical entities” (66).61
Making a distinction between influences at the level o f the word and level o f the
sentence helps to distinguish between sense and reference as well, since we may say that
“signs refer to other signs within the same system. In the phenomenon o f the sentence,
language passes outside itself; reference is the mark o f the self-transcendence o f language”
(74) .62At the level o f the sentence, semiotics, or the “intra-linguistic relationship,” is
superseded by the intention to refer. Alluding to Husserl’s analysis o f intentionality,
Ricoeur affirms that “ [L]anguage is intentional par excellence-, it aims beyond itself, so
that it is the intended, not the signified, whose reach goes outside language” (74).63 In this
sense, all metaphors are, on first use, “improper” in Fontanier’s sense; they transgress the
linguistic code in order to denote at a level that transcends intra-textual signification.
When a metaphor is created, it emerges as a meaningful event; it is said to be
“alive.” When its meaning eventually is accepted into general usage and lexicalized, it
“dies.” Ricoeur calls this the “circle” o f language and speech, a term he derives from
Roman Jakobson’s analysis o f the “interchange” between code and message in the essay
“Linguistics,” where Jakobson states that “without a confrontation o f the code with the
messages, no insight into the creative power o f language can be achieved” (qtd. in Ricoeur
121). Ricoeur takes Jakobson to mean that language exists as a polysemy that is
continually evolving with the introduction o f new metaphors in speech, which are in turn

118

taken up in common usage and eventually become embedded in the original matrix o f
language ( 121).
Ferdinand de Saussure’s traditional “disjunction” between sign and thing therefore
becomes problematic “because discourse, through its referential function, sets signs fully
into relation with things. Denotation is a sign-thing relation, whereas signification is a
relation between signifier and signfiied” (123).64 The question is therefore whether or not
an analysis o f the code, even at the level o f the sentence, can be separated from an
interpretation o f its message.
In a certain discourse situation, in a given social milieu and at a precise
moment, something seeks to be said that demands an operation o f speech,
speech working on language, that brings words and things face to face. The
final outcome is a new description o f the universe o f representations.
(Ricoeur 125)
Metaphor as substitution involves a semiotic analysis whereas metaphor as “new
pertinence” requires a semantic analysis: “As a lexeme, the word [a metaphor] is a
difference in the lexical code . . . As a part o f discourse, it bears a part o f the meaning that
belongs to the entire statement” (157).65
Ricoeur’s description o f the relationship o f metaphor to sentence is remarkably
similar to Michael Riffaterre’s analysis o f the relationship between “ungrammaticality” and
hypogram in the poem. Ricoeur (following Monroe Beardsley’s general analysis o f the
figure) affirms that “a metaphorical word functions only when it is contrasted and
combined with other non-metaphorical words . . . the self-contradiction o f literal

interpretation is necessary for the unfolding o f metaphorical interpretation” (138). On this
account, “what the figure contrasts with is a literal interpretation o f the sentence as a
whole, the impossibility o f which motivates the constitution o f the metaphorical meaning”
(139).
This process o f reconstitution corresponds to Riffaterre’s use o f ungrammaticality
as an heuristic that compels a second reading intended to capture the non-literal matrix o f
the text. Although Riffaterre calls this first reading o f a poem “heuristic,” it can only be so
if the reader is already aware that for poetry, “decoding” can only take place as
ungrammaticalities are noted and interpreted. The second reading, which he calls
“retroactive” is thus the reading that employs the heuristic proper to poetry and, as he
states, “This is the time for a second interpretation, for the truly hermeneutic reading”
(Riffaterre 5). It is telling, however, that Riffaterre does not describe the second reading as
a semiosis but instead uses the technical term for a process he ultimately is trying to
avoid— interpretation. The result o f Riffaterre’s hermeneutics is nevertheless not so much
an interpretation as a translation. He translates the poem into what Jean Cohen, in

Structure du language poetique calls the “least marked” language— that o f science,
assuming that the essential characteristic o f scientific language is that the translation o f any
other “language” into it is equivalent; it conveys “identity o f information” (qtd. in Ricoeur
139). This accomplishes a “reduction o f deviation” or “self-correction that re-establishes
the integrity o f the message” (159).
Cohen articulates this violation as a two-step process: “The totality o f the
procedure comprises two inverse and complementary phases— ( 1) situation o f deviation:
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impertinence-, (2) reduction o f deviation: metaphor” (qtd. in Ricoeur 152). More accurate,
perhaps, is that the reduction itself consists o f two steps. Transgression o f lexical “law”
does alarm the reader, who then reads again and recognizes the impertinence for what
is— metaphor. This recognition, however, renders the deviation harmless; it reduces it to
nothing because the meaning it lends to the sentence is, to the relief o f the reader,
equivalent to the meaning o f an ordinary statement. The difference that the deviation
seems to make is legitimately interpreted as affective or connotative. Cohen may argue
that “impertinence” as deviation does indeed yield a “new pertinence” that is unique to
poetic language. But for him this new pertinence is “harmless” in the sense that it is noncognitive: “emotional unity is the obverse side o f notional inconsequence” (qtd in Ricoeur
155). What Ricoeur calls the “semiotic postulate” for metaphor, because it is so generally
held, is that there is an equivalency between the transformation o f deviation to reduction
back to deviation (157). The same can be said for Riffaterre’s sense o f the translatability o f
the text o f the poem into ordinary language.
Ricoeur argues that this cognitive/non-cognitive distinction made by Cohen and
others has been assumed to correspond to the traditional difference recognized between
denotation and connotation, but that “the properly positivistic presupposition according to
which only the objective language o f scientific prose would be able to denote . . . . is a
prejudice that must be exposed to direct interrogation” (148). A figure is understood to be
so only in the context o f a sentence-statement that refers; metaphor must therefore pass
beyond simple substitution and a semiotics o f the word. According to Ricoeur, this means
that “what is intended by discourse [/ ’intente], the correlate o f the entire sentence, is
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irreducible to what semiotics calls the signified, which is nothing but the counterpart o f the
signifier o f a sign within a language code” (216).
For his part, Ricoeur concedes, like de Man, that “the merit o f the [reductionist]
method is undeniable” but doubts that a complete reduction is possible, especially when
the simultaneous effects o f metaphor at the level o f word and sentence are recognized
(140). Instead, Ricoeur argues that it is legitimate to ask what the metaphorical statement
might say about the world. Insofar as a metaphor is inextricably linked to a sentence
statement, it is involved in a predication (assigning a quality or qualities to a subject)
which is the central function o f semantics and the origin o f communication. It must convey
an intended adumbration o f the subject that originates in an exterior world: “[Gjrounded
on the predicative act what is intended by discourse [/ ’intente] points to an extra-linguistic
reality which is its referent” (Ricoeur 216):
The affirmation that the figure’s surplus o f meaning depends on
connotation is the exact counterpart o f the affirmation discussed earlier that
the figure is translatable with regard to its sense— in other words that it
carries no new information . . . But if metaphor is a statement, it is possible
that this statement would be untranslatable, not only as regards its
connotation, but as regards its very meaning, thus as regards its denotation.
It teaches something, and so it contributes to the opening up and the
discovery o f a field o f reality other than that which ordinary language lays
bare. (1 4 8 )66
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Literary Text as Metaphor
For linguists generally, it is only what is not sublimated in a literary text that is
denoted. What is left untranslatable in a text is wholly connotative and affective. Ricoeur
nevertheless argues that just as in the case o f the metaphorical statement, “it is entirely
conceivable that the opacity o f words [in a literary text] implies some other reference and
not no reference at all” (146). He first invokes the analogy Beardsley makes in his

Aesthetics between the literary work and the sentence, where both can be considered as a
“unit o f discourse.” There are two levels o f signification in a sentence, the explicit (what it
states) and the implicit (what it suggests), and these are, in turn, analogous to the
distinction we make between the denotation and connotation o f individual words. Based
on Beardsley’s argument, “a semantic definition o f literature—that is, a definition in terms
o f meaning— can be deduced from the degree to which a discourse involves implicit or
suggested secondary meanings” (91).
Beardsley also articulates a difference between the “the world o f the work,” or
“projection o f a possible and intelligible world,” and its verbal design. It is possible, when
analyzing a work, to confine oneself to the verbal design, but “in spontaneous discourse,
understanding does not stop at the sense, but passes by sense towards reference” (92).
Ricoeur therefore offers a new formulation o f literary reference: “[D iscourse in the
literary work sets out its denotation as a second-level denotation, by means o f the
suspension o f the first-level denotation o f discourse” (221). Poetry, either considered as
typical o f literary language in general or as a specific genre, does not exclude reference or
abolish it but “splits” it: “[P]oetry is not the suppression o f the referential function but its
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profound alteration by the workings o f ambiguity” (224). If, for modem critics, reference
is destroyed in the literary work, this merely shows that the epistemology o f logical
positivism has been imported as a presupposition into this critical approach to literary
language (226-27).
The Problem o f Mimesis
Ricoeur’s approach to mimesis becomes particularly important in his analysis o f
metaphor’s role in sense and reference at the level o f the work o f art. Ricoeur contends
that in Aristotle’s elucidation o f tragedy as the imitation o f human action, metaphor plays
a role larger than traditionally assigned. Aristotle conceives o f metaphor, he contends, as
part o f the lexis, or ordering and organizing, o f the mythos that is recalled in tragedy. As
such, it actively participates in creating the mimesis o f human action represented in the
poem. Quoting Aristotle’s comment in Poetics 1456 b 6, t 'i 7 a p a v e ’t v to A e^ovtog
ep7 ov, e l tp o ^ o tto iq 5eoi x a l pr) 5 ia tov X070V; [What, indeed, would be the
good o f the speaker, if things appeared in the required light even apart from anything he
says?] Ricoeur argues that lexis (and therefore the role that metaphor plays in producing
it) makes possible “the coming into language, the fact o f having been made manifest, o f

appearing in spoken words” (37). As an element o f lexis, metaphor is no mere matter o f
style: “The subordination o f lexis to muthos already puts metaphor at the service o f
‘saying,’ o f ‘poetizing,’ which takes place no longer at the level o f the word but at the
level o f the poem as a whole” (40).
These observations prompt Ricoeur to clarify his understanding o f the relationship
between mimesis, lexis, and metaphor. The traditional interpretation o f mimesis as
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imitation, he argues, is more Platonic than Aristotelian. Plato’s concept o f “definition”
implies a one-to-one correspondence between an idea and the word that “really” applies to
it; everything else, therefore, is merely a resemblance (37-38). For Aristotle, however,
mimesis is, like metaphor, an act. It is a “making,” which, in tragedy, structures the plot
(39). It is discursive rather than duplicative, which is what inspires Aristotle to state in

Poetics 1451 b5-6 that poetry is “something more scientific and serious than history,
because poetry tends to give general truths while history gives particular facts” [rj pev
7 a p ttolt|olq paAXov to: Ka$oAou, r) S’ laT opia to: x a d ’ eKaaTOV A eyei.] (85).
In the tragedy, mimesis is both faithful to human action (reality) and “original” in its
structuring o f the mythos to portray human action as more noble than or worse than the
human behavior found in reality (Ricoeur 40).67
For Ricoeur, Aristotle’s sense o f art imitating nature is as much o f a distinction as
a relation because it distinguishes the poetic, a “making,” from the organic, so that “reality
remains a reference, without ever becoming a restriction” (42):
If this hypothesis is valid, it can be understood why no Poetics can truly
ever have done either with mimesis or phusis. In the last analysis, the
concept o f mimesis serves as an index o f the discourse situation; it reminds
us that no discourse ever suspends our belonging to a world. All mimesis,
even creative— nay, especially creative— mimesis, takes place within the
horizons o f a being-in-the-world which it makes present to the precise
extent that the mimesis raises it to the level o f muthos. (43)68
Ricoeur’s conclusion is startlingly similar to Heidegger’s plea for his countrymen to listen
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to the poet’s “saying” o f Being not as merely symbolic but real or “actual.” Ricoeur, too,
asserts that “when the poet writes that ‘nature’ is ‘a temple where living columns. . . , ’ the
verb to be does not just connect the predicate temple to the subject nature . . . . It implies
besides . . . that what is is redescribed; its says that things really are this way” (247-48).
We may conclude, then, that 1) poetry “seeks to redescribe reality by the roundabout
route o f heuristic fiction”; 2) language uses metaphor to rise beyond direct description to
the level o f mythos; and 3) metaphorical truth is a consequence o f the redescriptive power
o f language (247) (Fig. 9).

emotive connotation
Being----------►Mytho s/being--------> Poem

A

(canceled denotation)
I
production o f meaning

second-order reference
(new denotation)

< -------- interpretation (hermeneutics)

Figure 9. Ricoeur’s proposed recursive relationship between reference and meaning.
According to the schema o f Figure 9, Being is retained, as in Heidegger, as an
unspoken category that is simultaneously revealed and not revealed when spoken by the
poet. Mythos, already ensconced in the human life o f “being-there,” [Dasein\ is ordered
according to logos in the lexis and metaphor o f the poem. As soon as the poem is
recognized as fiction, its first-order reference is exploded, as it were, releasing a
polysemous surplus that is both connotative (emotive) and meaningful. Meaning rise to the
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level o f a second-order (cognitive) reference to the encounter between Being and being
that first compels the poet to speak. Thus, “in the metaphorical discourse o f poetry
referential power is linked to the eclipse o f ordinary reference; the creation o f heuristic
fiction is the road to redescription; and reality brought to language unites manifestation
and creation” (239).
Negotiating Poetry and Philosophy
We can now take up de Man’s question about the relationship between “listening
to the poet,” and carrying out a philosophical project. Like Heidegger, Ricoeur seeks an
ontology o f discourse that would preserve the pluralism o f modes o f discourse and deny
the reduction o f philosophy into poetry. He observes, along with Heidegger, that
the philosopher fights on two fronts, against the seduction o f the ineffable
and against the power o f ‘ordinary speech’ (Sprechen), in order to arrive at
a ‘saying’ (Sagen) that would be the triumph neither o f inarticulateness nor
o f the signs available to the speaker and manipulated by him . . . . (310)
The poet uses language metaphorically to express the apperception o f a new object o f
knowledge revealed in Being. The philosopher, alert to the deconstruction o f reference
and redescription o f reality that language can intend, takes up this tension into thought.
When taken up in self-reflection (philosophy), poetry becomes conscious o f its relationship
to Being. What the philosopher thus expresses in a separate mode o f language is indeed a
commentary on what has been heard by another— a bringing-to-bear o f thought on
language.
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At the moment o f “hearing,” however, there occurs a disjunction between poet and
philosopher that on the one hand ends communication with Being while providing the
ground for concepts. Having heard, the philosopher cannot simply repeat, but attempts to
stir up or re-awaken in other listeners what the poet has returned to memory. According
to Ricoeur, “Philosophical discourse deliberately has recourse to living metaphor in order
to draw out new meanings from some semantic impertinence and to bring to light new
aspects o f reality by means o f semantic innovation” (291). Although philosophy must turn
away from poetry towards discourse and, eventually, the merely instrumental use o f
language, it nevertheless must begin as an understanding o f what is revealed by the poet,
and it therefore originates in a shared matrix o f second-order references. Its use o f living
metaphor cannot produce a concept; rather, living metaphor is the condition for the
possibility o f concepts: “What is given to thought in this way by the ‘tensional’ truth o f
poetry is the most primordial, most hidden dialectic— the dialectic that reigns between the
experience o f belonging as a whole and power o f distanciation that opens up the space o f
speculative thought” (313).
As Ricoeur himself notes, onto-theology—the attempt to bridge the gap in
language between the word o f God and the word o f humans— looks for a third term to do
so: “This “human, too human, discourse o f ontology attempts to respond to the entreaty
o f another discourse, which is itself perhaps only a non-discourse” (269). In the analogia

entis, St. Thomas looked to “participation” as a way to preserve the sense o f analogy o f
Being with beings and the notion o f proportional being where the relationship between
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terms is not mathematically determined, so that intellect is to soul as sight is to body
(274). The criticism o f this “too human” struggle has since culminated in the
deconstructive criticism o f Jacques Derrida and others, who claim that unacknowledged
metaphor lies behind any metaphysical claim (284-287). De Man’s criticism o f
Heidegger’s exegeses presupposes this limit to thought and language. Heidegger,
however, denies that in philosophy, hearing and seeing, for example, are used
metaphorically in conjunction with grounding thought (280-81). It is rather the case that
the hearing and seeing to which we commonly refer are known by virtue o f a participation
in or analogy with the apperception o f Being. The “blossoming forth” o f words in poetic
language, as Heidegger proposes it, is intentional and metaphorical, but philosophy is at a
critical distance from it; it must take up the metaphor into speculation to see how it
qualifies as knowledge. Analogously, scientific thought requires a model in order to begin,
before it uses logic in ordering, experiment, and verification:
Concepts in scientific language as well as in ordinary language can never
actually be derived from perception or from images, because the
discontinuity o f the levels o f discourse is founded, at least virtually, by the
very structure o f the conceptual space in which meanings are inscribed
when they draw away from the metaphorical process, which can be said to
generate all semantic fields. (300)
The metaphor, too, is the initial opening up o f the world for the understanding, even
though its function is to speak both what is and what is not. The relationship o f semiotics
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Figure 10. A model o f the relationship between the literary work and knowledge based
upon Heidegger and Ricoeur’s analysis o f literary language.
and semantics in literature is not so much a hierarchy as a division o f labor. Borrowing
from both Heidegger and Ricoeur, we could construct a model o f approaches to literary
language that preserves both realms o f activity and investigation (Fig. 10).
Poetic Language and Lyric Poetry
For the most part, Ricoeur uses the terms poetry, poetic language, and literary
language interchangeably. All o f the genres, from his perspective, are characterized by the
split reference that occurs in metaphorization. This common marker does not, however,
collapse the genres nor even sub-genres into one category, although we also can say that
the lines o f distinction can not be firmly drawn; rather, the traditional divisions, first
between types o f poetry and then types o f narrative, exist on a continuum (Fig. 10). The
lyrical expression is a metaphorical statement that uses prosopopeia to set a stage, to
provide a mask for, a hypothetical situation that redescribes the world in a way not
attainable in an ordinary expression o f emotion or in mere melody. The work comes
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alongside experience to open up a new space previously not accessible to the poet or to
the reader. As narrative claims a larger part o f the production o f a literary work, pure lyric
becomes increasingly an element or constituent o f a total effect rather than its framework;
it nevertheless may remain the essence o f a work, depending on the author’s purpose.
Ricoeur does agree with critics such as Northrop Frye that the thrust o f the lyric
poem is to create a mood by the direct expression o f emotion, pure and simple. He points
out, however, that an “alternate” emotional world is a powerful form o f redescription that
can modify knowledge about the world in a most profound manner. As Ricoeur suggests,
“feeling has an ontological status different from relationship at a distance; it makes for
participation in things” (246).69 Although its direct manner o f expression makes it closely
linked to the wordlessness o f music, its “making” within the world o f words makes it
complicit with the play o f logos on human experience. However musical, the lyric poem is
a metaphorical statement that intends a truth about the world. It is perhaps the
consciousness o f this power that compels lyric poets to meditate upon poetry itself, at
which point Lyric becomes self-conscious. Enter the philosopher, who listens and attempts
the andenken, the ‘thinking with.”

131

Epitaph and Epiphora
As we noted in Chapter One, the epigram written in the form o f epitaph, although
ostensibly referring to a dead person or persons through direct denotation by a name or
specific description, quickly evokes an heuristic by which the reader participates in a ritual
o f reading that recognizes a variation on an ancient theme o f statements about death and
dying. By virtue o f this semiotics o f reading, epitaphs could in fact dispense with the
material monument and become completely virtual, no longer written upon stone but upon
the relative evanescence o f papyrus or paper— and no longer dependent even upon
someone in particular having died. The explanation o f a given epitaph can, in this sense, be
achieved quickly and completely— it is a catechresis achieved through expansion o f a
matrix o f protestations against death. Anything added to this explanation is an
interpretation o f its meaning, even if we are quite sure (as Riftaterre seems to be, for
example) that what we are dealing with is an intent to nullify death through a reprise, in
the form o f the epitaph, o f its power to destroy. It could be that this is what the epitaph is
teaching us, but to say so is to acknowledge that an explanation, and the interpretation
that leads to understanding and knowledge, are inextricably linked to something that lies
outside the text, namely, human experience. The epitaph therefore is certainly a verbal
artifact, a construction, whose intertextual genealogy can be traced to an oral tradition o f
the funeral oration or logos epitaphos and to the earliest o f death rituals. Even by the time
o f ancient Greece, “the world was old,” as Mackail observes in the introduction to his
anthology o f the Anthology, adding:
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Then, no less than now, men trod daily over the ruins o f old civilisations
and the monuments o f lost races. One o f the most striking groups o f poems
in the Anthology is the long roll o f the burdens o f dead cities; Troy, Delos,
Mycenae, Argos, Amphipolis, Corinth, Sparta. (66)
All o f this has the effect o f reducing the text to its kernel matrix, which, for the earliest
humans, may have been only a cry o f pain. Here, at the very origin o f language, we face
questions about the respective ontologies o f emotion and intellect. Borrowing terms from
Heidegger, we could ask whether a cry o f pain, enlightened by the “gift” o f language
could “blossom forth” in a “saying” about human experience that is true not just in the
sense o f being an authentic expression o f emotion but in terms o f rendering a description
o f the world that is, indeed, true. For their part, the Greeks were, according to Mackail,
the “sayers” o f death, par excellence:
Here [in the epitaph], if anywhere, the Greek genius had its fullest scope
and most decisive triumph; and here it is that we come upon the epigram in
its inmost essence and utmost perfection. “Waiting to see the end’ as it
always did, the Greek spirit pronounced upon the end when it came with a
swiftness, a tact, a certitude that leave all other language behind. (68)70
Using Ricoeur’s hermeneutic o f metaphor, perhaps we can approach the sepuchral
epigrams in particular in terms o f epiphora, that is, as a movement or event o f writing
coming alongside the monument, real or imagined, to bring forth a redescription o f the
world. This redescription would have the potential to create a topology o f human
experience that is both new and cognitive— new because this particular emotional and
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intellectual landscape has never before been made present, and cognitive because lexis, its
ordering in logos, makes it cognizable as an objective description o f the world o f
experience.
Mackail divides his selection o f sepulchral epigrams (which, he notes, “would
otherwise have been much the largest o f the divisions,”) into a section o f “epitaphs
proper” and a section entitled “Death,” made up o f epigrams “dealing with death
generally” (31). He does not elucidate this criteria, but it seems that “epitaphs proper” are
those which he suspects are the most simply stated o f the epigrams, written on the
occasion o f specifically named people, and devoid o f pronouncements, subtle or not, about
the concept o f death—those that deal with the species rather than the genus o f death.
Although the “death” epigrams may still be epitaphs for particular people, often what is
foregrounded in the text itself is a commentary on the human condition. For example,
Macedonius o f Thessolonica, an epigrammatist o f the Byzantine period, has the deceased
wonder, in his or her death, about the purpose o f life:
T a la Ka! E iA fjd u ia, au p.ev Texeg, r) be K aA utrreigXcapeTOV d|jupotepag fiv n a a to a r a b io v
Eip.i be, p f| voetov irodi v e ta o jia r ovSe Y ap u p eag
rj Tivog, rj t i g ewv, otS a -rrodev |xeTe(3r)v.
Earth and Birth-Goddess, thou who didst bear me and thou who coverest,
farewell; I have accomplished the course between you, and I go, not
discerning whither I shall travel; for I know not either whose or who I am,
or whence I came to you. ( 11.1)
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Yet many o f the “death” epigrams do refer to specific people— famous warriors, a favored
slave, a child, parent, or even a favorite pet. This epigram by Simonides (556-467), for
example, is very specific, and although it makes a statement about the universal lot o f all
mortals, it is hardly distinguishable from what Mackail categorizes as epitaph:

Eapa per aXAoSairfi n e v & e i Kovig- e v be o e
K X e ia d e v e g ,

ttovtco,

[xotp eKixev Oava-rou

IIAa£6p.evov, YXuKepoi) b e peAuppovog oiKahe

vocttod

TlptrAaKeg, ou8’ ixev X lov €7r’ dp.cpipuTr]v.
Strange dust covers thy body, and the lot o f death took thee, O
Cleisthenes, wandering in the Euxine [Black] Sea; and thou didst fail o f
sweet and dear home-coming, nor ever didst reach sea-girt Chios. (11.20)
Perhaps more often than not it is a heavy-handed use o f metaphor, such as afflicts
this epigram by Bianor, a Roman writer o f the early first century CE, that renders, from
Mackail’s perspective, a “death” epigram more o f a commentary on the inevitability o f
death than a simple epitaph.

IlavTa Xapcov atrXiriaTe,

tl tov

veov rjpTraaag ocvrug

’'ArraAov; oh oog; eiqv, Kav {krye YiqpaAeog;
Ever insatiate Charon, why hast thou wantonly taken young Attalus? was
he not thine, even if he had died old? (11.39)
The general tactic o f accusing death for an unseemly eagerness to take possession o f life is
more effectively delivered by this anonymously written epigram, in which the writer “gives
face” to the dead person, who then speaks directly to the reader:
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Karffavov,

aW a

p.evco oe- ptevelg 5e re Kai

a v tiv’ a X k o v

IlavTag opwg #VT}Toug elg ’AiS^g SexeTai.
I died, but I await thee; and thou too shalt await some one else; one Death
receives all mortals alike. (11.52)
And Simonides achieves this same effect in a strangely doubled manner when he places his
epigram in the context o f a dramatic dialogue between father and son.

$fj 7roTe IIpuTOfjiax0^ itaTpog irepi xelpag exovTog,
VjviK’ dip’ l|xepTT|V eirveev TjAuuiriv
Tip/rivopibiq, 7rat56g cpiAou ouitoTe Xrjcrr)
out’

dpenrjv itodewv

outc

oaocppoauvT]v.

Protomachus said, as his father held him in his hands when he was
breathing away his lovely youth, ‘O son o f Timenor, thou wilt never forget
thy dear son, nor cease to long for his valour and his wisdom.’ (11.40)
Rather than invoking the dead to speak from the grave, Simonides embeds the dead
person’s last words in the epigram, creating a masque that would be a poignant one were
it not for the sudden and inappropriate hubris with which it ends. We can understand it,
nevertheless, as an epitaph that would be appreciated (and written) by a proud but griefstricken father. This simultaneous memorialization o f three generations is a “true” epitaph
in Mackail’s own sense o f remembering, not death, but the person who died. More
understated, however, is Simonides’ epitaph celebrating the friendship between Theognis
and Glaucus:
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Ef)|ia 0 eo 7 VL8 og elfii Eivwireog, u |T eired^Kev
rXauKog e-raipeirig d u n ttoXuxpovlod.
I am the monument o f Theognis o f Sinope, over whom Glaucus set me in
guerdon o f their long fellowship. (3.63)
Having the monument itself speak, rather than the deceased or Glaucus, the person who
commissioned the monument, seems a gesture o f humility, as if Glaucus were stepping
discreetly to the side to point to the monument rather than call attention to himself as its
builder. Yet the epitaph is clearly an epigram on fellowship, just as Brotachus’s epitaph is
an epigram on the fragility o f life and unpredictability o f death:
Kpr|g 7eved v B pojaxog TopTuviog evdaSe Keipm
ou Kcrra tout eXdcov, aXXd kcct ep/iropCav.
I Brotachus o f Gortyna, a Cretan, he here, not having come hither for this,
but for traffic. (3.66)
Many o f the epigrams, therefore, whether or not strictly classified as epitaphs by
Mackail, express this general concept o f humans’ vulnerability and death’s inevitability. In
that sense they are reflexive, that is, they extrapolate a universal from a particular
situation. They are a mimesis in Aristotle’s sense o f the actions o f humans. But they are
not self-conscious; there is no evidence that the inscriber is contemplating the vocation o f
the poet nor o f that anxiety a poet might feel over the capacity o f words to express the
truth o f the matter. On the contrary, there is a confidence apparent, even in the
expressions o f despair, that the articulation o f emotion reifies it. In this sense the epigrams
can be regarded as epiphora—metaphorical statements that open up a new topography o f
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human experience, that, were it not experienced through the logos o f the poem, could not
be experienced at all, much less articulated.
The development o f the “technology” o f the prosopopeiaic method marks in
particular this arrival by poets at an unselfconscious approach to Being, the proposal o f an
“I-Thou” relationship. This relationship in turn establishes the ground for a second
encounter with the reader. The Greek lyricists were confident that both encounters could
issue in dialogues that were transparent-both in the particulars o f speech about individuals
(the record o f history) and the extraction o f concepts (the universality o f human
experience). They employed a variety o f prosopopeiaic structures, including tableaus in
which, for example,
•

the dead (individually or in chorus; human or animal) speak

•

the commemorator o f an event speaks

•

the mourner speaks

•

the tomb speaks
Memorials to the famous comprise most o f the first and second type, but there are

many epitaphs spoken in the voice o f the common person, such as this young wife and
mother, who wishes she might have lived longer:
’ApxeXeco pe S a p a p r a IIoXi)^eivT|v, ©eoSeKTon
TTodba Kai a iv o ira d o b g evveite A inpapenqc,
"O aaov e-tr’ toStaiv Kai pr^-repa- ira lS a be Saipan*
e<p$aaev ou5’ aim ov eiKooiv fieXicov
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’OKTtoKoaSeKeTig 8 ’ at>TT| davov, apTi Tenoucra,
a p t i 8e kocl vvpipp, iravToXryoxpoviog.
Name me Polyxena wife o f Archelaus, child o f Theodectes and hapless
Demarete, and a mother as far as the birth-pangs; but fate overtook the
child before full twenty suns, and myself died at eighteen years, just a
mother and just a bride, so brief was all my day. (3.49)
and this by an old man, who wished never to have been bom.

' E|r)KOVTOiJTT]g Aiovuoxog evdaSe net pa i
Tapaevg, pr) 7 fjpag- a id e 8e pirjh’ 6 iranqp.
I Dionysius o f Tarsus lie here at sixty, having never married; and I would
that my father had not. (3.65)
Even animals could be made to express themselves in this way, providing lighthearted
guidance to weary travelers who happened upon the marker:

AapoKpiTO) pev

eyu,

XiYupav ona pouoav dveCiqv

axplg airo -rrrepiryMv, top (3adup cfyop uirvov
AapoKpiTog 8’ eiv’ epol top eoiKOTa Tnp(3ov, oSiTa,
e7 7 ndev ’Opanrou xe^ev atrocpdipeva.
On Democritus would I the grasshopper draw deep sleep when I let loose
shrill music from my wings; and Democritus over me when I was dead
reared this fitting tomb, O wayfarer, nigh to Oropus. (3. 59)
According to Mackail, among the epigrams on death, losing one’s life at sea was
the type “upon which the art o f the epigrammatist lavished its utmost resources”:
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And death at sea had a great horror and anguish attached to it; the
engulfing in darkness, the vain struggles for life, the loss o f burial rites and
all the last offices that can be paid to death, made it none the less terrible
that is was so common. From the Odyssey downward tales o f sea-peril and
shipwreck had the most powerful fascination. (74-75)
Fourteen o f the sixty-seven epigrams in his “Epitaph” section are on this theme and
illustrate several prosopopeiaic structures. The first, in the voice o f the tomb, creates a
nice ambiguity in the meaning o f “husbandman” by imagining the grave (metonymically,
“death”) as both the great leveler and that which finally compels eveiyone, sailor or
farmer, to be a tiller o f the earth:
Nauiryyou Tchpog e lp r 6 6 ’ avTtov ea-n 7ecj)p70\f
cog aX i koci 7odr| £i>vog uireoT’ ’ A'lhiqg.
I am the tomb o f one shipwrecked; and that opposite me, o f a husbandman;
for a common Hades lies beneath sea and earth. (3.17)
On the other hand, some o f these epitaphs simply wish fellow-mariners better luck, even
registering at times a certain indifference toward death:

Ncorri7ou Tacpog elpX' av be irXee- Kca y a p oft' ripelg
coAoped’, a t Aonvai vfjeg eTrovToiropouv.
I am the tomb o f one shipwrecked; but sail thou; for even while we
perished, the other ships sailed on over the sea. (3.19)
Cheerful sentiments, however, are unusual; the overall theme, namely, the baleful
insouciance o f death itself, quickly returns. Callimachus (fl. 250-270), for example, writes:
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Tig £evog, <5 vaw)ye Aeov-rixog evdabe vexpov
eupev eir’ ai/yiaXong, x<«>ae be ra5e tacpw
Aaxpuaag ernKTipov eov (3(ov ovbe 7ap ai)Tog
rjauxog, ai$uir) b la a daXacraoitopel.
What stranger, O shipwrecked man? Leontichus found me here a corpse on
the shore, and heaped this tomb over me, with tears for his own calamito us
life; for neither is he at peace, but flits like a gull over the sea. (3.22)
The strange form o f address at the beginning o f this epitaph has worried commentators,
but Mackail assures us that, although “extremely elliptical,” it is in keeping with
Callimachus’s style (363-64). It begins by addressing the person who died, then reverts
suddenly to the more commonly used form o f the dead person addressing the reader. The
epitaph as a whole, however, is really not about the person who died nor about death at
sea, but is rather a lament by Leontichus over his own misfortune. He feels himself dead
while he lives, and this evokes his empathy for the shipwrecked victim, sorrow for his o wn
life, and the apprehension that his own life, such as it is, will end as well in shipwreck,
both literal and figurative.
This epitaph by Leonidas o f Tarentum (3rd century C.E.), written in first-person,
first narrates the tragedy-at-sea during which Callaeschrus drowned:

Eupou pe Tpnixeta

kgT

alirrjeaaa xaT a^ig

Kai vu£ Kai bvocpeprig Kupxrra iravSimiqg
vE(3Xa\J>,,flpCa)vog- airaXiaftov be (3ioio
KaXXaiaxpog AipuKou peaaa flecov ireXcfyeug141

A rough and steep-down squall out o f the East, and night, and the waves of
the gloomy setting o f Orion were my bane, and I Callaeschrus lost my hold
o f life as I sped through the mid Libyan sea;
He ends by implicating the empty tomb in a deceit practiced upon the reader:

KaYw pev

ttovtw

Siveupevog lx $ u o i Kuppa

o x A e n p a r cpeuarria 8’ ourog eirea-ri Ai$og.
so I am rolled drifting in ocean, to be the prey o f fishes, and this stone says
falsely that it is over me. (3.26)
The reader already knows that an inscription does not refer in any case to a body lying
within; the inscription always is doubly false. It nevertheless makes transparent the
inscription’s purpose, which is not to refer to a specific person but to make a metaphorical
statement that refers to a world o f experience. In Simonides’ uncharacteristically lengthy
treatment o f the same idea, the drama o f the tragedy also comes first, with just the last
two lines again calling attention to the empty tomb.

'Hepi/q Tepaveia,

kockov

Aeirag, axpeAeg TaTpov

TfjAe Kctt eg Xkudecov paKpov opav Tavatv
M^Se ireAag voaeiv EKeipwviKov ol5pa daAaaaing
aYKea vupopevag apcpi MeAovpiaSogNuv 8’ 6 pev ev ttovto Kpuepog veKug- oi 8e Papelav
NauTiAC-qv Keveoi Tf)8e Pocoai Ta<pot.
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Cloudcapt Geraneia, cruel steep, would thou hadst looked on far Ister and
long Scythian Tanais, and not lain nigh the surge o f the Scironian sea by
the ravines o f the snowy Meluriad rock : but now he is a chill corpse in
ocean, and the empty tomb here cries aloud o f his heavy voyage. (3.24)
The speaker in this inscription first addresses the rocks upon which the sailor’s ship
foundered. Then, in a sudden turn, the speaker suggests that it is the tomb that tells this
story and, in so doing, mourns. Simonides, however specific he makes his setting, does not
name the deceased, and it is the mystery o f the pronoun that heightens the absence o f the
deceased. Here, we do not even know who “he” is—-just that a corpse now floats
somewhere in the cold depths.7' The empty tomb, however, has come alive by virtue o f
the inscription.
Prosopopeiaically Proposed Subjects
For both the epitaphs and “death” epigrams, whenever the speaker can not be
identified explicitly as the moumer/writer, the reader quickly assumes that an object has
been made capable o f speech; it has become a subject/addressor (Table 1).
Table 1. Prosopopeiaic creation o f virtual subject-addressor in the sepuchral epigram.
Object/addressor

Proposed Subject/addressor

Deceased (human or animal)

hypothetical deceased

T omb/Monument

hypothesized speaker/person

Alternatively, the addressee often is an object (physical or mental) that is personified
(Table 2).
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Table 2. Prosopopeiaic creation o f virtual subject/addressee in the sepuchral epigram.
Object addressed

Proposed Subject/addressee

deceased (human or animal)

deceased personified

concept o f death

death personified

natural feature

nature personified

animal

animal personified

deity

god personified

In all cases, since the inscription is public, the reader is the always-intended addressee
(Table 3).
Table 3. Encounter o f writer and reader via prosopopeiaically constructed dialogue.
Subject/addressor

Proposed

Intended Subject/addressee

Subject/addressee
Writer

deceased personified

Reader

death personified
object personified
god personified
There also are combinations o f these dialogic structures. This epitaph by Roman
epigrammatist Diodorus, for example, is unusual in that it is a husband’s defense,
supposedly offered by his dead wife, against the rumour that he killed her:

7/Iotw vuKTog ep/rjg a p.e Kexpixpev ouaa Taura
Acava, Kgokutou t’ d|npi7 0 T|T0v uScop,
Outl |T avrjp, o Aeyouai, KaTGKTavev eg 7 ap.ov dAXi^g
TraTtTaivoov

tl

[xanqv onvopa 'Poucpiviog;
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AXXa |i€ Kfjpeg a y o u a i p e p o p p e v a i- ou p l a SriTtoi)

IlauXa TapavTiviq Ka-rdavev (OKupopog.
Bear witness this my stone house o f night that has hidden me, and the wailcircled water o f Cocytus, my husband did not, as men say, kill me, his eyes
set on marriage with another; why should Rufinius have an ill name idly?
but my predestined Fates lead me away; not surely is Paula o f Taretumn the
only one who has died before her day. (3.47)
The category o f the imagined dialogue also utilizes the same technique o f address,
but in the form o f a dialogue that asks questions on behalf o f the reader and then
immediately offers the answer. The interrogator in Epitaph 3.62, for example, queries both
the tomb and the deceased and provides their answers:
TH p’ imo ooi XapC8a g dva-itomeTca; e l tov
toO Kupirpcaou

A p tp p a

ir a i8a X eyeig, u it’ epoL

XapCSa, ti to: vepfte; iroXug okotoq. a l 8’ avoSoi tl;

<pe08og. 6 6e IIXoutuv; pudog- arrcoXopeda.
Does Charidas in truth sleep beneath thee? If thou meanest the son o f
Arimmas o f Cyrene, beneath me. O Charidas, what o f the under world?
Great darkness. And what o f the resurrection? A lie. and Pluto? A fable;
we perish utterly. (3.62)
This form o f epitaph becomes as well an interesting study in the cancellation o f initial
reference, since it is obvious that, if what it articulates is true, Charidas can not answer any
inquiries. There is no ambiguity here, as there can be in epigrams that address the
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deceased directly, about an empirical reference or reference to the world outside the
poem; rather, outside reference is precluded by an explicitly stated philosophical position.
In Ricoeur’s sense, the epigram demonstrates an attempt, at least, to make metaphorical
reference to a general state o f affairs that either does or does not obtain in the world.
An Aesthetic o f Thought and Figure
Mackail includes two epitaphs on the famous battle between the Greeks and the
Persians at Thermopylae (481 B.C. E.) where three-hundred Spartans died fighting against
an overwhelming Persian force. The first is a commemoration o f the event by Parmenio, a
first-century Roman writer:
Tov 7 caT|g k«1 ttovtoi) a p e u p d e ia a ia i KeXeudoig
vaurr)v f|ireipou, ire^oiropov TreXcryoug,
’Ev T piaaalg boparoov eKarovTaatv e o ie y e v ap^g
EirapTiQg- a ia x u v e a d ’ oupea: Kai ireXcfyTn.
Him, who over changed paths o f earth and sea sailed on the mainland and
went afoot upon the deep, Spartan valour held back on three hundred
spears; be ashamed, O mountains and seas. (3.3)
The second is by Simonides:
£elv, aY ^eiX ov A aK ehaipovioig oti Tribe
Keip-efla rolg kcivcov pfjpaai rreidopevoL.
O passer by, tell the Lacedaemonians that we lie here obeying their
orders. (3.4)
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Pannemo celebrates the event by first alluding, via metaphor, to Xerxes’ herculean
achievement o f crossing the Hellespont on pontoons and digging a canal across the Athos
peninsula. Additional figures (“valour” that “held back” the Persians, and the metonymy o f
“three hundred spears,” to represent the Spartan army) contrast that accomplishment with
the miracle o f the Spartans’ defense. He heightens his attribution o f honor to the Spartans
by addressing two natural features that traditionally had prevented a successful invasion by
virtue o f their apparent size and strength, the mountains and the seas. What they could not
do— hold out against the Persian military juggernaut— the Spartans did. (O f course,
Parmenio’s readers knew that the Spartans ultimately succumbed to an overwhelming
force.) The kenning that Parmenio employs is clever: the “changed paths o f earth” he
quickly interprets for the reader in the striking images o f “sailing on the mainland” and
going “afoot upon the deep.” The closing phrase o f “mountains and seas” is an effective
return to the same pretty figures. Although addressing topographical features (mountains
and seas) as representatives o f deity is traditional, staging the address in the form not o f
prayer but o f accusation achieves a certain fresh effect. An argument could be made, on
Ricoeur’s grounds, that the accomplished use o f figures used here do initiate a
“redescription” o f the event at Thermopylae that culminates in the epitaph as a whole;
however, the poverty o f the metaphors tends to defeat the attempt, that is, the figures
already had become cliches, such that they add nothing to a reader’s repertoire o f
understanding the world. They merely justify the commemoration.
In his epitaph upon these same soldiers, Simonides’ also employs prosopopeia, but
rather than addressing the landscape, he has the dead themselves speak to the passers-by
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who chance upon the monument. Their address to the living is pregnant both with
meanings and questions. Whoever would take the message back to their fellow Spartans
(the Lacedaemonians) would find it difficult to paraphrase, for example, “we lie here
obeying your orders” without abandoning its ambiguities. Underlying the entire message is
the question o f whether or not their obedience was truly worth their sacrifice, since they
were betrayed by one o f Thermopylae’s own residents and ultimately failed in their efforts.
Parmenio skillfully uses figures to make a point about a type o f courage already
recognized— the epitaph is a form o f paideia, or perhaps even propaganda. On the other
hand, Simonides uses figure as a cataylst that works upon the liminal structures o f
courage— those thresholds o f bodily experience out o f which individual acts o f courage
arise, the grounds upon which the logos o f courage emerges. In this way it achieves a
redescription o f the world that both articulates and confuses, teaches and confounds,
reveals and withdraws.
Simonides also wrote two epigrams on the battle at Plataea, one for the Athenians
and one for the Spartans. The first is written in the voice o f those who died; the second is
a straightforward announcement:
E l to KaXoiq dvrjaKeiv aperqg pepoq e<m p e 7 icttov
Tip.iv ex TtavTtov tout’ aTteveipe Tux*!'
'E A A a 6 i 7 a p oiteu5ovTeg eX evfteplav tte p id e lvo a

KeCpefl’d^inpavTcp xp^M-evoi euXo7 iT|.
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I f to die nobly is the chief part o f excellence, to us out o f all men Fortune
gave this lot; for hastening to set a crown o f freedom on Hellas, we lie
possessed o f praise that grows not old. (3.1)
The elliptical structure o f the first two lines comprises a wonderfully compacted
logic. It is a definition, but it is not a tautology because the predicate adds information,
enlarging the subject to include o f a new set o f meanings. In one sense, dying nobly is set
out as the greater part o f a set o f values that comprise excellence. To convey this
information is to use a quantitative figure o f possession such that o f the “parts” that
comprise “excellence” (which remains undefined in the epigram), dying nobly is the
largest. Alternatively, or at the same time, the “chief part” can be taken, figuratively
speaking, as a qualitative, rather than quantitative, superiority o f part over part. In a third
sense, the phrase can be understood as a definition in reverse, namely, as a statement that
the most important thing to know about the topic o f excellence is that one should die
nobly. This reverse definition conveys new information as well; dying nobly introduces a
whole world o f dying. Finally, because o f this reverberating interaction o f dying and
achieving excellence, we can see that the “lot” assigned to the fallen soldiers is a double
one that includes two set o f references: one is having died nobly, the other is the
achievement o f excellence. The first reference establishes a real death; the second
establishes a moral reality that is no less real than the perishing o f the physical body. The
third and fourth lines let death lie, but they reserve for the soldiers a deathless honor.
In the second epitaph on the same subject, Simonides doubles the effect o f the
men’s martyrdom:

149

7'A<j(3€cjtov xAeog oibe <piXT) irepl ircapCSi devreg
Kvaveov davaTOu apflefSaXovTO vetpogOi) 5e Tedvaai d a wovTeg, eitei aip’ dp€TT| Kaduirepdev
KuSaivoua’ avaYei btopaTog e£ ’AiSeu.
These men having set a crown o f imperishable glory on their own land
were folded in the dark cloud o f death; yet being dead they have not died,
since from on high their excellence raises them gloriously out o f the house
o f Hades. (3.2)
In this case, having obtained that “chief part o f excellence,” it is they who live eternally,
having been raised out o f Hades, while they have at the same time obtained for their
country an eternal life in the form o f “glory” or fame. This glory nevertheless redounds as
well upon the benefactors, the soldiers. Despite the grim imagery, then, the second epitaph
is sanguine about death and denies its reality. Taken as epiphora, in both epitaphs
Simonides brings alongside his stylized obituary a supplement intended to refer to a new
and different state o f affairs. The first epitaph allows the dead to speak in chorus, and
when they do, they acknowledge a type o f good fortune that turns the tables on the bad
fortune of death itself; yet, death is not denied, and the reader understands that their
acknowledgment is one that only the living can attribute to them. On the other hand, the
second epitaph makes an announcement o f belief. The dead, although said to be alive, are
not present in speech, and somehow their absence makes this credo unbelievable, however
exalted the dead soldiers’ state is said to be. That epitaph which is most a figure is, o f the
two, the epitaph that is most convincing.
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Although it is difficult, then, to maintain a clear distinction between a “pine”
epitaph and what might be called a philosophical epigram or proverb, perhaps there is a
distinction to be made among the epigrams in terms o f what we could call “thinking
poetry” and “poetic thinking.” Thinking poetry I take in Heidegger’s sense, which
Ricoeur seems to affirm, o f the poet’s discovery o f a new cognitive landscape and an
articulation o f a “topology,” that necessarily references both new and old realms o f
experience and lets the truth o f Being appear. As Heidegger writes in his poem “The
Thinker as Poet,”
But poetry that thinks is in truth
the topology o f Being
This topology tells Being the
whereabouts o f its actual
presence. (12)
This thinking “. . . holds to the / coming o f what has been, and / is remembrance” (“The
Thinker as Poet” 10). In contrast, poetic thinking is the use o f style to heighten the effect
o f a conclusion already established in language and tradition. It is vulnerable to “[t]he bad
and thus muddled danger” o f “philosophizing” (“The Thinker as Poet” 8). This distinction
entails an aesthetic criterion that values thoughtful poetry more highly than poetic thinking
because o f its heuristic power to bring humans closer to the horizon o f Being.
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ENDNOTES
1.Fiorillo also claims, however, that Onchi did not consider this “equivalence” as
exhaustive and observes that later in his career Onchi extended his ascription o f “lyrical”
to that art which best captured “the subjective mood.” (Fiorillo, John. “Viewing Japanese
Prints: Koshiro Onchi” 2004. 8 August 2005
<http://spectacle.berkeley.edu/~fiorillo/texts/sosakutexts/sosaku_pages/onchi3.html>
My thanks to Dr. Donald Poochigian, Department o f Philosophy, University o f North
Dakota, for this reference.
2. Although on Riffaterre’s premises the second reading indeed should be considered
“semiotic,” I note in Chapter Two that RifFaterre calls this reading “hermeneutic,” thus
raising the question o f whether he is equivocating on the meaning o f this term in its
possible contexts o f “meaning” and “understanding.”
3 . 1 capitalize Lyric when using it as a noun that refers to it as a subcategory o f the genre
o f poetry.
4. According to Jaeger, the idea o f art-for-art’s-sake “does not appear in the great Greek
poets” (35). The third chapter, therefore, o f “Book One: Archaic Greece,” in his Paideia:
the Ideals o f Greek Culture, bears the title “Homer the Educator.” “Hesiod’s
contemporaries viewed Homer primarily as a teacher,” he claims, and “Hesiod is a poet
because he is a teacher” (74).
5. Because the earliest known inscription in Greek is an hexameter line on a wine jug
dated approximately 740 B.C.E., Havelock places the final development o f writing using
the Greek alphabet at approximately 700 B.C.E. He also argues that the line on this vase
may have been inscribed considerably later than the vase was made (15). The line reads
“who now o f all dancers sports most playfully,” and may have commemorated a dance
contest for which the vase was a prize (Havelock 193).
6. Havelock borrows this term from Berkley Peabody in his review o f Peabody’s The
Winged Word.
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7. According to William Harris, for example, ancient Greece inherited Mycenaean values
centered on a strict warrior code o f honor, as subsequently reflected in Homer. By the
time o f Archilochus, however, these values had been destabilized, and the interests and
values o f the merchant class were exerting an influence on public morality (38-40). On the
other hand, Archilochus is equally well known for a poem that, in legend at any rate,
contained such malicious invective that it induced the person it was directed against to
commit suicide.
8. These dates are derived from Havelock, particularly from his essay entitled “The
Character and Content o f the Code,” where he provides a brief review o f the “course o f
Greek literature” (146-147).
9. Even in Riffaterre’s rigorous method, however, there remains a place for a musical
analogy for this semiotic process, namely, “theme and variation,” with one significant
difference. In musical composition the theme is prominently announced first, making it a
transparent point o f comparison, while in Lyric the theme (matrix) may very well remain
unstated {Semiotics 26).Variations, on the other hand, are made visible and “marked” as
ungrammaticalities, destined for recognition in the second and subsequent hermeneutic
readings as equivalent: “The text is in effect a variation or modulation o f one
structure— thematic, symbolic, or whatever— and this sustained relation to one structure
constitutes the significance” {Semiotics 6).
10. De Man probably uses “Slavic” to include the Prague School o f structuralism and
Russian Formalism as influences upon Riffaterre. In his entry in The John Hopkins Guide
to Literary Theory, Lubomir Dolezel claims that the Prague School actually “preempts
much o f the poststructuralist technique.” Among its characteristic themes, according to
Dolezel, is the contention that “[tjhanks to its empirical character, Prague school
epistemology was able to overcome the postpositivistic split between sciences o f nature
{Naturwissenschaften) and human sciences ( Geisteswissenschaften).”
11. A poem’s complete explication, although theoretically possible because it is derived
from a finite number o f texts, is virtually unattainable for a single reader, who becomes
involved in a recursive process o f re-interpretation, “a kind o f semiotic circularity”
{Semiotics 166).
12. De Man makes this claim on logical grounds, which o f course catches him in his own
net, since any claim that he makes must, by definition, already be infected by metaphor.
13. Unfortunately this prayer to Aphrodite is the only extant complete poem by Sappho:
TTOiKiAodpov' ddavctT AippoSiTa
irat Aioo SoAottAokc, ACaaopaC oe,
pi) p’ a a a ta e pr|5' oviaiai 6apva,
•rcoTvia, 60poi<,
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aXXa tui8 eXd' , at itOTa Ka-repaTa
t da epaa au8aa oaotaa irrjXoi
eitXuea, ird-rpoo Se Sopov Xiitoiaa
xpuaiov rjdeo
ap p ’ u ira c ^ v fa ia a - KaXoi b e a ’ a y o v
UKeea OTpoudot itepl y a a peXaiva a
■nvKva SivvevTeo i n e p air’ lipavcoftepoa 8ia peaaco,

alipa 5’ e^LKOVTO' au 8’ u pckaipa,
peiA aiaaia diSavdiu irpoacoitco
ripe’ o m 8t)ut6 ireirovda kmttl
8-qirre KaXiqppi,
kutti p o i p a X iu ta deAco

yeveadai

p a iv o X a ftvpor T tva 8t)ut€ ireu'Jai
dip a ’ a 7 T|v e a £av ipiXoTaTa; tlo a ’, u
$ d in p ’ , a8KT|ei;
Kai. ^ dp a i ip e ^ e i , ra x e w a 8iw£eia t 8e 8<5pa pr) SeKe-f , aX X a S u a ei/
a l be pr| ipuXei, Taxecoo ipiXi^aei
kcouk eO eX oiaa
eXOe p ot Kal viiv, xa X eira v be: X v o o v
eK p e p ip y a u , o a a a b e p ot -reXeaaai
Ovpoa ipeppei., T eX eaov a v 8’ airra
a u p p a x o a eaao.
Omate-throned immortal Aphrodite,
wile-weaving daughter o f Zeus, 1 entreat you;
do not overpower my heart, mistress, with
ache and anguish,
but come here, i f ever in the past
you heard my voice from afar and acquiesced
and came, leaving your father’s golden house, with
chariot yoked: beautiful swift sparrows
whirring fast-beating wings brought you
above the dark earth down from heaven
through the mid-air and soon they arrived;
and you, blessed one, with a smile on your immortal face
asked what was the matter with me this time
and why I was calling this time
and what in my maddened heart I most wished to happen for myself:
“Who am I to persuade this time to lead you back to her love?
Who wrongs you, Sappho? If she runs away, soon she shall pursue;
i f she does not accept gifts, why she shall give them instead;
and if she does not love, soon she shall love even against her w ill.”
Come to me now again and deliver me from oppressive anxieties;
fulfil all that my heart longs to fulfil,
and you yourself be my fellowfighter. (Campbell 53) (versification added)

14. In his introduction to Bamstone’s Greek Lyric Poetry, William McCulloh argues that
the first line o f the couplet would have been a proper hexameter, with the second line
substituting a spondee after the third and sixth foot.
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15. All epigrams are taken from Mackail’s Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology.
Mackail numbers the epigrams in Roman numerals and his translations in Arabic numerals.
For the sake o f convenience, I follow the Arabic system assigned to the translations.
16. For example, Mimnemus’ 'H fia fioi, (p'lXe &vp€' r a x ocXX ol e a o u r a i /
avdpeq, e y a 8e docp&v ycrta p eX cttv e a o p a l. [Be young, dear my s o u l: soon will
others be men, and I being dead shall be dark earth.] (Mackail, Select Epigrams 12.6).
17. This inverse relationship o f connotative value between matrix and poem, where the
matrix is expanded in the poem into a reverse-image o f itself, is an element in keeping with
Riffaterre’s theory as a whole, and is examined later in the chapter.
18. My thanks to Prof. Michael Beard for pointing out that Edward Said makes a similar
point in Beginnings (1975): “[0]ne cannot have recourse [in structuralist practice] to a
direct unfolding (as in the Enfaltung o f hermeneutical interpretation) o f the kernel o f
meaning within a statem ent. . . . ” (327).
19. Neither Riffaterre or de Man call attention to the cultural dialogue figured in the
transformation o f the old cities’ chimes, which faithfully ring the hours o f the bourgeois
working day, into the fanciful form o f an elfin Andalusian dancer. Hugo certainly gives it a
prominent role in his initial address to Flanders, “where the benumbed North warms itself
in the sun o f Castille and mates with the South.” This dimension o f the poem warrants
inclusion in any full explication o f the poem.
20. According to Kristeva, with the arrival o f Nerval, Lautreamont, and Mallarme, poetry
“became a practice involving the subject’s dialectical state in language” that was “the end
o f poetry as delirium . . . [or] literature as an attempted submission to the logical order”
{Revolution 82). Kristeva here characterizes the subject’s attempt to be fully rational as a
self-subversive form o f irrationality.
21. Kristeva offers only a general example o f this diachronic phenomenon but one that is
pertinent to Greek poetry: “the Pindaric obscurity that followed Homeric clarity and
community” {Revolution 15). Clarity is valued when the symbolic order has been
established; nothing must be found that escapes its thesis, and obscurity would threaten
this linguistic surveillance. In this passage, however, it is possible that Kristeva uses clarity
in her sense o f the unalloyed signification in language o f the semiotic chora and obscurity
in the pejorative sense o f a delirium produced by an overbearing reason {Revolution 82).
Unfortunately, she offers no further comment.
22. Kristeva argues, for example, that theology attempts to foreclose semiosis and attain
to a thesis wholly conformable to the symbolic {Revolution 80). Maritain, on the other
hand, uses both mystical and moral experience as analogues to the experience o f creative
intuition (235, 236-7n).
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23. This imperative is found in other epigrams, such as Callimachus’ “say not that the
good die” (Mackail, Selections, Sect. 3, LXVII).
24. According to Elizabeth Nitchie, the second line o f an earlier version o f the epigram
read “Ere thy new light had fled.” She speculates that “there was a later manuscript
showing ‘new’ as the result o f further thought and revision. The repetition in the original
Greek o f the verb (eXap.Ttea . . . Xd(jnreig) tends to support the repetition o f the
adjective in the paraphrase” (277).
25. I f the intended incompatibility o f codes is not recognized, a simple misunderstanding
occurs that ruins the joke and cancels communication.
26. In their articulations o f the “intentional fallacy,” New Critics made it axiomatic that
speculation about authorial intention was illegitimate, and in this sense they anticipated
what also can be recognized in structuralism as a move toward reader-response criticism.
Their metaphor o f a poem as an icon or, in T. S. Eliot’s phrase, as an “objective
correlative” o f the poet’s experience, however, leaves them in the realm o f hermeneutics
rather than structuralism and does not diminish for them the author’s importance and
presence. Structuralists and post-structuralists, on the other hand, are inclined to invert the
relationship between author and text. Thus Foucault, for example, can redefine author
merely as “a certain functional principle” involved in the dissemination o f meanings (35253). '
27. “Because the subject is always both semiotic and symbolic, no signifying system he
produces can be either ‘exclusively’ semiotic or ‘exclusively’ symbolic, and is instead
necessarily marked by an indebtedness to both” {Revolution 24).
28. Even the majority o f epigrams categorized under “Life” in Mackail’s Selections are in
the temper of, for example, Palladus’s IIoXXo: X aX elc av $ p o n te,
5e T i$r|
p e r a [iiKpov o iy a , m l peXeTa fyov e t i tov davaTOV.” [You talk much, O Man,
and after a little while lie in the earth; / be silent, and while living, think on death.]
(Mackail, Selections, Sect. 12, XLVII) or, in the wry vein o f Julianus Aegyptius’
“IIoXXaKi pev to6 ’ a e i a a , m l ex Tupfyou be (3of|(r m v e te , irpiv toutt]v
dp-rufyaXiriade kuviv.” [I often sang it, and even from the grave will cry it: “Drink,
before you put on the clothes o f death”] (12.12).
29. Kristeva also uses an analogy o f “internal” music: “[T]he space underlying the written
is rhythmic, unfettered, irreducible to its intelligible verbal translation; it is musical,
anterior to judgment, but restrained by a single guarantee: syntax,” and she claims that
Mallarme expresses his notion o f the “mystery o f literature” in this manner {Revolution
29).
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30. Campbell notes that Sapphic authorship o f this fragment is disputed as well as its
arrangement in four, rather than two, lines (173).
31. From the essay “Words,” in On the Way to Language (1971), translation by Joan
Stambough.
32. The complete title o f the dialogue is “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese
and an Inquirer.” According to the translator, Peter D. Hertz, the dialogue was written on
the occasion o f a visit by Professor Tuzuka o f the Imperial University, Tokyo, in 1953 or
1954(199).
33. George Steiner observes that for Heidegger the only real question for philosophy is the
one Leibnitz first posed as: Why is there something rather than nothing? Heidegger frames
it in his own terminology as: “What is the Being \das Sein] which renders possible all
being [das Seiende]?” (35).
34. Krell notes Heidegger’s claim that the forms “to ov” and “to: ovTa,” were derived
from the ancient Ionian and Aeolian forms “to eov” and “t eovTa.” Liddell and Scott
translate them respectively as “Being” and “the world o f things” (7).
35. According to Werner Brock, this recognition o f temporality can be understood as the
production o f time: “Whenever the understanding [Heidegger’s ‘running-forward-inthought-to . . . ’] projects its potentiality from the matter o f its care, Time is produced by
rendering it present, while the ‘moment’ arises from the authentic fiiture” (82).
36. According to Krell, Heidegger, in his quotation o f the Diels-Kranz translation, changes
the semicolon that appears at the end o f the last phrase to a colon (80).
37. Heidegger’s conception o f the “saying” that “disappears immediately” is dangerously
close to silence, and, as we shall “hear” in Heidegger’s exegeses o f the poetry o f
Holderlin, it is this very threat o f not being able to “say” at all or, alternatively, to speak to
an audience who hears nothing, that confronts the true poet.
38. In his essay “On the Essence o f Truth,” Heidegger emphasizes once again that
concealment is the necessary attendant condition to the disclosure o f ’ AXri’& eux, even
arguing that the term is derived from X c tv d a veiv (to escape notice) (Brock 129).
39. Steiner adds that “memoration” is, from Heidegger’s point o f view, a “prelogicaf’phenomenon (129-130).
40. These four essays were published together in English translation in Existence and
Being (1949) along with an extensive introduction by Werner Brock.
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41. The major essays (largely drawn from lectures and addresses) are “Holderlin and the
Essence o f Poetry” (1936), “Remembrance o f the Poet” (1943), “What Are Poets For”
(1946), “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . .
(1951), “Language in the Poem” (1953), and
“Words” (1958).
42. N ot unexpectedly, Heidegger judges that Rilke does not quite rise to Holderlin’s
standard, although he concedes there are instances o f “valid” poetry among his works,
which he faithfully points out in the body o f the essay {Poetry, Language 96-98).
43. Where Heidegger has not provided the specific lines o f a poem to which he refers, I
cite page numbers, as well as stanza and line numbers o f the poems when appropriate, in
Michael Hamburger’s 1967 bilingual edition o f selected poems by Holderlin.
44. “According to Heidegger, he [Holderlin] meditates on the “Holy” just as the true
philosopher meditates upon “Being” (Brock 121-22).
45. Heidegger assumes that the poem is autobiographical, pointing out that Holderlin in
the spring o f 1801 made such a journey “back over the Bodensee from the Thurgau town
o f Hauptwyl near Konstanz to his home in Swabia” {Existence and Being 243).
46. In his essay “Words,” Heidegger relates the notion o f “singing” to what he has
described in Early Greek Thinking as X e y e iv ‘Saying’: “Singing is the gathering o f
Saying in song. If we fail to understand the lofty meaning o f song as Saying, it becomes
the retroactive setting to music o f what is spoken and written” {On the Way 148).
47. Michael Hamburger’s translation, however, would vitiate Heidegger’s interpretation o f
this line. He takes the pronoun others to refer to cares rather than to the people o f the
homeland: “Whether he likes it or not, and often, a singer must harbour / Cares like these
in his soul; not, though, the wrong sort o f cares” (261).
48. In “The Nature o f Language,” Heidegger asks, “What is it that the poet reaches?” and
answers, “Not mere knowledge. He obtains entrance into the relation o f word to thing. . . .
The word itself is the relation which in each instance retains the thing within itself in such
a manner that it ‘is’ a thing” (On the Way 66).
49. The complete first line, from which the title is taken, is “In lovely blueness with its
metal ro o f the steeple blossoms. ‘In lieblicher Blaue bluhet mit dem metallenenen Dache
der Kirchthurm. ’ (Hamburger 600). Heidegger comments only in passing that “it [the
poem] comes to us by a curious route” (213). Michael Hamburger explains further that the
poem first appears in Wilhelm Waiblinger’s novel Phaeton (1823). Since Waiblinger (also
a poet) spent considerable time with Holderlin, and apparently had access to some o f
Holderlin’s unpublished manuscripts, Hamburger speculates that Waiblinger indeed may
have adapted the poem “from one or more poems given to him by Holderlin and now lost,
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possibly adding and omitting passages in the process” (612-13). Hamburger formats it as a
prose-poem; it appears in verse form in Poetry, Language, Thought.
50. Heidegger’s parenthetical references are citations o f a German edition o f Holderlin’s
works published by Propylaen-Verlag, Berlin, 1914 ( Existence and Being 232).
51. Hamburger translates Gesprach as “discourse” (438).
52. According to Hamburger, Holderlin’s “madness” dates from 1806, when he was
admitted to a clinic in Tubingen. He was later placed under foster care and apparently
lived there in relative tranquility until his death, occasionally writing poetry. “In Lovely
Blueness . . is from this period (16).
53. The essay was first presented as a lecture in 1951, then published in Vortrdge und
Aufsatze in 1954 (Hofstadter xxiv).
54. Steiner comments that according to Heidegger, “The nerve o f poetry is the act o f
nomination.. . . The underlying motif here, familiar to Pietist thought, is o f Adam’s
nomination in the Garden o f every living thing” (145).
55. De Man notes that even in Friedrich Beissner’s critical edition o f Holderlin’s works,
accepted as the most authoritative collection to date, there remain unresolved questions
about the exact texts o f some important poems (248).
56. Rule o f Metaphor is based on a seminar held at the University o f Toronto in 1971 (3).
Its French title is La Metaphore Vive', however, translator Robert Czerny chose to use a
certain “metaphorical suggestiveness” in his translation o f the title that he hoped would
convey Ricoeur’s sense o f metaphor as both following rules o f language and itself ruling a
certain domain o f language, as well as Ricoeur’s frequent recollection o f Aristotle’s
maxim that the touchstone o f genius in poetry and rhetoric is the mastery o f metaphor
(“Translator’s Introduction” vii).
57. The context for Aristotle’s quotation is the Odyssey (XIV, 213). Odysseus, disguised
as a beggar, says to his swineherd: “I think that, looking on the stubble, you will recognize
my former strength . . . . ”
58. Aristotle also takes up this topic in Poetics, 1457 b 7.
59. After commenting in Poetics (1459a) that the “token o f genius” in a writer is knowing
how to use metaphor, Aristotle writes, “to y a p ev peracpepeiv to to opoiov
decopelv eoTtv.” Since English does not have an infinitive form o f metaphor, the
translator must use a phrase such as “the right use o f metaphor . . .” The phrase occurs
also in the Rhetoric (1412a): “A el 8e peTaipeireiv, K adarrep e ip e T a i irpOTeirpov,
airo oiKeitov Kai p r| tpavepcov, . . . . ” The Loeb translation avoids the infinitive:
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“As we have said before, metaphor should be drawn from objects which are proper to the
object, but not too obvious;. . . ( 4 0 7 ) .
60. Poetics 1457 b 7: M ercopopa 5e e o n v o uoparog ocXXorpiov errupopot rj onto
rod yevo vq eiri edog rj onto t o v eldovg . . . . “Metaphor is the application o f a strange
term either transferred from the genus and applied to the species......... ” (81).
61. This means that Saussure, for example, erred in treating language as a system
composed entirely o f signs. More accurate, according to Ricoeur, is the distinction Emile
Benveniste makes in Problems o f General Linguistics between semiotics and
semantics—that semiotics has to do with the elements o f a sentence (signs) whereas
semantics has to do with units o f language (beginning with the sentence) (69).
62. According to Ricoeur, Fontanier unfortunately inherited and then bequeathed a
conception o f language that nouns can somehow bestow names. I. A. Richards, among
other rhetoricians, has since demonstrated that nouns do not carry a “proper” or “real”
meaning; they derive meaning from context. It is at the sentence level that reference is
achieved: words sign, sentences refer (76).
63. Ricoeur notes in this context Monroe Beardsley’s affirmation in his Aesthetics (1958)
that when a new metaphor is used “something develops in the language” (97). Following
Beardsley, we can say that a new metaphor is “a semantic innovation without status in the
language as something already established with respect to either designation or
connotation” (98).
64. According to Ricoeur, this in the end is what separates the followers o f Saussure from
the followers of “Carnap, Wittgenstein, and so on, for whom semantics is fundamentally
the analysis o f the relationships between signs and the things denoted” (124).
65. Ricoeur in fact suggests that rather than metaphor, “metonymy— one name for another
name— remains a semiotic process, perhaps even the substitutive phenomenon par
excellence in the realm o f signs. Metaphor— unusual attribution— is a semantic process, in
the sense o f Benveniste, perhaps even the genetic phenomenon par excellence in the realm
o f the instance o f discourse” (198).
66. Ricoeur notes that both Benveniste and Frege hold that “semiotics is an abstraction
from semantics, which relates the internal constitution o f the sign to the transcendent aims
o f reference” (137). Semiotics is “subordinate” to semantics in that “the sign owes its very
meaning as sign to is usage in discourse” (137) Ricoeur does concede, however, that at
least for Frege, the sense/reference schema nevertheless “applies only to scientific
statements, and seems quite clearly to be denied to poetic statements” (220).
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67. Here we can recall (from Chapter One) Eric Havelock’s comment that mythos is “is
displayed at a second ‘diachronoic level’ o f the memory; the song [text] is a ‘feedback’”
(Havelock 157).
68. Ricoeur’s reference to “a world” as opposed to “the world” should not, I believe, be
taken as an allusion to “possible worlds” but rather in its ordinary sense o f “the world” o f
space and time. The thrust o f his argument, in The Rule o f Metaphor at least, reaches
only to a claim that mimesis reminds readers o f their own experience as physical and
historical human beings.
69. Ricoeur, however, is not willing to go as far as Nelson Goodman, for example, who in
Languages ofA rt contends that “[i]n aesthetic experience the emotions function
cognitively.” (qtd. in Ricoeur 231). While Goodman places metaphor in a generalized
theory o f denotation, Ricoeur insists there are relevant and helpful distinctions to be made
in terms o f the “rightness” o f descriptions and the redescriptions o f art (Ricoeur 239).
70. The Palatine Anthology, for example, included 750 “sepulchral” epigrams, in contrast
to 380 “amatory” epigrams and 358 “dedicatory” epigrams (Mackail 7).
71. Bergk, for example, argues that this epitaph should be combined with another two-line
epitaph in the Palatine Anthology (vii.511), also attributed to Simonides, that would
provide a name. Mackail, on the other hand, believes this merger doesn’t work, adding
that in many cases the names o f the persons memorialized in the epitaph were inscribed
apart from the epitaphs themselves (Mackail 364).
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